alternative investments | Pension360

Report: Maryland Fund’s Below-Median Returns Coincide With Shift to Alternatives

The Maryland State Retirement and Pension System experienced a 14 percent return in the 2013-14 fiscal year. The fund’s then-Chief Investment Officer, Melissa Moye, touted the returns as “strong” – but a new report suggests not only that those returns were below-median level, but also that they were driven by a shift in investment strategy that put more money in alternative investments.

From David Sirota at the International Business Times:

According to [report authors] Walters and Hooke, a former Lehman Brothers executive, that shift [of assets to Wall Street] coincided with below-median returns for Maryland’s public pension system.

“Ironically, as the fund’s relative performance has declined, its Wall Street money management fees have risen,” the report says. “In fiscal year 2014 alone, the Maryland state pension fund paid out roughly $300 million in fees to Wall Street money managers. Over the past 10 years, these money management fees amounted to over $1.5 billion, according to the fund’s annual financial reports. Nevertheless this high-priced advice resulted in 10-year returns that were $3.22 billion (net of fees) below the median.”

If the fund had matched medianreturns for public pension systems across the country, “the state could have awarded 80,000 poor children with $40,000 four-year college scholarships,” Hooke and Walters wrote.

Maryland’s shift into alternative investments happened while the securities and investment industries made more than $292,000 worth of campaign contributions to Democratic Gov. Martin O’Malley, who appoints some members of the Maryland pension system’s board of trustees. Vice News has reported that the Private Equity Growth Capital Group is a financial backer of a 501(c)4 group co-founded by O’Malley. In May, Pensions and Investments magazine reported that the Maryland governor appointed a managing director of an alternative investment firm called The Rock Creek Group to head a state task force on retirement policy.

Meanwhile, the chief investment officer of Maryland’s pension system was recently appointed to a senior position in the U.S. Treasury Department overseeing public pension policy.

“Eliminating active managers, selling alternative investments, and adopting indexing for 90 percent of the state’s portfolio would ensure median performance,” his report concludes. “These actions would also save the state huge amounts in money management fees.”

Hooke has testified in front of lawmakers advocating the increased use of index funds in pension investments – a strategy that would have worked well the last 4 or 5 years, but one that offers little protection against market contractions.

Since 2008, Maryland has more than doubled its investments in private equity, real estate and hedge funds. Those asset classes made up 29 percent of its portfolio in 2013.

Denmark Funds Ramp Up Alternative Investments

New government rules have led to a transformation in the asset allocation of Danish pension funds. Among the changes: more investments in alternatives. Reported by Reuters:

Pension funds in Denmark have had to gradually adapt to new solvency rules introduced by the Danish Financial Services Authority (FSA) since 2007, leading them to drop guarantees and take on more risk by investing in higher-yielding “alternative” assets, such as infrastructure projects, real estate and private equity funds.

Denmark’s top pension funds had on average invested 7 percent of their assets in alternative investments, excluding properties, by the end of 2012, the latest for which the Danish Financial Services Authority (FSA) has data for.

Out of the 152 billion Danish crowns ($26.4 billion) that the top funds had invested in alternative assets by end-2012, 59 billion crowns were in private equity funds, 44 billion in credit, 20 billion in infrastructure, 16 billion in agriculture and 13 billion in hedge funds.

As noted above, the average Denmark fund held 7 percent of their assets in alternatives in 2012.

The average U.S. fund holds 6.5 percent of its assets in alternatives, according to 2009 data from the Public Plans Database.

San Francisco Fund Delays Hedge Fund Investments Again

The San Francisco City & County Employees’ Retirement System (SFCCERS) decided earlier this summer to invest 15 percent of its assets in hedge funds. But the fund has never invested in hedge funds before – and some board members aren’t on board with the plan in its current form.

So, for the second time in three months, the board delayed a vote on the hedge fund investments. From FinAlternatives:

The $20.6 billion public pension delayed a vote on a planned $3 billion hedge-fund allocation for the second time last week, Pensions & Investments reports. The board first put off a vote in June.

The planned alternative investments allocation has become a source of contention at the San Francisco fund. Board member Herb Meiberger has vocally opposed it, going so far as to seek—and win—the support of Berkshire Hathaway chief Warren Buffett, who urged the pension to use index funds rather than hedge funds.

Meiberger remains the only board member in certain opposition. But the other board members appeared open to joining him, as well as to supporting Chief Investment Officer William Coaker, who has championed the plan. Coaker presented a detailed report to the board on Wednesday, but his fellow members demanded still more information before voting to table the matter for another 90 days.

The key issue for board members seems to be the specific allocation of the money. Board members wanted to know, specifically, what hedge funds were to be invested in. But that information wasn’t available.

The board will vote again in early December.

Photo by Kevin Cole via Flickr CC License

New York Retirement System Is Prepared To Increase Its Allocation to Hedge Funds, Alternatives

CalPERS is running away from hedge funds, but, as Pension360 has covered in the past, most pension funds aren’t following. In fact, some are running in the opposite direction.

Case in point: the New York State and Local Retirement System (NYSLRS). The fund hasn’t made any decisions yet, but it is open to the possibility of expanding its allocation in hedge funds and other complex investments. From Public Sector Inc:

A bill passed by the New York State Senate and Assembly at the end of their session in June would expand, to 30 percent from 25 percent, the share of pension fund investments that can be allocated in “baskets” of assets not otherwise specifically permitted by law. These include hedge funds and private equity funds, which involve more complex financial risks and are more difficult to value and monitor than traditional stocks and bonds. The change has been supported in the past by Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, NYSLRS’ sole trustee, although the lobbying effort for the bill this year appears to have been spearheaded by the New York City pension funds.

The bigger-basket pension bill hasn’t yet been sent to Governor Andrew Cuomo for his signature. If his approval or veto message contains so much as a single sentence’s worth of substantive explanation, it will exceed the sum total of all public comment devoted to the subject by state lawmakers this year. (The issue has also gone virtually unnoticed by State Capitol news media.)

In fiscal 2007, when DiNapoli became comptroller, NYSLRS paid out $162 million of investment management fees, including $27 million for alternative investments. By fiscal 2013, the latest year for which data are available, investment fees had risen to $454 million, including $163 million in the “absolute return” category alone, which includes hedge funds.

The NYSLRS has ramped up its allocation towards alternative investments in recent years. It the fund’s official investment policy is any indication, it is planning on devoting an even higher percentage of its assets towards such investments. From Public Sector Inc:

Total NYSLRS assets in the alternative category came to 11.8 percent last year, including 3.2 percent invested in absolute return strategies. However, according to its annual report, the fund’s long-term goal is to increase its alternative allocation to 21 percent, including 10 percent in private equity and 4 percent in absolute return assets including hedge funds, plus 4 percent in the newer category of “opportunistic” investments and 3 percent in “real assets” including commodities, infrastructure and timberland meant to create “inflation hedging strategies,” the annual report said.

The pension funds also announced recently a partnership with Goldman Sachs. Sachs will receive $2 billion to manage.

Is New Jersey Fudging Its Pension Fund Results to Defuse a Christie Scandal?

Over at Naked Capitalism, Yves Smith has written a great post looking deeper into New Jersey’s pension fund return data, which was revised upward last week. Yves asks the question: Did New Jersey artificially increase the value of its pension fund’s alternative investments to ward off mounting criticism of the fund?

This article was originally posted at NakedCapitalism.com

Is New Jersey Fudging Its Pension Fund Results to Defuse a Christie Scandal?

By Yves Smith

You cannot make stuff like this up. New Jersey, in its attempt to diffuse a pension fund scandal that implicates Chris Christie (it roused him to respond in public), looks to have committed the classic crisis management blunder of a cover-up worse than the original crime.

International Business Times reporter David Sirota has been putting questionable relationships between state pension funds and Wall Street under the hot lights. One of the objects of his scrutiny has been the New Jersey pension fund, which is seriously underfunded. A recent tally puts it at number 43 out of 50 states in the level of its pension funding, with only 60% of its commitments funded. The New Jersey shortfall is the result of a series of classic blunders, starting with a decision to starve the pension system in the 1990s under governor Christine Todd Whitman.

New Jersey dug its hole even deeper during the crisis, by taking risky bets right before the markets unraveled, including investing in Lehman shortly before its collapse.

This bad situation was made worse under Christie. As we wrote in 2011:

A more accurate rendition would be that, at least in New Jersey, the state has been raiding the pension kitty for over 15 years. This is not news to anyone who has been paying attention, any more than underfunding of corporate pensions. In the Garden State’s case, Governor Chris Christie skipped the required $3.1 billion pension fund contribution last year. He claimed this move was to force reform, but what impact does another $3.1 billion failure to pay have on an unfunded liability that was already over $50 billion?

Fast forward to the Sirota investigation. Sirota showed how Christie shifted fund allocations to managers of “alternative assets” like hedge funds and private equity funds, which charge vastly more in the way of fees than simple stock and bond funds. It should be no surprise that hedge and private fund managers are heavyweight political donors. The result was more fees to the managers and underperformance for New Jersey. As Sirota wrote:

Gov. Chris Christie’s administration openly acknowledged that more New Jersey taxpayer dollars were going to land in the coffers of major financial institutions. It was 2010, and Christie had just installed a longtime private equity executive, Robert Grady, to manage the state’s pension money. Grady promoted a plan to put more of those funds into riskier investments managed by Wall Street firms. Though this would entail higher fees, Grady said the strategy would “maximize returns while appropriately managing risk.”

Four years later, New Jersey has secured only half the promised results. The state has sent more pension money to big-name Wall Street firms like Blackstone, Third Point, Omega Advisors, Elliott Associates and Grady’s old firm, The Carlyle Group. Additionally, the amount of fees the state pays financial managers has more than tripled since Christie assumed office. New Jersey is now one of America’s largest investors in hedge funds.

The “maximized returns” have yet to materialize… Had New Jersey’s pension system simply matched the median rate of return, the state would have reaped roughly $3.8 billion more than it did between fiscal years 2011 and 2014, says pension consultant Chris Tobe.

Unfortunately, it is all too common for pension fund systems to swing for the fences when they are in trouble and commit even more money to supposedly higher return investment approaches like private equity. In fact, due to too much money flooding into these strategies, returns for both hedge funds and private equity funds have generally lagged stock market returns in the post-crisis period.

On top of that, New Jersey’s authorized allocation to alternative investments is a full one third, a stunningly high level. Even CalPERS, a long-standing investor in alternatives, has less than half that level committed to these strategies.

But in New Jersey’s case, there’s even more reason than usual to doubt that the motivation for the shift to riskier investments was due to desperation to catch up, as opposed to rank corruption. After all, Christie’s professed strategy has been to worsen the crisis at the pension fund. What better way to achieve that result than to invest the money indifferently in high fee strategies, and get the side benefit of currying favor with extremely well-heeled donors?

Now, under heat for the suspicious-looking shift to Wall Street firms combined with embarrassing underperformance, New Jersey is suddenly reporting higher results as if no one would notice the change. On Friday, Sirota published a new scoop: New Jersey is now saying its pension fund returns for 2013 are a full 1% higher than previously announced. As Sirota writes:

Facing an ethics complaint after disclosures of the state’s below-market pension investment returns, Gov. Chris Christie’s top economic officials defended themselves by declaring that they delivered 16.9 percent returns in fiscal year 2014. Yet only weeks ago, the Christie administration reported the returns were 15.9 percent — lower by more than $700 million.

The discrepancy surfaces amid intensifying criticism of the Christie administration’s decision to triple the amount of pension money invested in high-fee private equity, venture capital, hedge fund, real estate and other “alternative investment” firms — many of whose employees have made financial contributions to Republican organizations backing Christie’s election campaigns.

In an op-ed published in the Newark Star-Ledger on Friday, the two top officials of New Jersey’s State Investment Council, Robert Grady and Thomas Byrne, criticized the investment strategy proposed by investors such as Warren Buffett, who say pension money should be primarily in stock index funds, not in alternative investments. Defending New Jersey’s $20 billion bet on alternatives, Grady and Byrne declared that “in the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014, the pension fund achieved a return of 16.9%.”

A return of 16.9 percent would still trail median public pension returns.

“The July 22 release says the fund produced returns of 15.9, according to preliminary data compiled as of June 30, 2014. Now final audited results showed the fund returned 16.9 percent,” Christopher Santarelli, from the New Jersey Department of Treasury, told International Business Times in response to a request for comment about the differing numbers.

This sort of revision is unheard of. Remember, even with New Jersey, over 2/3 of pension fund assets are invested in stocks and bonds. Those valuations are unambiguous. Similarly, hedge funds are required to provide valuations (so-called “net asset values”) monthly, with those figures verified by third party appraisal firms. The stock, bond, and hedge fund results come in shortly after month-end; there’s no basis for revision after the fact (put it another way: a change in valuation for any of these types of funds, even if favorable, would warrant withdrawing funds as soon as possible, because it would be proof of serious deficiencies in controls and accounting at the fund manager).

So the only types of investments where results are less clear-cut are in private equity, venture capital, and other illiquid strategies where the fund managers rather than third parties provide the valuations for their investments.

But even here, those managers have other investors in their funds besides New Jersey. They calculate the net asset value across the entire fund and then give valuations to investors based on their percent participation. So if New Jersey was getting revised valuations for such a large portion of its funds, you’d expect some other public pension funds to report significant upticks as well. But New Jersey seems to be suspiciously unique in this regard.

To understand how implausible this miraculous 1% performance improvement is, let’s look at New Jersey’s current asset allocation, as of June 30:

We will charitably include “Commodities and Other Real Assets,” “Real Estate Debt,” and “Real Estate” in the not-independently-valued funds for the purpose of this back-of-the-envelope calculation.
If you total Debt Related Private Equity, Real Estate Debt, Police and Fire Mortgage Program, Commodities and Other Real Assets, Real Estate, and Buyouts/Venture Capital, you get 17.13%. Remember, the total that is not independently valued is almost certainly lower.
The 1% miraculous improvement in performance is attributable to at most 17.13% of the portfolio. That is tantamount to that portion of the portfolio producing returns that were at least 5.8% higher than initially reported. That is simply not plausible.
We have to believe either that New Jersey is utterly incompetent at record-keeping,which would be a violation of its fiduciary duty, or something stinks to high heaven. It’s not hard to guess which is more likely.

Kentucky Pension Board Approves $325 Million In New Alternative Investments

The Kentucky Retirement Systems’ Board of Trustees met Thursday, and the meeting produced several interesting news items.

One development, which Pension360 covered earlier today, involved increasing the transparency around the investment fees paid to outside firms that handle the System’s alternative investments.

The other item of interest had to do with alternatives, as well. The KRS Board approved $325 million in new alternative investments, to be placed with five different funds. The funds and allocations, as reported by the Kentucky Center for Investigative Reporting:

A $100 million investment in the Deutsche Bank Secondary Opportunities Fund III will go toward limited partnership.

A $65 million investment in Taurus Mining Finance Fund will go toward precious and industrial metal mining ventures globally.

A $60 million investment in Crestview Partners III will go toward leveraged buyouts.

A $50 million investment in BTG Pactual Timberland Fund I will go toward timberland.

A $50 million investment in Oberland Capital Healthcare will go toward prescription drug royalties.

Under KRS’ new transparency rules, the fee rates paid to those individual funds will be public information.

But the public still won’t be able to see the dollar amounts paid in fees to those individual funds. And, as is common practice, the specific make-up of the funds will remain confidential.

Kentucky To Disclose More Details About Alternative Investments, But Some Data Will Remain Secret

About 30 percent of the Kentucky Retirement System’s investment portfolio is allocated towards alternative investments. That kind of investment strategy leads to significant fees and expenses. But much of the data surrounding the fees the System paid to firms to manage those alternative investments were hidden under lock and key…until now.

Yesterday, the KRS Board of Trustees approved a measure designed to increase transparency surrounding the fees the System pays to individual firms to handle its investments. From WFPL:

Kentucky Retirement Systems, which runs the $16 billion pension and health care funds for state, city and county workers and retirees, will be providing more detail about the fees it pays to the managers of its so-called “alternative” investments.

[Interim investment director David Peden] said KRS’ investment committee and the full board warmed to the idea after articles by the Kentucky Center for Investigative Reporting and the Lexington Herald-Leader on the level of transparency about fees paid to hedge funds and private equity firms.

Until now, KRS had disclosed the total amount of fees paid to investment firms — $53.6 million in the year that ended June 30, 2013 — but did not report the fee rates charged by individual firms. That practice will change in coming weeks, Peden said, as KRS staff posts fees for all current holdings on the agency’s website.

So, interested observers will be able to find the fee rates that KRS pays to individual firms.

But KRS still isn’t going to tell the public everything.

Among the information that will still be inaccessible to the public: the total dollar amount of fees paid to individual firms; the fee rates paid to “fund of funds”; and the specific make-up of the alternative funds, which are protected by confidentiality agreements between KRS and the fund managers.

Memphis’ Pension Fund Is Considering Going All-In On High-Risk Strategies

For the last two years, the City of Memphis Pension Fund has been considering an overhaul in investment strategy. The strategy: re-allocating hundreds of millions of dollars from U.S. stocks and bonds into higher-risk investments. That entails increased allocations toward private equity, hedge funds, foreign stocks and bonds and real estate investments.

On August 28, the board that makes investment decisions for the fund will vote on the change in policy.

The board had already voted at its last meeting to allow the fund to double its real estate investments, from 5 percent of its portfolio to 10 percent.