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Bruce Rauner Named Most Important Player in U.S. Pensions

Institutional Investor magazine has released its list of the 40 most influential people in U.S. pensions. Topping the list is the man who now governs a state with one of the worst pension problems in the country: Bruce Rauner.

From Institutional Investor:

Republican Bruce Rauner, the victor over Democratic incumbent Pat Quinn in the recent Illinois gubernatorial race, may regret he ever wished to win elective office. Rauner, onetime chairman of Chicago private equity firm GTCR, has had no real profile on retirement policy but finds himself staring at what may be the most serious pension mess among the states.

As of June 30, 2014, Illinois’s pension debt had reached $111 billion; Moody’s Investors Service reported in September that the state’s three-year average pension liability over revenue was 258 percent, five times the median percentage for all 50 states.

In 2013, Quinn persuaded the legislature to pass a bill raising the retirement age and cutting cost-of-living increases for beneficiaries. But the Illinois constitution holds that pensions cannot be “diminished,” and a coalition of public employee unions sued. And on November 21, Sangamon County Circuit Judge John Belz found the law unconstitutional, declaring, “Protection against the diminishment or impairment of pension benefits is absolute and without exception.”

Depending on various appeals, Rauner, 57, could try to implement his campaign agenda for pensions, which includes capping the current program and shifting members to a defined contribution plan — though he has begun to talk of just shifting new employees to avoid legal problems. Rauner has said he’d seek to keep benefits from rising faster than inflation and would eliminate employees’ ability to receive large pay hikes before retirement to beef up their pensions.

The odds of pushing these reforms through a Democratic-controlled state senate remain long, made worse by allegations that Rauner (and separately, Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel [No. 4]) accepted contributions from executives affiliated with firms that manage Illinois pension plans. Rauner has not publicly responded to the allegations.

The ranking clearly reflects not what Rauner has already done, but the power he will have in the coming years. If the Illinois Supreme Court strikes down the state’s pension reform law, lawmakers will have to start from scratch – and Rauner will be at the helm.

Photo By Steven Vance [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Firms Managing Illinois Pension Money May Have Skirted Pay-to-Play Rules By Donating To Rauner Campaign

Over the course of his campaign, Illinois governor-elect Bruce Rauner accepted contributions from executives from firms that manage portions of the state’s pension money, according to a new report from David Sirota.

Those contributions may violate SEC pay-to-play rules, under which investment firms can’t make donations to politicians that have any influence—direct or indirect—over the hiring of firms to handle pension investments.

As Illinois governor, Rauner will have that influence – the governor has the power to appoint trustees to the state’s pension boards.

More from David Sirota on the donations:

During his gubernatorial campaign, Rauner raised millions of dollars from executives in the financial sector — and, despite the pay-to-play rule, some of the money came from executives at firms affiliated with funds that receive state pension investments. That includes:

– $1,000 from Mesirow Financial senior managing director Mark Kmety and $2,000 from Mesirow Financial managing director David Wanger. ISBI’s 2013 annual report lists Mesirow Financial as a hedge fund-of-fund manager for the pension system, and lists $271 million in holdings in Mesirow investment vehicles. In an emailed statement, a Mesirow spokeswoman told IBTimes that a separate branch of Mesirow works with the Illinois pension system and that therefore “we do not believe these contributions violate the pay to play laws.” Neither Rauner donor from Mesirow Financial “has any relationship with and/or receives any compensation from any state entity, nor do they pursue state business,” she wrote.

– $2,500 from Sofinnova general partner James Healy. TRS lists Sofinnova as a private equity manager. The system’s 2013 annual report says the firm manages $8.1 million of state pension money, and was paid more than $900,000 in fees that year. In June, TRS committed to invest another $50 million of state pension cash in Sofinnova. Healy did not respond to IBTimes’ interview request.

– $5,000 from Northern Trust’s Senior Vice President Brayton Alley. Illinois TRS lists Northern Trust Investments as an equity manager. The system’s 2013 annual report says Northern Trust manages $2.3 billion of state money, and made $548,000 in fees from the system that year. A spokesman for the firm told IBTimes, “We are aware of the obligations under various Illinois and federal laws and regulations” and “we are unaware of any violation to such requirements.”

– $9,600 from employees of the real estate firm CBRE. The 2013 annual reports of TRS and ISBI show a combined $184 million worth of state pension investments in CBRE investment vehicles. A representative for CBRE told IBTimes that the employees are not covered by the SEC rule because they are not involved in state pension business and not employed by the subsidiary of CBRE that does pension investment work.

– More than $90,000 in in-kind contributions from John Buck of the John Buck Company, which is listed as an investment manager for TRS. A spokesman for TRS, David Urbanek, told IBTimes that the pension system’s investment in the John Buck Company “is now in wind-down mode” and added that “the company is no longer actively managing TRS money.” A representative for the John Buck company said, “We do not manage money for TRS.”

While some of the contributions are relatively small, the SEC recently prosecuted its first pay-to-play case over donations totaling just $4,500. SEC sanctions can be strong: The rule can compel investment managers to return all fees they have collected from the pension systems after the political contributions were made.

Illinois state law also restricts contributions from state contractors to candidates for governor, though the executive director of ISBI, William Atwood, told IBTimes that the pension systems are exempt from the statute.

Specifics of the SEC rule in question, as explained by law firm Bracewell & Giuliani:

Rule 206 (4)-5, which was adopted in 2010, prohibits investment advisers from providing compensatory advisory services to a government client for a period of two years following a campaign contribution from the firm, or from defined investment advisers, to any government officials, or political candidates in a position to influence the selection or retention of advisers to manage public pension funds or other government client assets. Some de minimus contributions are permitted, topping out at $350 if the contributor is eligible to vote for the candidate, and the contribution is from the person’s personal funds.

Read Sirota’s entire report here.

By Steven Vance [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Siedle: For Pension Funds, Private Equity Deals Can Come With Baked-In Conflicts of Interest

Over at Forbes, the “pension detective” Ted Siedle has penned an extensive column delving into the contractually-permitted conflicts of interest that can accompany private equity deals.

He hones in on Bruce Rauner and his firm, GTCR, which handled assets for numerous pension funds. Rauner and GTCR encapsulate the secrecy and potential conflicts of interest that pension funds can sign off on when they hand assets over to private equity firms.

Siedle writes of Rauner:

According to a report by Council 31 AFSCME Illinois, a few years ago Rauner’s firm received millions in Pennsylvania state pension assets to invest after a $300,000 campaign contribution to that state’s Democratic governor. In Illinois, a company owned by Rauner paid a member of the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System Board more than $25,000 a month. His firm was selected to handle TRS pension dollars. The TRS member, Stuart Levine, is now in federal prison for public malfeasance.

It seems Rauner mastered the art of accessing public pension assets to manage, including (according to his firm’s SEC filings) reliance upon placement agents which have proven to be so controversial at public pensions across the country.

In my opinion, before Rauner can be deemed fit to serve as governor of Illinois, an in-depth review of his secret dealings with state pensions is called for– especially since the state’s pensions are in a crisis (which merits investigation) and 4 out of the state’s 7 last governors ended up in prison. The last thing Illinois needs is to compound its pension problems.

If Rauner wins, expect questions about his past and ongoing private equity business dealings to continue to swirl. In my forensic experience, greater scrutiny of opaque investments always reveals weaker investment performance.

Siedle dug through GTCR’s SEC filings. He found that when pension funds signed deals with the firm, they were often also permitting GTCR to engage in a multitude of scenarios that could lead to conflicts of interest for the firm. Siedle writes:

The litany of permissible conflict of interest scenarios (many of which are commonplace throughout private equity) detailed in Bruce Rauner’s firm SEC filings, should be disturbing to any so-called sophisticated investor. Unfortunately, public pensions routinely consent to such potentially harmful conflicts either because they don’t read, don’t fully comprehend the oblique disclosures, or simply don’t care that politically-connected insiders may be profiting at the expense of stakeholders. For example:

“The Adviser and certain employees and affiliates of the Adviser may invest in and alongside the Funds, either through the General Partners, as direct investors in the Funds or otherwise (emphasis added)…

The Adviser and its related entities may engage in a broad range of activities, including investment activities for their own account (emphasis added)…

The Adviser may, from time to time, establish certain investment vehicles through which employees of the Adviser and their family members, certain business associates, other “friends of the firm” (emphasis added) or other persons may invest alongside one or more of the Funds.

In certain cases, the Adviser may cause a Fund to purchase investments from another Fund, or it may cause a Fund to sell investments to another Fund.”

Translation from legal-speak: Rauner and his associates could invest directly, or create a special “family and friends” fund which could invest, at lower cost in shares of the same companies his firm purchased for funds in which public pensions invest. The associates, or “family and friends” fund, could profit by holding onto those shares, or immediately flip them, selling to the funds in which public pensions invest at a guaranteed, riskless mark-up.

Alternatively, GTCR could sell start-up companies it founded (or the family and friends fund could sell companies it purchased from GTCR) to funds the firm managed for public pensions at inflated prices.

“In addition, the Adviser may, from time to time, fund start-up expenses for a portfolio company and may subsequently sell such portfolio company to a Fund. Such transactions may create conflicts of interest because, by not exposing such buy and sell transactions to market forces, a Fund may not receive the best price otherwise possible, or the Adviser might have an incentive to improve the performance of one Fund by selling underperforming assets to another Fund in order, for example, to earn fees.”

Improve the performance of the friends and family fund by selling the laggards to other GTCR funds in which public pensions invest? Seems possible, based upon the firm’s SEC filings.

Read Siedle’s full column, which contains more analysis and insights, here.