Kolivakis: 5 Reasons Behind Canada Pensions’ Real Estate Binge

Canada

Canadian companies and pension funds collectively invested $2.75 billion in commercial U.S. real estate in the first month of 2015.

In 2014, that number was a hefty $9.7 billion. What’s behind the binge? Leo Kolivakis of Pension Pulse gives 5 reasons why Canada’s pensions are snapping up real estate in the U.S., and elsewhere.

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By Leo Kolivakis, Pension Pulse

Why are they doing this? There are a few reasons. First, real estate has long been heralded as the best asset class among Canada’s large public pension funds which are increasingly shifting assets away from volatile public markets into private markets, especially real estate and infrastructure which offer more predictable yields over the long-run.

Second, Canada’s large pension funds aren’t dumb. They read this blog and many other market sources and I’m sure the most savvy of them agree with me, Canada’s crisis is just beginning. This is why they’re scrambling to snap up as much U.S. and European real estate even though the loonie keeps declining. They know it will fall further but they also know there are better opportunities outside of Canada at this time given their long investment horizon.

Third, some of Canada’s large public pension funds, like bcIMC, are much more exposed to Canada’s commercial real estate market than others. bcIMC recently announced it agreed to sell Delta Hotels and Resorts to Marriott International for $168 million, but it has a lot more work to properly diversify its real estate holdings outside of Canada.

Fourth, in my opinion the Caisse’s real estate division, Ivanhoé Cambridge, is by far the best real estate investment management outfit in Canada. There are excellent teams elsewhere too, like PSP Investments, but Ivanhoe has done a tremendous job investing directly in real estate and they have been very selective, even in the United States where they really scrutinize their deals carefully and aren’t shy of walking away if the deal is too pricey.

Fifth, I don’t see interest rates rising anytime soon. In fact, I see central banks pumping a lot more liquidity into the global financial system. And as I recently explained, I’m not in the camp that the Fed will raise rates in 2015 and risk making a monumental mistake.

Having said all this, the rush into real estate and other illiquid alternatives worries me. Why? Because I’m increasingly worried about global deflation and the long-term effects it will have on all investments, especially illiquid private markets.

Don’t get me wrong, done properly, real estate, infrastructure and private equity are great asset classes. But as global pension funds and sovereign wealth funds topple over each other to find deals, they are significantly bidding up prices, lowering prospective returns on all private market investments, and this will really hurt them if a prolonged period of deflation sets in.

A long time ago I wrote a comment asking whether pensions are taking too much illiquidity risk. I think you should all read that comment again and keep it mind as you plow into U.S. and global real estate. Sure, pensions should take the long, long view, but they also need to be acutely aware of price entry and how a prolonged period of debt deflation impacts all their investments, especially private market investments.

 

 

Photo credit: “Canada blank map” by Lokal_Profil image cut to remove USA by Paul Robinson – Vector map BlankMap-USA-states-Canada-provinces.svg.Modified by Lokal_Profil. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.5 via Wikimedia Commons – http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Canada_blank_map.svg#mediaviewer/File:Canada_blank_map.svg

Biggs: Public Pensions Take On Too Much Risk

roulette

Andrew Biggs, former deputy commissioner of the Social Security Administration and current Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, penned a column for the Wall Street Journal this week in which he posed the thesis that public pension funds invest in too many risky assets.

To start, he compares the asset allocations of an individual versus that of CalPERS. From the column:

Many individuals follow a rough “100 minus your age” rule to determine how much risk to take with their retirement savings. A 25-year-old might put 75% of his savings in stocks or other risky assets, the remaining 25% in bonds and other safer investments. A 45-year-old would hold 55% in stocks, and a 65-year-old 35%. Individuals take this risk knowing that the end balance of their IRA or 401(k) account will vary with market returns.

Now consider the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers), the largest U.S. public plan and a trendsetter for others. The typical participant is around age 62, so a “100 minus age” rule would recommend that Calpers hold about 38% risky assets. In reality, Calpers holds about 75% of its portfolio in stocks and other risky assets, such as real estate, private equity and, until recently, hedge funds, despite offering benefits that, unlike IRAs or 401(k)s, it guarantees against market risk. Most other states are little different: Illinois holds 75% in risky assets; the Texas teachers’ plan holds 81%; the New York state and local plan 72%; Pennsylvania 82%; New Mexico 85%.

The column goes on:

Managers of government pension plans counter that they have longer investment horizons and can take greater risks. But most financial economists believe that the risks of stock investments grow, not shrink, with time. Moreover, while governments may exist forever, pensions cannot take forever to pay off their losses: New accounting rules promulgated by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) and taking effect this year will push plans to amortize unfunded liabilities over roughly 15 years. Even without these rules, volatile pension investments translate into volatile contribution requirements that can and have destabilized government budgets.

Yet public-plan managers may see little option other than to double down on risk. In 2013 nearly half of state and local plan sponsors failed to make their full pension contribution. Moving from the 7.5% return currently assumed by Calpers to the roughly 5% yield on a 38%-62% stock-bond portfolio would increase annual contributions by around 50%—an additional $4 billion—making funding even more challenging.

But the fundamental misunderstanding afflicting practically the entire public-pension community is that taking more investment risk does not make a plan less expensive. It merely makes it less expensive today, by reducing contributions on the assumption that high investment returns will make up the difference. Risky investments shift the costs onto future generations who must make up for shortfalls if investments don’t pay off as assumed.

Read the entire column here.

 

Photo by  dktrpepr via Flickr CC License