New Jersey Bill, Now on Christie’s Desk, Would Expand Pay-to-Play Rules for Pension Investments

shaking hands

With all the drama surrounding New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie’s latest round of pension changes, one big pension-related development has been overlooked: on Monday, state lawmakers approved a bill that would expand pay-to-play rules as they relate to pension investments.

The bill, which would increase transparency around fees paid to private investment managers, was sent to Christie’s desk on Monday.

More from Philly.com:

[The bill] would expand restrictions on investments of state pension funds with outside money managers who donate to national political committees.

The legislation also would require the state Treasury Department to regularly publish reports disclosing fees paid to private managers who invest state pension funds.

Pay-to-play rules already prohibit the Division of Investment from awarding contracts to firms or investment managers who have donated to New Jersey political parties or campaigns in the preceding two years.

A 2010 federal law imposed a similar ban. Under that law, the Securities and Exchange Commission in June ordered Wayne-based TL Ventures Inc. to repay $250,000 in pension fees collected from Philadelphia and Pennsylvania after learning the firm’s founder had donated to Mayor Nutter and then-Gov. Tom Corbett.

But managers can still donate to national committees such as the Republican Governors Association or Democratic National Committee, which can spend money on and influence state politics. Legislation passed Monday by the Assembly on a 53-15 vote would close that loophole by extending the State Investment Council’s pay-to-play regulations to cover investors’ donations to national political committees.

The bill passed the Senate in October on a 25-8 vote, with seven abstentions.

Lawmakers believe the SEC pay-to-play rules are too lenient.

State pension officials, however, say the rules could harm the fund’s alternative investment portfolio; the fee disclosure requirement runs the risk of dissuading some investment managers from doing business with the fund.

Alternatives account for 28 percent of New Jersey’s pension investments.

 

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UK To Debate Ban on Secret Pension Fees

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The UK government will consider a ban on secret pension fees in light of a proposition from Lord Mike German to improve the transparency of pension investments.

More from the Financial Times:

The UK government is to debate a ban on non-disclosure agreements that conceal fees between pension funds and asset managers, in a bid to provide individuals with more information about how their pensions are managed.

A proposed amendment to the Pension Schemes Bill put forward by Lord Mike German, former leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats, would put an end to pension schemes signing non-disclosure agreements with fund companies over fees.

Lord German’s proposal, which has the backing of investor rights charity ShareAction, would also require pension funds to inform savers on request about how they voted at company meetings on issues such as executive pay, and explain how they select and monitor fund managers.

Lord German said: “The purpose of this amendment is to try and establish whether the government is prepared to give people the rights that they need. [Savers] are not disinterested in their pensions.”

[…]

Lord German’s amendment was submitted to parliament in mid-December and will need approval from DWP ministers, the Treasury and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. If the amendment is adopted it could enter law by the end of March, according to Lord German.

Currently, pension schemes are only required to disclose information about investment policy and performance in annual reports. ShareAction said that in practice “savers are often sent information that is technical [and] inaccessible”.

Asset managers have already voiced their displeasure with the proposition. BlackRock told the Financial Times: it is “neither in the interest of institutional investors nor of investment managers to ban non-disclosure agreements”.

Benchmarks, Transparency Could Bring More Pension Funds to Infrastructure, Says Group

Roadwork

The European Association of Paritarian Institutions (AEIP) last week called for greater transparency and more performance data in the infrastructure sector.

These changes, according to the AEIP, could help attract more pension funds to the sector.

From Investments and Pensions Europe:

Infrastructure markets need to be more transparent, with greater emphasis placed on the development of sector benchmarks, according to the European Association of Paritarian Institutions (AEIP).

Setting out its views on infrastructure, the association said that while pension funds were long-term investors – and therefore well-suited to invest in the asset class – they first and foremost needed to abide by their fiduciary duties to members.

“The reality is that infrastructure represents a valuable asset class and for sure a viable option for long-term investors, but these latter face several hurdles to access it,” the AEIP’s paper noted.

It said the lack of comparable, long-term data was one of the hurdles facing investors and that the absence of infrastructure benchmarks made it difficult to compare the performance of the asset class.

It also identified an organisation’s scale as problematic to taking full advantage of the asset class.

“Direct investments, those that yield the most interesting returns, are the most difficult to pursue, as their governance and monitoring require skilled individuals and a strict discipline regulating possible conflicts of interests,” it said.

“National regulation does not always simplify direct investments, and pension regulators in some cases limit the use of the asset class in a direct or indirect way.”

The association called on governments to play their part in making infrastructure accessible.

“Often the lack of infrastructure investments is not due to a lack of projects but not finding the right match with investors,” the AEIP added. “Some form of standardisation might be investigated.”

Read the paper here.

Incoming Massachusetts Governor to Push for Transparency at MBTA Fund

Charlie Baker

Massachusetts Governor-elect Charlie Baker says he will push for more transparency and openness from the MBTA retirement fund.

Baker’s statements come days after it was reported by the Boston Globe that the pension fund posted its annual report a full year late; the fund also waited a year to disclose troubles at a hedge fund that held pension money. The hedge fund is now shutting down in the wake of civil fraud charges brought against its executives.

From the Boston Globe:

The incoming Baker administration will press for greater openness at the MBTA retirement fund and encourage it to operate more like other pensions for public workers, a spokesman for Governor-elect Charlie Baker said Monday.

“The governor-elect wants to protect the pensions of hard-working MBTA employees and feels greater transparency and disclosure could help the pension board make better investment decisions,’’ the spokesman, Tim Buckley, said in a statement. Given the significant investment of taxpayer dollars in the MBTA, he said, Baker “feels it is appropriate to explore ways to align the MBTA pension board’s investment practices with those of other public pension boards.”

[…]

Baker’s spokesman declined to offer specifics on how he might tackle the issue. The pension fund is organized as a trust and in 1993 won a Supreme Judicial Court ruling that it does not have to make records public, hold open meetings, or follow the ethics rules of public agencies.

[…]

A governor’s main leverage with the MBTA pension fund is indirect. Governors get to appoint people to the seven-member Department of Transportation board, which in turn sends three “management” appointees to the six-member T retirement board.

Read more Pension360 coverage of transparency issues at the MBTA fund here.

 

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General Partners Gain Upper Hand Over Pension Funds As Raising Capital Becomes Easier

balancePensions & Investments released an interesting report yesterday outlining the balance of power in the private equity world between general partners and pension funds.

In the last few years, the balance of power has shifted dramatically towards GP’s, according to the report.

From Pensions & Investments:

Until the 2008 financial crisis, general partners pretty much set the rules, leaving most limited partners little say on terms, including on fees and expenses, when they committed to funds. Then fundraising got harder, and even the most popular private equity managers had to accept investors’ demands for lower fees and expenses and a greater degree of transparency.

Now, the highest-returning general partners are regaining the upper hand.

“Certainly, the pendulum has swung more toward the GP compared to 2009,” said Kevin Campbell, managing director and portfolio manager in the private markets group at fund-of-funds manager DuPont Capital Management, Wilmington, Del. The firm was spun out from the pension management division of DuPont’s pension plan in 1993.

[…]

Said DuPont’s Mr. Campbell: “I’ve seen the pendulum of power change positions several different times during the last 15 years,” where private equity fund terms are determined by the GP and sometimes they are more influenced by the LP.

Strong-performing managers that retain the same team and the same investment strategy used when they earned their strong returns have the most influence over fund terms, Mr. Campbell said. These managers also are raising a fund that is similar in size to their last fund and they have a “good investor base,” meaning investors who routinely commit to their funds, he said.

[…]

Some are increasing their negotiating clout by getting large capital commitments from sovereign wealth funds before the first close, enabling them to give other interested institutional investors a take-it-or-leave-it deal, said Stephen L. Nesbitt, chief executive officer of Marina del Rey, Calif.-based alternative investment consulting firm Cliffwater LLC.

Part of the reason GPs have power over LPs has to do with fundraising. GPs are having an easy time raising capital, which means they don’t have any incentive to negotiate terms with LPs. From P&I:

It’s easier to raise capital now; funds are raised more quickly and general partners have more influence on terms, he added.

Indeed, some private equity funds are closing very quickly, with access to much more capital than they need. Instead of holding several fund closings — giving general partners the ability to invest the capital commitments before the final close — a number of firms are having “one-and-done” closings. Because there are asset owners willing to invest on those terms, the GPs have little reason to give in to limited partners demanding changes to fund terms.

For example, Veritas Fund Management in August held a first and final close at $1.875 billion for its latest middle-market private equity fund, after just three months of fundraising. And private equity real estate manager Iron Point Partners LLC in November closed the Iron Point Real Estate Partners III LP at $750 million, well above its $450 million target.

And KPS Capital Partners LP held a first and final closing last year of its $3.5 billion KPS Special Situations Fund IV, above its $3 billion target. It was KPS’ third oversubscribed institutional private equity fund, according to a statement from the firm at the time.

Read the full report here.

Newspaper: Kentucky Pension Officials Have “Forgotten Whom They Work For”

Kentucky flag

Pension360 has covered the push in recent weeks by several Kentucky lawmakers to make the state’s pension system more transparent.

The secrecy surrounding Kentucky’s pension investments is well documented, and the issue has even spurred a lawsuit.

One Kentucky newspaper wrote Tuesday that pension officials have “forgotten whom they work for” – the public.

The Herald-Dispatch editorial board writes:

Apparently, [pension officials] are in sore need of a reminder that they are employed to serve the public and, as such, how they conduct their business should be open to scrutiny by the public.

[…]

Some want to know more about how the pension funds operate. As of now, Kentucky law allows the systems to operate partly shielded from the public. For example, the public is not allowed to know how much is paid out to individual retirees, nor does the systems have to reveal how much they pay out in fees to individual hedge fund managers who are investing the pension money and other external investment advisers. But we do know they are paying out hefty sums, to the tune of $55 million last year to investment management firms.

The public has a right to know both of those aspects of the pension system.

[…]

Private investment companies doing business with governments also must realize who’s paying their fees and that accountability comes with gaining contracts with government-run pension systems. The excuse put forth by Kentucky officials and others about how revealing the investment companies’ contracts would reveal “trade secrets” doesn’t hold up. That argument simply is not sufficient to conceal how much money they are making from taxpayers and the public employees who contribute to the systems. Until that information is revealed, the public has no way to know whether it’s getting its money’s worth from those companies.

A couple of Kentucky lawmakers plan to introduce bills next month that would require the pension systems to use the state’s competitive bidding process, disclosing terms of the deals and the proposed management fees, as well as shed more light on the pension payouts to the state’s lawmakers. All of those requirements would be steps in the right direction and should be put into law.

Read the full piece here.

Kolivakis on Post-GASB New Jersey and Pension Fund Compensation

numbers and graphs

Last week, the funding ratio of New Jersey’s pension system dropped 20 points. That’s because the state began measuring funding under new GASB accounting rules, which requires using market asset values instead of actuarial ones.

This new way of measuring liabilities puts New Jersey in an even deeper hole. But as Leo Kolivakis of Pension Pulse points out, this is a hole that New Jersey dug for itself – with poor pension governance, below-median investment performance and by diverting state pension payments to other parts of the budget.

Here’s Kolivakis’ take on New Jersey’s situation, the new GASB rules and compensating pension fund staff.

__________________________

Originally published at Pension Pulse:

You can read more on GASB’s new rules for pensions here. I note the background for these changes:

On August 2, 2012, the GASB published accounting and financial reporting standards that improve the way state and local governments report their pension liabilities and expenses, resulting in a more faithful representation of the full impact of these obligations.

The guidance contained in these Statements will change how governments calculate and report the costs and obligations associated with pensions in important ways. It is designed to improve the decision-usefulness of reported pension information and to increase the transparency, consistency, and comparability of pension information across state and local governments.

For example, net pension liabilities will be reported on governments’ balance sheet, providing citizens and other users of these financial reports with a clearer picture of the size and nature of the financial obligations to current and former employees for past services rendered.

In particular, Statement 68 requires governments providing defined benefit pensions to recognize their long-term obligation for pension benefits as a liability for the first time, and to more comprehensively and comparably measure the annual costs of pension benefits.

The new GASB rules will impact all state and local pensions, not just New Jersey. This will be another important measure to determine whether U.S. public pensions are indeed on solid footing.

As for New Jersey, back in March, I commented on its pensiongate scandal and didn’t mince my words:

The article doesn’t capture the real problem at U.S. public pension plans, namely, lack of proper governance. You basically have politicians appointing political bureaucrats in charge of public pensions, paying them peanut salaries and getting monkey results. There are exceptions but this is typically how U.S. public pension funds are mismanaged.

And who benefits most from this? Of course, the Paul Singers, Dan Loebs, Steve Schwarzmans, and all the rest of the who’s who managing hedge funds and private equity funds. It’s one big alternatives party — for the big boys. Everyone is making a killing except for these public pension funds, praying for an alternatives miracle that will never happen. These alternatives managers and their sophisticated marketing are milking the public pension cow dry. They basically have a license to steal.

And why not? There are plenty of dumb institutions listening to their useless investment consultants who are more than happy to recommend the latest hot hedge fund or private equity fund to their ignorant clients. It’s a frigging joke which is why the Oracle of Omaha is 100% right when he warns us that the worst is yet to come for U.S. public pensions.

As far as New Jersey, Gov. Christie has done some good things on pension reform but a lot more needs to be done. Double-dipping pensioners are bleeding New Jersey dry.  Unions can bitch all they want about rich alternatives managers meddling in their state’s politics but they must accept shared risk of their plan, which includes raising the retirement age and cuts in benefits as long as the plan is chronically underfunded. The state of New Jersey, however, should make sure it tops up its public pension plan which it neglected to do for years (the major cause of the pension deficit).

The biggest factor explaining the pension deficit in New Jersey and other states is how successive state governments failed to make their pension contributions, using the money to fund other things (no doubt in an effort to buy votes).

But there are plenty of other factors that didn’t help, like lack of sensible pension reforms, lousy investment performance and poor governance.

On this last point, Michael B. Marois of Bloomberg reports, California Pension Fund Bonus Payouts Climb 14% From Prior Year:

The $300 billion California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest U.S. public pension, paid $9 million in bonuses last fiscal year, up 14 percent from a year earlier as earnings exceeded benchmarks.

The fund, known as Calpers, paid $8.7 million in bonuses to investment staff in the year ended June 30, and almost $300,000 to four non-investment executives, according to data provided by the system. The rewards are based on three-year performance verses a benchmark, as well as the earnings of each asset class and individual portfolios, said spokesman Brad Pacheco.

“These awards are part of the overall compensation we provide to recruit and retain skilled investment professionals needed to ensure success of the fund,” Pacheco said.

Public-pension funds are recouping investment losses suffered during the 18-month recession that ended in June 2009, which wiped out a third of Calpers’ value. Still, the crisis left U.S. pensions short more than an estimated $915 billion needed to cover benefits promised to government workers. Taxpayers have been asked to make up the shortfall.

The biggest bonus earner was Ted Eliopoulos, the chief investment officer who recorded a $305,810 bonus last year in addition to his $412,039 base pay.

Top Job

That bonus was paid when Eliopoulos was acting chief investment officer after his predecessor Joe Dear died in February from cancer. Prior to that, Eliopoulos headed the fund’s real estate portfolio. He now earns $475,000 in base pay after he was tapped for the top investment job in September.

Eliopoulos announced in September that the fund was divesting all $4 billion it had in hedge funds, saying they were too expensive and too complicated and not worth the returns.

The pension fund earned 18.4 percent last fiscal year, 12.5 percent a year earlier and 1 percent in 2012. It estimates it need 7.5 percent annually to meet its long-term obligation to pay benefits promised to state and local government workers.

Calpers is still short $103.6 billion needed to cover those promises based on market value as of June 30, 2012, the latest figure that was available. That shortfall is up 19 percent from a year earlier.

The California fund says it must grant bonuses to help compete with the pay that employees could make if they went to work on Wall Street. Pacheco said spending money on in-house investment management saves about $100 million a year that otherwise would be paid to Wall Street in fees.

Wall Street bonuses, which rose 15 percent on average last year to $164,530 — the highest since 2007 — may climb again as a result of payments deferred from previous years, New York Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli said last month.

Four executives outside the Calpers investment office were paid a total of $295,930 in bonuses last year, the fund said. Anne Stausboll, chief executive officer, got $113,679; Chief Actuary Alan Milligan earned $75,748 and Chief Financial Officer Cheryl Eason was paid $89,703, almost double a year earlier.

Calpers paid a total of $7.9 million in bonuses in the prior fiscal year.

Compensation is part of pension governance and if you ask my expert opinion, CalPERS’ compensation is fair and accurately reflects the market, their performance and their ability to attract and retain professionals to manage billions. The only thing I would change is base it on four-year rolling returns, like they do at Canadian public pension funds.

All this hoopla on compensation at U.S. public pension funds is totally misdirected. I happen to think most U.S. public pension fund managers are grossly underpaid, just like I think some Canadian public pension fund managers are grossly overpaid (read my comment on PSP’s hefty payouts and the subsequent ones on its tricky balancing act and its FY 2014 results which were likely padded by skirting foreign taxes).

Getting compensation right is critical to the long-term health of any public pension fund but supervisors of these funds should make sure they’re paying their senior investment staff properly based on benchmarks that truly reflect the risks they’re taking. I believe in paying people for performance, not for taking dumb risks to trounce their silly benchmark (that contributed to Caisse’s ABCP disaster which the media is still covering up).

Survey Sheds Light On Barriers To Cross-Border Investing

plant growing out of brick wall

What obstacles do institutional investors face when making cross-border investments? And what strategies do they use to overcome those obstacles?

A survey was recently conducted to find out, and the results have been published in the Rotman International Journal of Pension Management.

The survey asked respondents to identify and rate the biggest obstacles to cross-border investment:

We first asked respondents to rate, using a five-point Likert- type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), to what extent 20 different issues identified in the investment obstacles literature would “decrease the likelihood your fund will invest in another country.”

[…]

The top two issues, as identified by summing the percentages of “agree” and “strongly agree” responses, were “financial regulation uncertainty” (FP, 80%) and “unfavorable comments by government officials in recipient country” (IC, 73%). While the latter is an IC factor, it focuses on the nation-state and the use of informal suasion by officials, and thus is related to FP factors. Following these items almost two-thirds (64%) of the funds agreed or strongly agreed that “unfavorable tax treatment of your fund type” (FP) and “non-transparent investment review policies” (FP) would reduce the possibility of their fund’s investing in another country. Of these four factors, “financial regulation uncertainty” (FP) and “non-transparent investment review policies” (FP) elicited the highest proportion of “strongly agree” rankings.

The survey also asked respondents to identify the strategies they used to address the barriers:

Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they used eight specific strategies to address the 20 possible barriers: increase transparency; co-invest; use external managers; restrict voting rights; accept outside investors; use debt; other strategies; and no strategy. Respondents could select all applicable strategies used to address each issue. The strategy identified most often (124 times) to address all three factor classifications was “no strategy,” followed by “external managers” (68) and “increase transparency” (55). Rounding out the top five were “co-investing” (34) and “other strategies” (30). The fact that “other strategies” was selected least often suggests that the survey included the most commonly used strategies.

Finally, the survey asked respondents to rank ten long-term investing objectives. The aggregate results:

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The article, authored by Rachel Harvey, Patrick Bolton, Laurence Wilse-Samson, Li An, and Frédéric Samama, can be read in full here.

 

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