San Francisco Pension Investment Staff Recommends Foray Into Hedge Funds

Golden Gate Bridge

The investment staff of the San Francisco Employees’ Retirement System (SFERS) has recommended to the board that the system allocate up to 10 percent of its assets in hedge funds.

SFERS has been waffling for a year over whether or not to put money into hedge funds, and what the allocation should be.

From Bloomberg, via FinAlternatives:

The San Francisco Employees’ Retirement System staff is recommending its board consider investing 10 percent of assets in hedge funds.

[…]

The staff said it also could support a 5 percent hedge-fund allocation for the $20 billion city pension, according to a memo sent to the board from William Coaker, the chief investment officer. The board is scheduled to consider the recommendation at a Feb. 11 meeting in San Francisco.

“Many of the objections we have heard about hedge funds are at best an incomplete picture,” Coaker’s memo said. “Hedge funds have less than half the volatility of the equity market. Transparency is improving in the hedge-fund industry as a whole.”

The San Francisco pension board in December postponed a decision on adding hedge funds to its investment mix and asked staff for a more detailed analysis ahead of this month’s meeting. The fund isn’t currently invested in hedge funds, which are loosely regulated investment pools that are generally open only to high-net-worth and institutional investors.

The San Francisco Employees’ Retirement System manages $20 billion in assets.

 

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New Chicago Treasurer Makes Pension Funding His Priority

chicago

Chicago Treasurer Stephanie Neely is stepping down at the end of November.

Her replacement, Kurt Summers, said his priority will be fixing the city’s pension systems. From the Chicago Sun-Times:

The full City Council is expected to ratify the appointment of Kurt Summers at Wednesday’s meeting, but the incoming treasurer is not waiting for the vote before rolling up his sleeves and getting to work.

He’s already meeting with actuaries and pouring over the books of the four city employee pension funds.

They include the Municipal Employees and Laborers funds that have already been reformed and police and fire pension funds still waiting for similar action.

In 2016, the city is required by law to make a $550 million contribution to shore up police and fire pension funds with assets to cover just 29.6 and 24 percent of their respective liabilities.

Much of that money will have to come from Chicago taxpayers.

That’s because, unlike Municipal Employees and Laborers, police officers and firefighters do not get compounded cost of living increases.

The process of making the city’s pension funds healthy, he said, includes decreasing investment fees and increasing investment returns. In other words, “investing more efficiently and less expensively.” From the Sun-Times:

As a member of the board overseeing all four city employee pension funds, Summers said he can “make a dent” in the taxpayer burden by reducing investment fees and bolstering returns.

Summers noted that the firefighters and laborers pension funds are paying dramatically higher fees to their investment managers than the Municipal Employees and police pension funds.

“One fund is paying 80 percent more in fees. Another is paying 50 percent more. Yet, there’s one client: The city of Chicago. That’s real money. For fire, the value of that is about $2.5 million-a-year on $1 billion in assets,” he said.

“These kinds of things aren’t going to solve the kinds of holes we have. But any benefit we can find to invest more efficiently and less expensively is a benefit to taxpayers and retirees.”

Summers noted that the bill that saved the Municipal and Laborers Pension funds — by increasing employee contributions by 29 percent and reducing employee benefits — assumes an “actuarial rate of return” on investments of 7.5 percent-a-year.

That makes it imperative that the funds invest in the “right type of assets,” he said.

“If there’s market shock during that time that looks anything like what happened in 2008 — or even what we saw in July — then you end that period of fixed, graduated contributions with less funding than was modeled out in the legislation and there’ll have to be greater catch-up to get to 90 percent funding,” Summers said.

“We’ll have to have portfolio and asset allocation changes to protect our rate of return because ultimately, the taxpayers and retirees are relying on us to hit that number and, if we don’t, they have a bigger bill on the other side of the graduated payments structure.”

That doesn’t necessarily mean being conservative, he said.

“It’s a common misconception to say, `If I invest in the markets or fixed-income [instruments], we’re gonna be protected, but real estate, private equity or hedge funds are risky.’ That’s plain wrong,” Summers said.

“The reality is, you have just as much, if not more exposure to risk and volatility in the market with investments in basic public securities than you do with alternative products meant to mitigate risk and limit volatility. That’s the business I was in — trying to do that for clients around the world.”

As Treasurer, Summers would be a trustee of the city’s pension funds.

Lowenstein: Do Pension Fund Make Investing Too Complex?

maze

Former New York Times financial writer Roger Lowenstein wonders in his new Fortune column whether pension investments have become too complex.

Lowenstein’s thesis:

Pricey consultants have convinced many pension funds to pile into private equity, real estate and hedge funds, which don’t necessarily promise higher returns or long-term investing.

[…]

[Pension funds] have assembled portfolios that are way too complex, way too dependent on supposedly sophisticated (and high fee) investment vehicles. They have chased what is fashionable, they have overly diversified, and they have abandoned what should be their true calling: patient long-term investing in American corporations.

[…]

It’s true that the stock market doesn’t always go up. But a long-term investor shouldn’t be wary of volatility. Over the long term, American stocks do go up. And state pension systems should be the ultimate long-term investors; their horizon is effectively forever.

Lower volatility helps fund managers; they don’t like having to explain what happened in a bad year. But it is not good for their constituents. The Iowa system has trailed the Wilshire stock index over 10 years—also over five years, three years, and one year. Over time, that translates to higher expenses for employees or for Iowa taxpayers. And Iowa is typical of public funds generally.

[…]

Many hedge funds trumpet their ability to dampen volatility. Pension funds should not be in them. From 2009 to 2013, a weighted index of hedge funds earned 8% a year, according to Mark Williams of Boston University. The return on the S&P 500 was more than twice as much, and a blended 60/40 S&P and bond fund earned 14%. Granted, a small minority of hedge funds consistently beat the index. But most public pensions will not be in such superlative funds.

Lowenstein on private equity:

Private equity remains the rage. However, private equity is hugely problematic. Those confidential fees are often excessive—with firms exacting multiple layers of fees on the same investment.

Moreover, there is no reliable gauge of returns. Private equity firms report “internal rates of return.” These do not take into account money that investors commit and yet is not invested. “The returns are misleading,” says Frederick Rowe, vice chairman of the Employee Retirement System of Texas. “The professionals I talk to consider the use of IRRs deceptive. What they want to know is, ‘How much did I commit and how much did I get back?’”

Since no public market for private equity stakes exists, annual performance is simply an estimate. Not surprisingly, estimates are not as volatile as stock market prices. But the underlying assets are equivalent. A cable system or a supermarket chain does not become more volatile by virtue of its form of ownership.

The fact that reported private equity results are less volatile pleases fund managers. But the juice in private equity comes from its enormous leverage. Pension managers would be more honest if they simply borrowed money and bet on the S&P—and they would avoid the fees. And if high leverage is inappropriate for a public fund, it is no less inappropriate just because KKR is doing it.

Lowenstein ends the column with a call for pension funds to renew their focus on “long-term goals”:

With their close ties to Wall Street, pension managers tend to be steeped in the arcane culture of the market. The web site for the Teacher Retirement System of Texas refers to its “headlight system” of “portfolio alerts” and the outlook for the U.S. Federal Reserve and China.

Managers who think in such episodic terms tend to be traders, not investors. This subverts the long-term goals of retirees.

The focus on the short and medium term squanders what a pension fund’s true advantage is. You may not have thought that public funds had an advantage, but they wield more than $3 trillion and have the freedom to invest for the very long term.

Better than chase the latest “alternative,” pensions could become meaningful stewards of corporate governance—active monitors of America’s public companies. A few fund managers, including Scott Stringer, the New York City comptroller, who oversees five big funds, are moving in this direction, seeking board roles for their funds. More should do so, but that will require an ongoing commitment. It will require, in other words, that pension funds stop acting like turnstile traders and fad followers, and that they start behaving like investors.

Read the entire column here.

 

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What Does CalPERS’ Hedge Fund Pullout Mean For the “Average” Investor?

one dollar bill

Larry Zimpleman, chairman and president of Principal Financial Group, has written a short piece in the Wall Street Journal today detailing his reaction to CalPERS cutting hedge funds out of their portfolio and what the move means for the average investor.

From the WSJ:

I was very interested (and a bit surprised) to read about the decision of Calpers (the California Public Retirement System) to move completely out of hedge funds for their $300 billion portfolio.

While I haven’t visited directly with anyone at Calpers about the reasons for their decision, from the stories I’ve read, it seems to be a combination of two things. First, it’s not clear that hedge-fund returns overall are any better than a well-diversified portfolio (although the management fees of hedge funds are much higher). Second, hedge funds had only about a 1% allocation in the overall portfolio. So even if they did provide a superior return, it would have a negligible impact on overall performance.

What’s the takeaway for the average investor? First, if you have “alternatives” (like hedge funds) in your own portfolio, they need to be a meaningful percentage of your portfolio (something like a 5% minimum). Second, take a hard look at the recent performance against the management fees and think about that net return as compared to a well-diversified stock and bond portfolio. Hedge funds are, as their name implies, set up more for absolute performance and outperformance during stressed times. If you’re a long-term investor that believes in diversification and can tolerate volatility, hedge funds may be expensive relative to the value they provide, given your long-term outlook.

Principal Financial Group is one of the largest investment firms in the world and also sells retirement products.

Zimpleman’s post was part of the WSJ’s “The Expert” series, where industry leaders give their thoughts on a topic on their choice.