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CalPERS and CalSTRS Rake in Big Returns, But Much Work Left To Be Done

The 2013-14 fiscal year ended June 30, which means we’ve entered a new year for public pension funds, at least in fiscal terms. It also means that the latest investment performance data is being released, and that data has some funds smiling.

California is one state that has to be happy with what it sees: big investment returns for both of the state’s major pension funds, CalPERS and CalSTRS. From SWFI:

The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) returned 18.42% for the fiscal year that ended on June 30th. CalPERS defeated its custom benchmark of 17.98% and surpassed last fiscal year’s return of 13.2%. The private equity portfolio of CalPERS generated 19.99% returns, just 3.31% shy of the benchmark. The asset classes of real estate and fixed income beat their respective benchmarks.

And CalSTRS saw similar success, says SWFI:

Looking toward the other Sacramento pension giant, CalSTRS posted 18.66% for the fiscal year that ended on June 30th.

The CalSTRS global equity portfolio posted 24.73% in returns. CalSTRS private equity posted 19.61% in returns.

But just because you can see the light doesn’t mean you’re out of the tunnel. CalPERS still has a lot on its plate. From the Sacramento Bee:

Happy days are hardly here again for the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, or for taxpayers who must make good on government pensions.

“There’s much, much work to be done,” said Ted Eliopoulos, CalPERS’ interim chief investment officer. “We’re ever vigilant; we try not to get too excited in good years or bad years about one-year results.”

Eliopoulos knows better than most that CalPERS remains in a deep hole.

Even with the 18.4 percent return, CalPERS estimates that it is only 76 percent funded, a remnant of overpromises made by the Legislature in 1999 and the finanical crash of 2007 and 2008. CalPERS would need to make 18 percent on top of 18 percent for several years running, and no one should expect that to occur.

CalPERS was also in the news last week when its former chief executive, Fred Buenrostro, pleaded guilty in a sordid federal criminal case in which he admitted to taking bribes of $200,000 in cash, some of it delivered in a shoebox, no less, as detailed by The Sacramento Bee’s Dale Kasler.

The case against Buenrostro and Villalobos is salacious, but it’s also a sideshow. No matter how corrupt they might have been, they would not have affected the giant pension fund in any significant way.

The far bigger problem is CalPERS’ unfunded liability. That will take years to fix.

In fact, although both funds have come a long way since 2008, neither one is out of this mess. From the Sacremento Bee:

On the surface, CalPERS and CalSTRS have recovered from the crippling multibillion-dollar losses they suffered when the housing bubble burst and the stock market crashed in 2008. CalSTRS’ portfolio, for example, has risen to $189.1 billion in market value, well above the pre-crash watermark of roughly $160 billion. Similarly, the CalPERS portfolio has soared 83 percent since bottoming out at $164 billion in 2009, putting it at $299 billion.

Despite the comeback, the funds spent several years after the crash with a much smaller pool of money to invest. That limited the amount of money they could earn. Even as they made gains, they’ve been unable to keep pace with their pension obligations, which have continued to rise as government workers accumulate years of service.

As a result, CalPERS is 76 percent funded. CalSTRS is 67 percent funded. They have more than enough money to pay pension benefits for now and the foreseeable future, but don’t have enough for the long term. Experts say 100 percent funding is ideal, although a funding level as low as 80 percent is acceptable.

To be fair, California isn’t in denial about the funding status of its two largest funds. And it isn’t letting big returns blind them to the issue, either.

Both funds are increasing contributions rates for members and employers, and the state has increased its own 2014 contribution to both funds. The changes will bring in billions more dollars annually to the system.

Here’s How A Handful of Pension Funds Will Benefit From Citigroup’s $7 Billion Settlement

Last week, Citigroup agreed to settle the claim that it had misled investors about the quality of mortgage-backed bonds it sold prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis. The settlement required that Citi admit they misrepresented the quality of those bonds, and that admission carried a $7 billion price tag for the firm. Most of that money will be allocated toward fines it must pay to the Justice Department and to consumer relief.

But there were other victims as well, which means there are other winners in this settlement: the pension funds who bought those precarious bonds.

Illinois is one state that will benefit. From the Chicago Tribune:

Illinois will receive $84 million as part of a national $7 billion settlement resolving allegations by federal and state authorities that Citigroup Inc. sold risky mortgage-backed securities that harmed investors, which included pension systems and communities.

More than half the money headed to Illinois will fully compensate the state’s pension funds for losses suffered from 2006 to 2007, when they were misled by Citi, according to the Illinois attorney general’s office.

Citigroup will pay $33.04 million to the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System, $3.12 million to the State Universities Retirement System and $7.83 million to the Illinois State Board of Investment, which oversees the State Employees’ Retirement System, General Assembly Retirement System and Judges’ Retirement System.

An additional $40 million will be dedicated to consumer relief, and an independent monitor will be appointed to help distribute the money.

“This relief will fully restore the losses Illinois’ pension systems incurred as a result of Citigroup’s fraudulent schemes in the mortgage-backed securities market, and it will provide much-needed aid to Illinois homeowners who are still paying for Wall Street’s reckless actions,” Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan said in a statement.

Illinois can’t yet break out the party hats: the state’s pension shortfall still stands at around $100 billion.

California is the other major beneficiary. As reported by the Sacramento Business Journal:

California will get nearly $200 million as part of Citigroup Inc.’s $7 billion nationwide settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice in resolving civil claims related to the financial company’s conduct in selling residential mortgage packages during the run-up to the financial crisis.

California’s two large public pension funds, California Public Employees’ Retirement System and California State Teachers’ Retirement System, will recover $102.7 million in damages for losses on mortgage-backed securities. California consumers also are guaranteed at least $90 million in relief.

“Citigroup misled consumers and profited by providing California’s pension funds with incomplete information about mortgage investments,” California Attorney General Kamala Harris said in a news release. “This settlement holds Citi accountable and compensates the state’s pension funds that protect the retirement savings of hardworking Californians.”

New York is receiving $92 million as well, but it’s not known whether the state’s pension funds will see any of that money.

New Details Emerge In CalPERS Conspiracy Case; Ex-CEO Accepted $200,000 in Bribes

Slowly but surely, we are learning more details about the bribery, conspiracy and cronyism that took place within the walls of CalPERS between 2002 and 2008. Prosecutors have had working theories since early 2013, but the case broke wide open last week when former CalPERS Fred Buenrostro pleaded guilty to charges of fraud conspiracy and bribery.

Now, he’s telling his story. Much of what he is saying we already know: he and his friend Alfred Villalobos (a placement agent) conspired to direct billions of dollars in CalPERS investments to a private equity firm called Apollo, for which Villalobos was working as a placement agent.

They also falsified documents to make sure Villalobos raked in massive finders fees to the tune of $14 million; Buenrostro was rewarded with a Lake Tahoe condo, free trips to Dubai and Hong Kong, and a cushy $300,000 a year job at an investment firm after his retirement from CalPERS.

But in a new twist, Buenrostro says he received $200,000 in bribes, delivered via paper bags and shoeboxes, for his trouble. Breitbart reports:

What was new Friday was the blockbuster admission that Buenrostro took $200,000 in cash from Villalobos. In his written plea agreement, Buenrostro said Villalobos paid him in three installments in 2007, “all of which was delivered directly to me in the Hyatt hotel in downtown Sacramento across from the Capitol.”

According to Buenrostro, Villalobos told him to be careful how he deposited the cash in order to avoid detection by banking authorities. “Villalobos told me to be sure to ‘shuffle’ the currency before making any deposit, as the bills were new and appeared to be in sequential order,” Buenrostro wrote.

Later, after he’d left CalPERS and the investigation into their relationship gained momentum, Buenrostro said he accepted an additional $50,000 from Villalobos, paid by check.

Buenrostro is hoping that by cooperating with the investigation, his prison sentence will be reduced. But that depends on how much he has to tell; after all, much of what he has said was already public knowledge. Ed Mendel of CalPensions has read the plea agreement:

Apart from providing the bogus disclosure documents for Apollo, the plea agreement has few specifics about what Buenrostro accomplished for Villalobos while taking gifts and cash from late 2004 until leaving CalPERS in May 2008.

Would Buenrostro tell what success he had in influencing specific CalPERS investment decisions? Does he know if confidential information helped Villalobos, who received at least $50 million in fees, get specific clients seeking CalPERS investments?

What additional information, if any, federal prosecutors may want is not mentioned in the plea agreement.

But there are hints of a larger conspiracy here. Is it possible other CalPERS board members were in on it? Or is Buenrostro simply dropping half-truths to improve his bargaining position with authorities? Again from Mendel:

The Buenrostro plea agreement twice uses the phrase “I did knowingly and intentionally conspire with Villalobos and others.” Whether “others” refers to persons not yet named or is just a legal catch-all term is not clear.

An oddly veiled incident briefly described in the plea agreement seems to suggest that Villalabos used undue influence, if not small bribes, to get the CalPERS board to approve a pharmacy benefits contract.

“In approximately 2005, I observed Villalobos provide valuable casino chips to certain (now former) members of the CalPERS board as well as my wife before the board considered a proposal from Health Care Company No. 1 in connection with CalPERS’ health care benefit program,” said Buenrostro.

Without naming the company or board members, Buenrostro said he saw two of the board members recommend a contract with the company in a CalPERS committee, and then at the full CalPERS board all three chip recipients voted for the contract.

A similar incident is described with names and more detail in a special review of placement agents done for CalPERS by the Steptoe & Johnson law firm and Navigant Consulting, costing $11 million and issued in March 2011.

In 2004, Medco Health Solutions, which lost the CalPERS pharmacy benefits contract several years earlier, hired Villalobos as a consultant for $4 million, said the special review.

Later that year three CalPERS board members — Charles Valdes, Kurato Shimada and Robert Carlson — met with Villalobos, Buenrostro and the Medco CEO, David Snow, at Villalobos’ home at Lake Tahoe.

The five men (excluding Snow) had served together on the CalPERS board ten years earlier, said the review. Buenrostro was hired as CEO in 2002 with the support of Valdes, Shimada and Carlson.

“Valdes also reportedly joined Buenrostro and Villalobos at casinos local to the Villalobos home, where he and others are said to have accepted hundreds of dollars in playing chips from Villalobos while there,” said the review.

“We understand that the chips were offered to Valdes, Buenrostro’s wife at the time, and others to allow Villalobos more time to speak with Buenrostro alone.”

The review said “Shimada also reportedly joined Buenrostro, Valdes and others on visits to casinos local to the Villalobos home and has, at different times, denied and acknowledged accepting playing chips from Villalobos while there.”

Valdes left the CalPERS board in 2009 without seeking re-election.

Shimada resigned from the board in 2010. In 2007, he was the head of a CalPERS committee that rejected a proposal to disclose placement agent fees associated with CalPERS investments.

Arizona Fund Chief To Be Fired After Handing Out Illegal Raises

Last week we brought you the story of an Arizona pension fund that was embroiled in not one, not two, but three separate investigations: The first, a criminal investigation for allegedly inflating asset valuations to trigger bigger bonuses. Second, a workplace investigation into a sexual harassment complaint. The third, a state inquiry into illegal raises of up to 27 percent given to employees of the fund.

The latter investigation wrapped up over the weekend, and the state brought a swift, strong ruling: The Public Safety Personnel Retirement System (PSPRS) will have to fire its top administrator and undo the raises it gave its investment staff. The Arizona Republic reports:

The Public Safety Personnel Retirement System on Wednesday halted illegal pay raises of up to 27 percent that were improperly authorized late last year for five investment-staff employees and were uncovered by The Arizona Republic.

“As of today, we will immediately stop any future payments of the improperly implemented salary adjustments to all five investment staff employees,” PSPRS Chairman Brian Tobin wrote in a letter Wednesday to a state official who further acknowledged the payments violated state law.

Trust administrator Jim Hacking acknowledged Tuesday that PSPRS gave the pay raises without the approval of the state Department of Administration, as required by law. Trust officials refused to say who authorized the pay increases, but Hacking has final authority in all personnel decisions.

Jim Hacking, the fund’s top administrator, is now on leave and is expected to be fired by July 21. He had no comment on the matter.

These raises weren’t your run-of-the-mill, cost-of-living salary increases. On the contrary, the fund was doling out heavy chunks of change to its investment staff, according to The Republic:

Records show the pay increases ranged from 7.5 percent to 26.7 percent, with four of the employees getting annual salary increases in excess of $22,000. Trust officials refused to say how much had been illegally spent, but records compiled by The Republic indicate the total amount in raises was roughly $86,000.

The illegal raises are the latest problem for the trust, which is under a state workplace-violation investigation and a federal criminal probe. The $7.9 billion trust provides retirement benefits for Arizona police officers, firefighters, elected officials and prison guards.
“They are spending money that is not theirs,” said Levi Bolton, executive director of the 14,000-member Arizona Police Association. “Why not just go out and buy a pony?”

More specifics:

Those receiving the raises were:

• Mark Steed, chief of staff. His pay increased by 26.7 percent, or $27,142, to $128,741.

• Shan Chen, lead portfolio manager. His pay increased by 19.4 percent, or $22,296, to $136,991.

• Mark Lundin, deputy chief investment officer. His pay raise was the only one not retroactive. His pay increased 13.46 percent, or $22,890 to $192,890.

• Martin Anderson, deputy chief investment officer. His pay increased by 13.3 percent or $24,400, to $208,000. Hacking also gave Anderson a three-year contract on June 1 that includes guaranteed raises and a $69,000 retention bonus in 2017.

• Vaida Maleckaite, investment operations analyst. Her pay increased by 7.5 percent, or $5,895, to $83,895.

Did the staff deserve raises? Who knows. The PSPRS was only 60% funded as of 2012, which doesn’t reflect all that well on the fund’s management.

While Hacking is surely his way out, he may take a good chunk of money with him. That’s because the fund’s board is now tasked with negotiating a settlement package with Hacking. The board extended his contract last December, and it lasts until July 2015. He currently makes $234,000 a year.

An Under-The-Rader Bill in Illinois Would Set Up Another State-Run Retirement Plan

Illinois has the worst funded pension system in the United States–40.37 percent funded as of 2013–which is why it’s a significant news item that state lawmakers are trying to establish another state-run retirement system. Interestingly, these efforts have garnered very little media attention. But the idea is edging closer to becoming law, as the bill passed the Senate in April and now waits in the House.

The bill, called SB2758–which you can read in its entirety here–would set up a 401(k)-style plan for all businesses in the private sector who don’t already have a retirement plan. All eligible employees would be automatically enrolled, although there would be an opt-out option. And the program would be run by Illinois Department of Revenue. Reboot Illinois has more:

The proposed program would require employers who employee over 25 workers and who offer no retirement plan to automatically enroll their employees with a 3% payroll deduction. The employees could opt out at any time or change the contribution level. These retirement accounts are totally portable, and the money would never enter the state treasury but would instead be owned by the worker. The assets would be pooled to ensure low fees and secure investments. Simply put, the plan would make it easy for employees to save their own money for retirement without burdening employers or costing taxpayers a penny.

The program would be overseen by a Board chaired by the state Treasurer. The bill lays out a simple concept: automatic enrollment in a retirement savings account that belongs to employees and not politicians and is managed by proven private vendors. To make it a reality, we need a state Treasurer who is committed to transparency, knowledgeable about finance, and relentless in fighting for the financial security of ordinary people.

A 401(k) plan is much safer for the government to administer than a defined-benefit plan. But Illinois has a poor track record when it comes to maintaining a sustainable retirement system, and it’s that angle that has people worried about the state’s ability to run a retirement system. That includes John Giokaris of the Illinois Mirror:

If experience teaches us anything, the entry of Illinois state government into the non-public employee retirement fund marketing and investment oversight business ought to be a non-starter. SB 2758 attempts to construct a government program that largely duplicates IRA services already widely available in the private market for anyone interested in retirement savings. It exposes the state and private employers to a liability risk, despite the bill’s purported protections against lawsuits (this is Illinois, after all). It also opens the door for likely litigation over whether a state can compel participation in a program that Biss and Frerichs are selling as “voluntary.”

The reason for the bill is simple: Illinois’ private sector workers aren’t saving enough money. And they shouldn’t expect Social Security to help them, because it won’t be enough. From Reboot Illinois:

Social Security was never intended to be a sole source of retirement income. Indeed, the average Social Security payout per month is $1,281. Unfortunately, in Illinois, the median amount of money in retirement accounts is $3,000. Together, these two numbers tell us that far too many Illinois residents will likely to live in poverty when their working days are over. They should not have to choose between paying for groceries, utilities or their prescriptions. They deserve better than that: they deserve a safe, easy way to save for retirement.

Ultimately, it’s up to the government to administer this plan in an efficient, cost-effective way that doesn’t put a target on the back of taxpayers’ heads down the line. You can be sure the debate around this plan will intensify if and when it passes the House. Pension360 will keep you updated.

Detroit Gives Raises to City Officials As Vote Nears to Cut Worker Pensions

Detroit’s high-profile bankruptcy has filled the front pages of newspapers across the country, and it seems the new twists just keep coming in this drama. In one corner, public employees and retirees are getting ready to vote on a measure that would cut their paychecks and pensions in unprecedented ways.

In the other corner, Detroit’s Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr is drawing flak for awarding raises to many city officials, including the mayor, city council members, and some non-union city workers:

Effective July 1, they all get 5 percent raises. Before the raise, Mayor Mike Duggan earned $158,000 a year, and Detroit’s nine at-large council members made $73,181 each, along with a pension, cell phone, city car and city-paid gasoline.

By comparison, the median household income in Detroit was $25,193 in 2011, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Orr’s own salary of $275,000 a year to guide Detroit through the largest municipal bankruptcy case in history will not change.

“We’re still in the middle of bankruptcy, we still don’t know what the cost is going to be, and it seems like the attorney fees, right now, have gone up to $75 million,” [Wayne County Executive Robert] Ficano said live on WWJ 950 Wednesday morning.

Orr’s office says the costs for the increases are covered in the city’s restructuring plan, which is pending in federal bankruptcy court. Later this month, some of those same workers will see larger paycheck deductions earmarked for increased pension contributions. Deductions of 4 percent to 8 percent will begin July 14 to help fund pensions.

Back to the vote: the stakes are high for both the city and its workers. If workers and retirees vote “yes” on the measure, they’ll be giving up big chunks of their paychecks and benefits. If they vote “no”, they’ll likely have to settle for a far worse deal:

Hundreds of millions of dollars in pledged foundation and state money to spare deeper cuts from pensions and to save the city’s art collection depends on approval of the city’s plan by workers and retirees. If they vote against it, the pledged donations vanish. This may be the proponents’ most convincing argument: Vote for the city’s deal, or cuts — as much as 4.5 percent from some retirees’ pensions as well as smaller than expected cost-of-living increases — will get far worse.

If they go along with the deal, retirees and workers would also agree to give up lawsuits challenging cuts to their pensions. Though a federal judge here has made it clear that he believes pensions may be cut in bankruptcy, the Michigan Constitution includes protections, and opponents of the city’s plan say they cannot believe their colleagues would even consider ceding legal challenges.

Meanwhile, another struggling Michigan city, Flint, is considering following in Detroit’s footsteps by declaring bankruptcy. Flint is attempting to cut its retirees’ benefits to improve its financial position. But the legality of that move is dubious and will be decided by a judge soon.

Flint once had 200,000 residents has seen a dramatic drop in population over the past several decades. The birthplace of General Motors (NYSE: GM) has lost many factory jobs and abandonment of properties.

Last year, Detroit became the largest municipality in the U.S to enter Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Flint is about an hour away and if the judge rules against the city’s effort to cut its retiree health care benefits, the city is expected to file for bankruptcy. Flint will join dozens of cities and counties that have sought help from courts to modify their retiree benefit system.

“If we don’t get any relief in the courts … we are headed over the same cliff as Detroit,” said Darnell Earley, the emergency manager of Flint’s finances. “We can’t even sustain the budget we have if we have to put more money into health care for city workers.”

Photo Credit: University of Michigan via Flickr Creative Commons License

The Politics Behind Pennsylvania’s Pension Wrangling

When Pension360 last reported on news out of Pennsylvania, its governor was refusing to sign the state’s budget by the July 1^st deadline unless lawmakers passed major pension reform.

The July 1^st deadline has come and gone, and no reform measures have emerged from the legislature. But Gov. Tom Corbett made his move yesterday—signing the budget but forcefully wielding his line item veto power. The strategy: cut vital spending from the budget in an attempt draw lawmakers away from their summer vacations and back to the capitol:

Overall, Corbett struck $65 million from the Legislature’s own appropriations and another $7.2 million in earmarks and other spending items picked by lawmakers, noting that the proposal sent to him last week increased the General Assembly’s own $320 million budget by 2 percent.

“They filled the budget with discretionary spending and then refused to deal with the biggest fiscal challenge facing Pennsylvania, our unsustainable public pension system,” Corbett told reporters.

Overall, the $29 billion budget Corbett signed Thursday does not increase state taxes while authorizing $871 million in new spending, largely for public schools, prisons, pension obligations, health care for the poor and social safety-net programs.

To plug the deficit, it relies on more than $2.5 billion in one-time stopgaps, the biggest use of stopgaps outside of the three years around the Great Recession.

The main appropriations bill passed without a single vote from a Democrat.

Lawmakers made no immediate indication of how they would respond to the line-item vetoes, or whether they would move up planned return dates of Aug. 4 for the House and Sept. 15 for the Senate.

There are two reasons Gov. Corbett is choosing to take a stand now. I’ve already mentioned the first one: lawmakers leave for the summer after the budget is passed and don’t return until as late as September 15. Corbett wants to get them back to the capitol to pass pension reform.

But the second reason is this: Gov. Corbett is facing an upcoming election—and he’s currently trailing in polls behind his Democratic challenger, Tom Wolf.

So if some of this feels like campaign theater, it’s because it probably is. In fact, the political calculus behind Corbett’s recent decisions is one of the more fascinating aspects of this story.

Consider that Corbett could have vetoed the budget entirely, a move that would certainly rile lawmakers and get them back from their summer vacations. But the move would have riled the electorate, too:

A full veto would affect many stakeholders, though most employees would get paid. It potentially could delay money for groups receiving millions of dollars from the state, particularly social services such as day care providers hit hard in 2009 during a 101-day budget impasse under ex-Gov. Ed Rendell.

Corbett wants to be seen as taking a stand to save the state’s finances, not sabotage them. Line item vetoes are a less reckless way of accomplishing that goal.

Political maneuvering aside, Corbett has a point. Pennsylvania’s pension system, as is true in many states, is a fiscal hazard that will only get worse as time goes on:

If lawmakers don’t find a solution to what Corbett calls a pension crisis, costs will steadily rise for taxpayers. Pennsylvania will raise payments into the state’s pension systems by $600 million in the new budget year. The state has $47 billion in unfunded liability in pension obligations.

If you asked Corbett about his line item vetoes, he would probably tell you that, in fact, deep cuts to social services spending will be the new norm if lawmakers can’t get pension costs under control.

Corbett’s actions are making him enemies with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle:

[Democrats accused] Corbett of lacking leadership skills and mishandling the state’s finances while pursuing school funding cuts that they say accelerated school property tax hikes.

“Tom Corbett made this mess,” House Minority Leader Frank Dermody, D-Allegheny, said. “He owns it.”

Republicans stressed that they had worked hard to pass a pension overhaul.

House Majority Leader Mike Turzai, R-Allegheny, said the leading pension bill was hatched by House Republicans, not Corbett, while the Senate’s four top Republicans suggested Corbett had been reckless.

“The state budget process is not a game to be played and vital government programs should never be placed in jeopardy,” they said in a statement.

Pension360 will keep you updated on this story as it plays out over the next few weeks.

Photo by Chesapeake Bay Program via Flickr CC

Report Provides New Look at Public Pension Debt, State-by-State

Robert Sarvis and the Competitive Enterprise Institute have released a new report on public pension debt in the United States. The report draws from several estimates of pension debt and produces a list of states with the highest (and lowest) burdens of pension debt on their shoulders.

The report begins by laying out some of the reasons most states are shouldering massive pension debts:

One reason is legal. In many states, pension payments have stronger legal protections than other kinds of debt. This has made reform extremely difficult, as government employee unions can sue to block any scaling back of generous pension packages.

Then there is the politics. For years, government employee unions have effectively opposed efforts to control the costs of generous pension benefits. Meanwhile, politicians who rely on government unions for electoral support have been reluctant to pursue reform, as they find it much easier to pass the bill to future generations than to anger their union allies.

Another contributing factor has been math—or rather, bad math. For years, state governments have understated the underfunding of their pensions through the use of dubious accounting methods. This involves using a discount rate—the interest rate used to determine the present value of future cash flows—that is too high. This affects the valuation of liabilities and the level of governments’ contributions into their pension funds.

More on the ‘bad math’ portion of that argument:

In defined benefit plans, states are on the hook for payouts regardless of their pensions’ funding level. Therefore, the discount rate used in the valuation of pension liabilities should be a low-risk rate, because of the fixed nature of pension liabilities. Ideally, this should as low as the rate of return on 10- to 20-year Treasury bonds, which is in the 3 to 4 percent range.

However, in the U.S., most state and local governments use discount rates based on much higher investment return projections, usually of 7 to 8 percent a year. This usually leads to state and local governments making lower contributions, in the expectation of high investment returns making up for the gap. However, while such returns may be achievable at some times, they need to be achievable year-on-year in order for a pension fund to meet its payout obligations, which grow without interruption. Therefore, failing to achieve such high returns can result in pension underfunding that extends into the future. Discount rates based on high return projections also incentivize pension fund managers to seek higher returns. This encourages in-vesting in riskier assets, which incur large losses for investors when they go south.

For years, this practice was validated by the quasi-private Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). To improve accounting, GASB recently introduced new standards that have pensions deemed underfunded—those with a funding level of under 80 percent—use a lower discount rate. However, pension plans deemed to be above 80 percent funded will still be able to use a high discount rate. Thus, the new GASB standards do not go nearly far enough to end the dubious accounting practices that have exacerbated state pension underfunding by hiding its extent.

Of course, these factors affect different states in different ways. Not all states use an 8 percent discount rate, although many do. That’s why the report breaks down which states are the worst off based. We won’t give away the results–but there are some surprises. Click the link below to check out the results of this interesting study.

Read the full report here.

The GOP Is Floating A Pension Tweak to Fix the Highway Trust Fund – Is It A Good Plan?

We’re used to hearing news of pension wrangling coming from politicians on the state and local level–but today, we get some rare news of a pension debate happening in the United States House of Representatives.

First, some context: The Highway Trust Fund is going to run out of money sometime in August. It is funded by gas tax revenues, but that money has proved insufficient in the face of increased transportation spending.

Courtesy of the Department of Transportation

The Fund is a fairly important one: it is the source for federal spending on highways, roads, bridges and transit. So its insolvency, in short, is problematic. Democrats have previously proposed raising taxes to infuse the Fund with some extra cash. But Republicans have stood in staunch opposition to that method, and they’ve just recently come out with a plan of their own (and it involves pensions):

The proposal, which would be financed in several unusual ways, is expected to generate about $10 billion to keep the Highway Trust Fund from becoming insolvent on Aug. 1 and to pay for projects the fund does not cover. The committee will begin work on the bill Thursday.

The plan would be financed through a financial maneuver known as pension smoothing, which increases tax revenues by allowing companies to delay tax-deductible pension contributions, and by unspecified user fees. Money would also be transferred from a fund that is used to clean up leaky underground storage tanks.

In other words:

Essentially the GOP will allow private firms with retirement plans to contribute less to them next year. That will bolster firms’ profits and, therefore, increase tax collections. In other words Congress will violate its own standards, put into law to protect pensions with sensible accounting, for a short term revenue boost.

The plan would generate about $10 billion and would buy Congress more time to figure out a long-term fix to the HTF’s solvency woes. But it doesn’t come without its drawbacks, as Steve Malanga explains:

None of this is free, of course. Aside from the dangerous trend of allowing private firms to purposely underfund their pensions, the plan boosts federal revenues today at the cost of increasing the deficit over the long term.
Given this proposal, you would think that everything is just peachy with funding of private sector pensions in America. But The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which is responsible for insuring private pensions, just put out a report estimating it’s on an eight-year path to insolvency itself.
The nation’s laws dictating private sector pension standards were enacted to protect retirement plans. But Congress, in its endless quest for more revenues, can’t even live by the standards that it imposed on companies.

Mr. Malanga presents this chart:

Congress appears to be in a major conundrum–do they fund the HTF now at the expense of the future? Do they leave the Fund empty, and put many major infrastructure projects on hold? Or do they come up with another solution? The third option is simultaneously the most logical and the least likely. Stay tuned.

CalPERS Sends Message to Cities: Pay Up

In 2012, the city of San Bernardino, California made an unprecedented move: bankrupt and financially handcuffed, the town defied pension juggernaut CalPERS and simply stopped paying its contributions to the system. It has since resumed making those payments, but the fight is far from over. Now, CalPERS wants the city to pay back the payments it missed:

At issue is the $17 million in back payments and penalties that San Bernardino failed to make between declaring bankruptcy in August 2012 and resuming payments in July. Calpers has maintained that it is owed in full. But now in bankruptcy negotiations, the city is hoping to pay only a fraction of that, arguing that the city’s creditors must all share in the bankruptcy pain. The amount may be small, given the system’s assets, but if San Bernardino gets a reduction, the precedent could be huge, opening the door to other struggling municipalities using bankruptcy law to justify delaying or withholding payments to the pension system.

“This city has taken on the 800-pound gorilla, which is Calpers,” said Ron Oliner, a lawyer for the San Bernardino Police Officers Association, which represents the city’s uniformed officers. “Everyone in California is watching San Bernardino, and everybody in the nation is watching California.”

Calpers has for many years resisted all efforts to allow cities, for whatever reason, to stop making their required payments. (Federal law allows bankrupt companies to slow them greatly.) While agreeing that “significant progress has been made in the mediation,” Rosanna Westmoreland, external communications manager for Calpers, said the pension system’s hands were largely tied by statutes mandating that all the pension system’s participants make their full contributions on time and that no workers’ benefits be reduced. “It is the law,” she said.

The problem is that it remains unclear whether, in cases like this, federal bankruptcy law trumps state pension laws. A federal judge hearing the Detroit bankruptcy case ruled, for instance, that federal laws took precedence in that case, so the benefits of city workers in Detroit could be reduced in defiance of state law. But Calpers has insisted that this does not apply to the situation in California, an assertion that may be tested in court, if the mediation provides no solution.

Even before a recent wave of municipal bankruptcies hit California, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, known as Calpers, had also insisted that under state law, no local government or public agency could reduce the benefits of current workers or retirees.

Cutting pension costs have proved difficult in California. That’s due to the so-called “California Rule”, which prohibits the rollback of pension benefits, even on a go-forward basis. Economist Sasha Volokh explains:

Most states are free to alter public employee pensions, as long as they do so on a purely prospective basis. For instance, a state can reduce cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), say from 3% to 2%, as long as the amount accrued so far is still subject to the old COLA. But the rule is otherwise in California: California courts have held that ‘upon acceptance of public employment [one] acquire[s] a vested right to a pension based on the system then in effect.
In California, when a public employee begins work, he not only acquires a right to the pension accumulated so far—presumably zero on the first day, and increasing as he works longer—but also the right to continue to earn a pension on terms that are at least as generous as the ones then in effect, for as long as he works. And if pension rules become more generous in the future, then those more generous terms are the ones that are protected. Any changes to these rules must be reasonable, meaning that they ‘must bear some material relation to the theory of a pension system and its successful operation,’ and any disadvantages to the employees ‘should be accompanied by comparable new advantages.’ This is the ‘California rule.

Cities have tried to roll back their pension obligations. San Jose was one such city; earlier this year, it passed a plan forcing employees to pay more towards pensions. But the courts responded with a resounding “you can’t do that”. Volokh, for one, doesn’t like the economics behind that ruling.

When pensions are given special protection that’s unavailable for other job characteristics, the mix of wages and pensions is distorted relative to what it would otherwise be (given collective bargaining, tax policy, employee time and risk preferences, and other factors). If market or fiscal pressures mean government compensation must become less generous, it’s salaries and other benefits that must take the hit, even if some employees would prefer to take some of the blow in terms of decreased pension benefits. Those with shorter life expectancies — men, the less-educated, the poor, minorities, and those in bad health — suffer the most from policies that protect pensions at the expense of current salaries. Some of the pain will also fall on taxpayers, and some of that pain may result in trimming state government services (e.g., police, fire, garbage collection, DMV, schools). The California rule thus makes reductions in government compensation either more painful for employees or more expensive to taxpayers than they would be if pension terms could adjust together with salaries and other benefits.

Anyhow, CalPERS is setting a precedent with its action towards San Bernardino. It’s a precedent that indicates, bankrupt or not, cities still owe CalPERS its money.

Photo by Pete Zarria via Flickr CC

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