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Judge Gives New Orleans Another Month To Cover Pension Debts

New Orleans now has until October 3^rd to come up with a plan to cover the funding shortfalls facing the city’s firefighter pension fund after a judge today extended the city’s deadline.

A judge ruled last year that New Orleans had to pay back the firefighters’ pension fund for the annual payments the city had skipped between 2009 and 2013. That dollar amount could total up to $52 million. From The Times-Picayune:

The standoff between Mayor Mitch Landrieu and New Orleans firefighters showed small signs of a thaw Wednesday (Sept. 3) as Civil Court Judge Robin Giarrusso gave the city another month to produce a plan to cover its massive debts to the firefighters’ pension fund.

Tommy Meagher, secretary and treasurer of the pension fund’s governing board, said the firefighters are willing to refinance the city’s obligations in creative ways to help lower the monthly payments going forward.

“The pension board has gone above and beyond everything we can do,” he said.

Part of New Orleans plan will likely involve several accounting tactics, including pension smoothing. From The Times-Picayune:

He explained that the board had agreed to stretch the city’s future pension obligations over 30 years rather than 14.5 years — a tactic that he compared to refinancing a home mortgage. He also said the board is willing to extend “pension smoothing,” an accounting strategy that lets the fund’s actuary predict higher interest rates when calculating the fund’s future investment returns. Essentially, if the fund can show it will earn more on its investments down the road, the city can pay less to the fund each month.

The board was willing to extend its use of smoothing from three years to seven, Meagher said.

Andy Kopplin, Landrieu’s chief administrative officer, said he had been asking for such breaks since 2011 and expressed appreciation for the board’s willingness to bend.

“We commend the board for doing that,” he said.

When a judge originally ruled in 2013 that New Orleans had to recoup the payments it shorted the pension fund, the city tried to appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court refused to hear the case.

Hawaii Labeled “Sinkhole” State by Watchdog Group

A few names consistently pop up in any discussion of states with the most pension debt—Illinois, New Jersey and a handful of other states are frequently cited as shouldering the heaviest pension burdens.

Hawaii isn’t always on that list. But according to one watchdog group, Truth in Accounting, the state’s pension burden is among the worst in the country. The Hawaii Reporter recaps:

Only Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois and Connecticut are in worse fiscal condition that Hawaii.

Donna Rook, president of StateDataLab.org, a division of Truth in Accounting, said Hawaii has been one of the five worst states since this annual study was started in 2009.

“The average Hawaii taxpayer’s share of the state’s debt is $27,000 after available assets are tapped. Since we set aside both capital assets and debt related to capital, the remaining debt is primarily unfunded pensions and retirement health,” Rook said.

The $27,000 per taxpayer is about 57 percent of the average resident’s annual income, Rook said.

Sheila Weinberg, founder and CEO of Truth in Accounting, said Hawaii financial statements show $4 billion in retirement liabilities, but the state actually has nearly $15 billion of unfunded retirement promises.

Hawaii has only $5 billion to pay the state’s bills, which total $18 billion, Weinberg said.

The same Truth in Accounting report also shared some better news: Hawaii has vastly improved the timeliness of its year-end financial reports.

For more data on Hawaii, visit Truth in Accounting’s data lab here.

Michigan To Sell Record Number of Bonds to Finance Pension Shortfalls

640px-Kalamazoo — Kalamazoo is just one Michigan city considering a historic bond offering to cover pension obligations.

It’s a strategy that’s becoming increasingly common—municipalities, straddled with outstanding pension obligations, issue bonds to cover near-term funding shortfalls.

In a particularly risky iteration of the practice, cities and states will take the proceeds from selling the bonds and re-invest them into the market.

That’s exactly what Michigan is gearing up to do, according to Bloomberg:

The Detroit suburb of Macomb County plans a $270 million sale of municipal debt, its biggest ever, to finance retiree health-care costs, while Kalamazoo is considering a historic $100 million bond offer for similar expenses. Bloomfield Hills plans to borrow a record $17 million for pensions. The law allowing the practice expires Dec. 31.

U.S. states and cities are struggling with how to pay for promises to workers after the recession ravaged their finances. Yet few communities see debt as the answer — sales of revenue-backed pension bonds have tallied $356 million this year, data compiled by Bloomberg show. Interest rates close to five-decade lows are making it more attractive to pursue the risky strategy of investing borrowed funds in financial markets.

“We can’t afford to wait,” said Peter Provenzano, Macomb County finance director. “Timing the market is difficult. You could sit on the sidelines and miss out on an opportunity.”

It’s a risky strategy that’s been covered many times before, perhaps best by the Center for Retirement Research’s recent brief.

The gist: If a city is going to re-invest proceeds from issued debt, they better hope the market produces returns that exceed the cost of servicing the debt.

The problem is, most cities that turn to this practice are already in dire straits fiscally. If the bet doesn’t pay off, it leaves cities even worse off.

At least one Michigan city is shying away from the practice: Grand Rapids.

“The best way to have odds in your favor is to do this when stock prices are depressed,” Scott Buhrer, the city’s chief financial officer, told Bloomberg. “We’re in the latter stage of a bull market.”

Photo: “Kalamazoo” by User Mxobe on en.wikipedia – own-work. Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons

Puerto Rico’s Pension Obligations May Lead to US-Style Bankruptcy

Puerto Rico may not have statehood status, but it’s picking up some of the United States’ habits. Lately, that means weighing bankruptcy. And, like the United States, ballooning pension obligations are a major reason Puerto Rico is wearing the proverbial fiscal handcuffs.

From Reuters:

Momentum is building toward a deal that would make painful losses inevitable for investors holding about $20 billion in bonds issued by Puerto Rico’s highway, water and electricity authorities even as some big U.S. mutual funds launch a legal battle to squelch a new law that authorizes a restructuring.

The Puerto Rican government and most of its creditors have hired U.S.-based bankruptcy experts to advise them through the Caribbean island’s efforts to solve its debt problem, and the resolution figures to look a lot like a U.S.-style bankruptcy.

The crisis came to a head late last month when Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla pushed through the Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act to create a bankruptcy-like process for restructuring the debt of commonwealth-run corporations.

This isn’t coming out of nowhere; the writing has been on the wall recently. Just two weeks ago, Fitch downgraded a number of Puerto Rico’s bonds. From a Fitch press release via Business Wire:

Puerto Rico’s bonded debt levels and unfunded pension liabilities are very high relative to U.S. states, with a large amount of outstanding debt issued for deficit financing purposes. Pension funding will remain exceptionally low even with the significant pension reform effort undertaken by the current administration, and the April 2014 Puerto Rico Supreme Court decision finding recent reforms of the teachers’ retirement system unconstitutional presented the administration with yet another challenge. The Commonwealth has stated in the past that without reform the teachers retirement system would confront an annual cash flow deficit beginning in fiscal 2020.

Puerto Rico tried earlier this year to reform its teacher pension system, which is set to run out of money by 2020. The Island passed a law that increased retirement ages and employee contributions, while mandating that the system adopt more 401(k) qualities. But a court struck down the law in April.

Report Provides New Look at Public Pension Debt, State-by-State

Robert Sarvis and the Competitive Enterprise Institute have released a new report on public pension debt in the United States. The report draws from several estimates of pension debt and produces a list of states with the highest (and lowest) burdens of pension debt on their shoulders.

The report begins by laying out some of the reasons most states are shouldering massive pension debts:

One reason is legal. In many states, pension payments have stronger legal protections than other kinds of debt. This has made reform extremely difficult, as government employee unions can sue to block any scaling back of generous pension packages.

Then there is the politics. For years, government employee unions have effectively opposed efforts to control the costs of generous pension benefits. Meanwhile, politicians who rely on government unions for electoral support have been reluctant to pursue reform, as they find it much easier to pass the bill to future generations than to anger their union allies.

Another contributing factor has been math—or rather, bad math. For years, state governments have understated the underfunding of their pensions through the use of dubious accounting methods. This involves using a discount rate—the interest rate used to determine the present value of future cash flows—that is too high. This affects the valuation of liabilities and the level of governments’ contributions into their pension funds.

More on the ‘bad math’ portion of that argument:

In defined benefit plans, states are on the hook for payouts regardless of their pensions’ funding level. Therefore, the discount rate used in the valuation of pension liabilities should be a low-risk rate, because of the fixed nature of pension liabilities. Ideally, this should as low as the rate of return on 10- to 20-year Treasury bonds, which is in the 3 to 4 percent range.

However, in the U.S., most state and local governments use discount rates based on much higher investment return projections, usually of 7 to 8 percent a year. This usually leads to state and local governments making lower contributions, in the expectation of high investment returns making up for the gap. However, while such returns may be achievable at some times, they need to be achievable year-on-year in order for a pension fund to meet its payout obligations, which grow without interruption. Therefore, failing to achieve such high returns can result in pension underfunding that extends into the future. Discount rates based on high return projections also incentivize pension fund managers to seek higher returns. This encourages in-vesting in riskier assets, which incur large losses for investors when they go south.

For years, this practice was validated by the quasi-private Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). To improve accounting, GASB recently introduced new standards that have pensions deemed underfunded—those with a funding level of under 80 percent—use a lower discount rate. However, pension plans deemed to be above 80 percent funded will still be able to use a high discount rate. Thus, the new GASB standards do not go nearly far enough to end the dubious accounting practices that have exacerbated state pension underfunding by hiding its extent.

Of course, these factors affect different states in different ways. Not all states use an 8 percent discount rate, although many do. That’s why the report breaks down which states are the worst off based. We won’t give away the results–but there are some surprises. Click the link below to check out the results of this interesting study.

Read the full report here.

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