Ted Ballantine | Pension360

NY Comptroller DiNapoli: Six Reasons the State Shouldn’t Switch to a 401(k) System

State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli is the sole trustee of New York’s $180 billion Common Retirement Fund (CRF).

His challenger, Robert Antonacci, has said he would shift New York’s pensioners into a 401(k)-type plan if elected.

But during an editorial board meeting Monday, DiNapoli laid out six reasons why he’d keep New York’s defined-benefit system in place. From Syracuse.com:

1. It benefits 1 million New York employees and their families, a significant portion of the state’s population, he said. The average pension paid retirees, other than firefighters and police, is $21,000 a year.

2. The money paid out to retirees stays in New York, benefiting the state’s economy. About 80 percent of the people who receive a pension remain in the state, DiNapoli said.

3. The state’s pension plan is 92 percent funded and that’s a good asset to have when New York goes out to borrow money, he said. The health of the state’s pension plan is one of the things financial agencies look at when they issue bond ratings. Those ratings in turn affect the ability of the state and local municipalities to borrow.

4. New York has responded to current economic conditions by curtailing pension benefits for newly hired state employees. Local governments that have had a turnover in employees saw a savings as a result, DiNapoli said.

5. Twice in the past two years the state has cut the rate local governments pay into the system, he said.

6. Switching to a defined contribution plan won’t change the state’s obligation to provide a pension to the 1 million people already in the system, DiNapoli said. Plus, it would create retirement insecurity for even more New Yorkers. “A 401(k) was never meant to be the substitute for a pension,” DiNapoli said.

DiNapoli is leading Antonacci in the polls by double digits.

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Arizona Pension Commits $150 Million To Real Estate Funds

The Arizona State Retirement System (ASRS) has committed a total of $150 million to two real estate funds: Blackstone Property Partners and Related Companies’ Energy Housing Fund.

The first fund will invest in industrial, retail and office buildings. The second fund will focus on residential apartments.

From IPE Real Estate:

The pension fund approved the $100m commitment to Blackstone Property Partners, as well as a $50m commitment to the Related Companies’ Energy Housing Fund.

Arizona is the second major US institutional investor to place capital with Blackstone Property Partners, following a $100m commitment last month by the Texas Permanent School Fund.

Blackstone, which is looking at a $1bn initial capital raise for the fund, will co-invest $75m of its own capital.

The open-ended fund, will invest in larger properties and portfolios. US office, industrial, retail apartments are being targeted by the fund, which is projected to achieve between 9% and 11% returns and be leveraged at 50%.

Arizona said Related’s Energy Housing Fund will invest in residential properties – primarily apartments – in areas of energy development and tight housing conditions. The pension fund will classify the investment as a niche and tactical investment within its real estate portfolio.

The fund will invest in US apartments as well as new developments, focusing on deals in Texas and North Dakota for their links to the energy sector.

[…]

The pension fund said it is also conducting due diligence on two more potential investments: a joint venture with Red Mill Capital to invest in US retail, and a co-investment with the CIM Group on a New York residential and retail project.

ASRS allocated $500 million for real estate investments in 2014.

The pension fund manages $30 billion in assets.

New Jersey Pension Panel Faces “Big Test”

When Chris Christie created the Pension and Benefit Study Commission, the skeptics were quick to point out the politics of the decision.

The panel was formed to recommend reforms for the state’s pension system; but when Christie announced his appointees, some thought its real function was to act as a political shield for the governor, who has said benefit cuts are likely on the horizon for state workers.

The panel is set to release its latest report in November. The editorial board of the New Jersey Star-Ledger says the report will be a “big test” for the panel:

The panel is expected to issue its report within a month. If it offers a lopsided solution that relies entirely on a second round of benefit cuts, its report will be dead on arrival. Democrats would not consider a solution like that, and for good reason.

[…]

Democratic leaders say they will not consider more benefits cuts until Christie restores full payments. That can’t be done without a tax increase, which Christie finds equally repugnant.

The job of this panel is to find the political sweet spot, to come up with a repair plan that both sides might accept. If it fails that test, its report will gather dust and its mission will have failed.

In the end, Democrats will have to accept some new benefit cuts. The state’s fiscal condition is much worse than anyone expected when this deal was signed in 2011, thanks mostly to the sputtering economy. If New Jersey had simply matched the average state since the Great Recession, it would have raised roughly $3 billion more in annual revenues and the 2011 reform would probably have survived.

Democrats can’t expect taxpayers to make up the entire shortfall if there are reasonable cuts to be made. One example: In its preliminary report, this panel noted that the state’s health benefits remain generous, and that some might qualify as “Cadillac plans” under Obama care. The state also treats early retirees more generously than Social Security does. The panel, no doubt, will have a long list of soft spots like this.

Christie needs to face reality, too. He can’t expect public workers to bear the entire burden when the state that has shortchanged these funds for so long, and when Christie himself broke his commitment to do better. And after years of fiscal crisis, there is simply no spare money in the treasury. That means a tax increase is needed.

This is a bipartisan panel, but Christie made all the appointments, a big mistake that undercuts its credibility. If its members want to have impact, they will have to declare their independence by offering a balanced repair plan.

If that leaves both sides unhappy, then the panel will have done its job by telling the hard truth about this unforgiving math.

The panel’s first report can be read here.

New Orleans Creates Pension Reform Task Force

New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu announced Tuesday morning the creation of a “task force” to recommend “fundamental” changes to the city’s Fire Fighters Relief & Pension Fund.

From the Times-Picayune:

The mayor created the “working group” through an executive order that will stay in place for 12 months.

The group will be made up of nine members, including city officials, firefighter representatives and local business leaders, according to the announcement.

– New Orleans Chief Administrative Officer Andy Kopplin

– Councilwoman Stacy Head

– Timothy McConnell, superintendent of the New Orleans Fire Department

– Paul Mitchell, Jr., deputy director of the pension board

– Thomas F. Meager, III, secretary and treasurer of the firefighters’ pension board

– Nick Felton, president of New Orleans Fire Fighters Association, Local 632

– Hardy Fowler, an accountant and the former managing partner of KPMG in New Orleans

– Scott Jacobs, an insurance and risk management professional

– Greg Rattler, Sr., a vice president at JPMorgan Chase & Co.

The New Orleans Business Council will pay for outside consultants and any “technical assistance the group may need, according to the announcement. Its chairman, Paul Flower, will also chair the pension advisory group.

The task force doesn’t have authority over the pension fund’s Board of Directors, so it won’t have any way to enforce the changes it prescribes.

The city and Mayor Landrieu are in the midst of a legal battle over unpaid contributions that were supposed to be made annually to the firefighters’ fund.

When Given A Choice, Why Do People Choose DC Plans Over DB Plans?

In many states, newly hired public employees are faced with a choice: enrollment in a traditional defined-benefit plan, or a 401(k)-style defined-contribution plan.

What drives the decision-making of those who choose DC plans? Scott J. Weisbenner and Jeffrey R. Brown examined the topic in a recent paper in the Journal of Public Economics.

They studied employees in the State Universities Retirement System (SURS) of Illinois, a system that gives every employee a one-time, permanent choice between enrolling in a DB or a DC plan. Here’s what they found about why people might choose DC plans:

First, we find sensible patterns with regard to economic and demographic factors: the probability of choosing the DC plan decreases with the relative financial generosity of the DB plans versus the DC plans and rises with education and income. However, while the relative generosity of the plans does have a nontrivial effect on pension plan choice, it certainly is not a “sufficient statistic” in explaining that choice nor is it the most important determinant in terms of its economic magnitude.

Second, we find that the ability to control for beliefs, preferences, financial skills, and plan knowledge – variables that are not available in standard administrative data sets – increases the amount of variation in plan choice that we are able to explain by approximately seven-fold, relative to using standard economic and demographic variables alone. Specifically, as measured by adjusted R-squared, economic and demographic characteristics such as gender, marital status, presence of children, education, income, net worth, occupation, and (self-reported) health can explain only 6.2% of the overall variation in the DB versus DC plan choice (adjusted R-squared = 0.062). When we expand our regression to include information about beliefs, preferences, financial skills, and plan knowledge, the adjusted R-squared rises to 0.471. Among the important factors in the DB/DC plan choice are respondent attitudes about risk/return trade-offs, financial literacy, beliefs about plan parameters, and attitudes about the importance of various plan attributes.

Third, we note that beliefs about plan parameters are important even when these beliefs are incorrect. In general, people seem to make sensible choices based on what they believe to be true about the plans, but they do not always have accurate beliefs (and thus may not be making optimal decisions). Finally, we provide evidence that preferences over the attributes of the retirement system (e.g., the degree of control provided) are also significant determinants of the DB/DC plan decision.

The paper is titled “Why do individuals choose defined contribution plans? Evidence from participants in a large public plan” and can be read in full here.

Photo by TaxCredits.net

Chart: New Jersey Pension Turns In Below-Median Performance

Over the last decade, New Jersey’s pension investments have out-performed those of similar public pension fund. But in more recent years, New Jersey’s performance has fallen off. Although its returns have climbed into double-digits, it hasn’t kept pace with its peers.

Here’s a closer look at the New Jersey’s pension returns over the last four years:

2012 was a down year for nearly every pension fund. But New Jersey managed to perform better than its peers on that occasion. Otherwise, the last four years have been marked by under-performance.

Chart 1 credit: New Jersey Treasury Department

Chart 2 credit: International Business Times

Redacted Document Demonstrates Secrecy Surrounding Pension Funds and Private Equity Investments

The New York Times recently obtained a copy of a private equity limited partnership agreement from Carlyle Partners, and the document offers outsiders a rare peak into the opaque world of private equity investments.

[Document can be viewed at the bottom of this post, or by clicking here.]

The document is heavily, heavily redacted, but it’s important because it reveals just how few details are publicly available regarding the private equity investments of pension funds.

Many pension funds sign agreements just like this one – in fact, the list of pension funds that invest in Carlyle funds is long:

New York City Retirement Systems

CalPERS

CalSTRS

Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System

Florida State Board of Administration

Michigan Retirement Systems

Texas County & District Retirement System

New Mexico Public Employees Retirement System

Los Angeles County Employees’ Retirement Association

and many more.

Pension360 has previously covered how private equity firms encourage pension funds not to comply with FOIA or public records requests pertaining to private equity investments.

That sentiment is reflected in the Carlyle agreement, which pushes pension funds to resist public records requests if possible. From the New York Times:

Another blacked-out section in the Carlyle V agreement dictates how an investor, like a pension fund, also known as a limited partner, should respond to open-records requests about the fund. The clean version of the agreement strongly encourages fund investors to oppose such requests unless approved by the general partner.

Some pension funds have followed these instructions from private equity funds, even in states like Texas, which have sunshine laws that say “all government information is presumed to be available to the public.”

For an in-depth foray into the redacted elements of the agreement and its implications, head over to this Naked Capitalism post or the New York Times article.

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Photo by Truthout.org via Flickr CC License

Few Details On New York Pension’s Partnership With Goldman Sachs As Comptroller Remains Quiet

New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, the sole trustee of the states $181 billion Common Retirement Fund (CRF), announced last month a partnership between the pension fund and Goldman Sachs.

CRF will give Goldman $2 billion to invest in global equities. But few other details have emerged about the partnership. That led one think tank, the Pioneer Institute, to push for more clarity. But the Comptroller’s office has remained mum on specifics. From Public Sector Inc:

The lack of transparency in portfolio management and the conspicuous absence of a board of trustees overseeing the investment process is troubling, if not perilous.

Matthew Sweeney, a spokesman for the comptroller’s office, answered some of a dozen questions about the GSAM deal. Here are a few of those he did not comment on, completely unedited:

– Which other investment management firms applied to the competitive bidding for the $2 billion allocation?

– What were the specific criteria on the basis of which GSAM was selected?

– Can you share the investment policy sheet that was publicized as part of the RfP for this portfolio segment? This would include targets like concentration risk and counterparty risk limits as well as a number of other parameters related to the asset classes included, long/short ratios, other risk metrics, geographies and other relevant characteristics of the desired portfolio.

– What are the performance targets in terms of risk and return for the performance-based compensation, if any?

– What are the benchmarks selected to evaluate the performance of this portfolio sleeve in the coming years?

Mr Sweeney did answer a question regarding the compensation structure in the contract – with the laconic: “Fees are disclosed on an annual basis.”

[…]

With so much pension money at stake, why didn’t Mr DiNapoli’s office publicize the selection process, a clear rationale for the investment and the performance objectives he has (or so one hopes) for Goldman? What value are Goldman’s undoubtedly well-compensated analysts and investment bankers supposed to add?

The so-called partnership “will initially focus on dynamic manager selection opportunities in global equities to enhance returns” and then provide “improved analytics and reporting on its portfolio and enhanced evaluation and due diligence on current and potential active managers.” In other words, the CRF added a potentially expensive actively managed distraction for its global investment team days before CalPERS announced ditching its $4 billion hedge-fund allocation precisely because it was too small to make a dent in overall return and too expensive in terms of time and money to manage.

The bottom line is that, because of their sheer size, most pension funds can do little but focus on efficient cost and risk management. An open and competitive bidding process is essential to keeping costs down. And a critical part of risk management is having a robust, transparent and accountable investment process, which the CRF appears to be patently lacking. One need not look far afield to see where this sort of conduct ultimately leads.

The Common Retirement Fund paid $575 million in management fees in fiscal year 2013-14. The fund manages $181 million in assets.

You can read more coverage of the Goldman Sachs deal here and here.

Union Leader Calls Out Christie, New Jersey For Playing “Fiscal Games” That Led to “Self-Made” Pension Crisis

Patrick Colligan, the president of the New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Association, has written an op-ed piece in the New Jersey State-Ledger expressing his discontent with the report recently produced by the state’s Pension and Health Benefit Study Commission.

In the piece, Colligan chastises Christie for playing “fiscal games” with the state pension system:

The Commission should tell the public about the fiscal games going on behind their backs. Before the ink was dry on the pension reform law the governor began using increased employee contributions to reduce employer pension payments. When the Legislature tried to close that loophole and use the extra contributions for pension funding, the governor vetoed it.

Add that to the failure of the state to make its actuarially required pension contributions and you have the making of a self-made pension crisis. It is worth noting if full PFRS pension payments were made during the last 15 years, it would be funded in the mid-90 percent ratio and no one today would be discussing pension reform.

New Jersey does a great job of shifting costs to employees without ever tackling the reason for those costs. Health benefits are a prime example. If the state were truly interested in reducing their health care costs they can take a number of bold steps. First, cut out insurance companies and administer its own healthcare network.

Second, rein in pharmacy benefit manager costs. How much do these PBMs make off the state? Requests for that information are repeatedly denied. Contracts for prescription costs should be required to show the true costs and rebates for the medicines involved and how much of those costs are enriching the companies brokering the deals.

Finally, the state has too many health plan choices with no real cost containment strategies. The State could consider innovative approaches to control costs like State Health Benefits Program-owned patient care centers, and wellness and disease management.

Contrary to popular belief, no one wants a healthy, well-funded and long-lasting pension and health care system more than the people who pay for it and count on it for their retirement. Put us at the table and have an open mind about our thoughts, and the state would be shocked how fast pension and benefit costs are brought under control.

Colligan also spends a good portion of the piece talking about the funding situation of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS).

Read the whole piece here.

Court: Colorado Pension System Can Cut COLAs

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled Monday that Colorado’s largest pension fund could legally scale back cost-of-living adjustments.

In 2010, the Colorado Public Employee’s Retirement Association (CPERA) cut annual COLA increases from 3.5 percent to 2 percent. Retirees took the cuts to court, alleging breach of contract. But the ruling today sided with the pension system, and so the COLA cuts will remain.

From the Denver Post:

The Colorado Supreme Court on Monday ruled that the Colorado Public Employee’s Retirement Association can adjust the cost-of-living increases that current retirees under the state’s largest pension plan receive.

“We hold that the PERA legislation providing for cost of living adjustments does not establish any contract between PERA and its members entitling them to the perpetual receipt of the specific COLA formula in place on the date each became eligible for retirement or on the date each actually retires,” the Colorado Supreme Court stated in its ruling.

Cost-of-living formulas were first implemented in 1969 and have been adjusted several times over the years, with a 3.5 percent fixed rate set back in 2000 after stock markets had several years of big gains.

Concerns that the pension plan was severely underfunded triggered 2010 legislation that capped annual cost-of-living increases at 2 percent unless the pension’s investment suffered a loss the prior year.

In that case, the increase adjust at the actual inflation rate, up to 2 percent.

Retirees sued, arguing that PERA had a contractual obligation to provide the increases in place at the time they retired for the remainder of their lives.

A district court judged ruled against the retirees in Justus v. State, but the Colorado Court of Appeals overturned that decision.

Colorado Attorney General John Suthers, who office argued the case for the state, said he was pleased with the decision.

“The law in question was an important part of ensuring that PERA remains there for state retirees long into the future. As we argued to the Court, upholding the law helps protect both current and future retirees, and the state’s taxpayers,” he said in a statement.

PERA manages over $40 billion in assets and has over 400,000 members.

Photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

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