Japan Pension’s Portfolio Overhaul Pays Dividends With Record Quarter

Japan

A shift into riskier investments has paid off for Japan’s pension fund – at least in the fourth quarter of 2014.

In late 2014, Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) began a portfolio overhaul that involved shifting a higher percentage of assets away from bonds and into stocks.

The well-publicized shift proved to be a boon for the Tokyo stock market, and the pension fund rode that wave as the fourth quarter of 2014 proved to be the second-best quarter in the fund’s history.

From the Wall Street Journal:

The GPIF on Friday reported a ¥6.6 trillion ($55 billion) investment profit in the December-ended quarter, a return of 5.2% compared with the previous quarter. The fund generated a return of 2.9% in the third quarter.

The value of the its assets under management reached ¥137 trillion, the highest since the fund was created in 2001.

GPIF officials don’t reveal the specifics of their investment activities, but figures released Friday showed the fund has likely sold about ¥6.5 trillion of Japanese government bonds during the quarter while buying roughly ¥2 trillion each of overseas and domestic equities, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.

[…]

At the end of October, the GPIF announced major changes to its asset allocations, cutting its intended weighting to domestic bonds to 35% from 60%. It raised the allocation to foreign and domestic equities to 25% each, from 12% each, and to foreign bonds to 15% from 11%.

The fund is still only halfway toward achieving these targets.

The GPIF manages $1.1 trillion in pension assets and is the largest pension fund in the world.

 

Photo by Ville Miettinen via Flickr CC License

Rhode Island Pension Lawsuit Won’t Be Delayed, Says Judge

Rhode Island Judge
Judge Sarah Taft-Carter

Lawyers on both sides of Rhode Island’s pension lawsuit had asked the court to push back the start of the trial, but a judge denied that request on Friday. The lawyers had wanted more time to prepare, but Superior Court Judge Sarah Taft-Carter re-iterated that the trial will start on April 20, as planned. Carter’s remarks, reported by WPRI:

“It’s time to try the case,” Superior Court Judge Sarah Taft-Carter said in open court. She described the pension cases as “old,” noting some were filed five years ago. The judge said she will file pretrial orders later Friday. Taft-Carter’s decision appeared to catch the dozen or so lawyers by surprise, particularly since both sides were in agreement on the need for a delay, potentially until January. […] But Taft-Carter noted that she had already scrapped one proposed trial start date – September 2014 – to give the two sides more time to prepare. “The issues remain the same,” the judge said. “The parties have had more than a year since the failed mediation to conduct their discovery.” […] John Tarantino, the lead attorney for the state defending the pension law, acknowledged he was disappointed by Taft-Carter’s decision Friday but noted it will have the same effect on both sides. “I understand the judge wants to get the case tried,” Tarantino said. “We believed we would have been in a better position – both sides – with a continuance. … We’ll deal with the time we have.” He indicated it’s unlikely the state will appeal Taft-Carter’s decision.

On Thursday, Carter also granted a motion to consolidate the collection of pension-related lawsuits into a single case.

Moody’s: New Jersey Pension Ruling A “Credit Negative” For State

Chris Christie

A New Jersey Superior Court judge ruled this week that Chris Christie acted outside the law when he cut the state’s pension contributions $2.4 billion over two years.

That means, pending appeal, the state will be making its full contribution in 2015 – a development that hasn’t yet been budgeted for.

So while the ruling was good news for the state’s underfunded pension system, the decision is a “credit negative” for the state itself, according to Moody’s.

From NJ.com:

The flexibility of the state’s pension payment has been “a tool essential” to balancing the budget, Moody’s Investors Service said. Putting limitations on that amounts to a “credit negative.”

“Going forward, making the full pension contribution would incrementally improve the pension funding position, but would significantly increase budget pressure by reducing the state’s ability to fund other programs and potentially challenge the state’s liquidity,” Moody’s said.

[…]

“While it remains unclear whether the payment will be increased in fiscal 2015, a $1.6 billion obligation would comprise nearly 15 percent of the unspent budget,” Moody’s said.

A credit negative assessment doesn’t suggest a rating or outlook change — which could affect New Jersey’s interest rates — is imminent, but rather assesses the impact of a single event, Moody’s said.

Since the full pension payment isn’t budgeted for, lawmakers are worried that “devastating” cuts will have to be made in the current budget.

The situation might have been avoided had the state taken the same approach as Illinois in 2013.

When Illinois passed it’s pension overhaul it didn’t count the savings in the budget — because it knew a legal challenge was imminent.

 

Photo By Walter Burns [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Chicago Slapped With Credit Downgrade; Moody’s Cites Pension Liabilities As City Flirts With Junk Status

chicago

Credit rating agency Moody’s hit Chicago with a credit downgrade on Friday, cutting the city’s rating to Baa2 – two steps above junk bond status.

Notably, Moody’s indicated that the city could face future downgrades even if its 2014 pension reforms withstand legal challenges.

Pension360 has covered the city’s ballooning pension payments, which could exceed $1.5 billion annually by 2019.

More on the downgrade from Bloomberg:

“The city’s credit quality could weaken as unfunded pension liabilities grow and exert increased pressure on the city’s operating budget,” Moody’s analysts Matthew Butler and Rachel Cortez wrote. “We expect substantial growth in unfunded pension liabilities even if the city’s recent pension reforms survive an ongoing legal challenge.”

Chicago is obligated to pay $600 million into four pension funds in next year’s budget, though Standard & Poor’s said the contribution may be delayed after Feb. 24 elections led to an unexpected runoff vote between Emanuel and Jesus “Chuy” Garcia.

[…]

The third-most-populous U.S. city has $20 billion in unfunded pension obligations that it can’t address without the approval of the state legislature. State lawmakers in June restructured two city pension plans with about $9.4 billion in underfunded liabilities for about 60,000 municipal workers and retirees by making them pay more and reducing benefits. The changes didn’t apply to the police and fire systems.

Labor unions in Chicago sued to block the law in December, and the litigation was put on hold pending the outcome of an Illinois Supreme Court ruling on a state pension overhaul.

While Illinois is the lowest-rated state, credit raters differ on Chicago’s standing. S&P grades the city A+, the fifth-highest rank and four levels above Moody’s. Fitch Ratings ranks it two steps higher than Moody’s.

Chicago has the lowest credit rating of any major city in the country, excluding Detroit.

 

Photo by bitsorf via Flickr CC License

Pension Pulse: Diving Deeper Into Caisse’s Big 2014

Canada

The median U.S. public pension fund returned 6.8 percent in 2014.

But north of the border, one of Canada’s largest public funds blew that figure away.

Caisse de depot et Placement du Quebec, Canada’s second-largest pension fund, posted investment returns of 12 percent in 2014, nearly doubling the returns of its U.S. peers.

Over at Pension Pulse, Leo Kolivakis dives deep into Caisse’s 2014 results. What did he find? The post is re-printed below.

_______________________

By Leo Kolivakis, Pension Pulse

You can gain more insights on the Caisse’s 2014 results by going directly on their website here. In particular, the Caisse provides fact sheets on the following broad asset classes:

Keep in mind that unlike other major Canadian pension funds, the Caisse has a dual mandate to promote economic activity in Quebec as well as maximizing returns for its depositors.

In fact, the recent deal to handle Quebec’s infrastructure needs is part of this dual mandate. Some have criticized the deal, questioning whether the Caisse can make money on public transit, but this very well might be a model they can export elsewhere, especially in the United States where CBS 60 Minutes reports infrastructure is falling apart.

Whether or not the Caisse will be successful in exporting this infrastructure model to the United States remains to be seen but if you follow the wise advice of Nobel laureate Michael Spence on why the world needs better public investments, public pensions investing in infrastructure could very well be the answer to a growing and disturbing jobs crisis plaguing the developed world.

As far as the overall results, they were definitely solid, with all portfolios contributing to the overall net investment of $23.77 billion (click on image below):

fp0226_caisse_de_deopt_620_ab-e1424897313958

Of course, what really matters is value-added over benchmarks. After all, this is why we pay Canadian pension fund managers big bucks (some a lot more than others).

In fact, in its press release, the Caisse states in no uncertain terms:

“[its] investment strategy centers on an absolute return approach in which investment portfolios are built on strong convictions, irrespective of benchmark indices. These indices are only used ex post, to measure the portfolios’ performance. The approach is based on active management and rigorous, fundamental analysis of potential investments.”

I’ve already discussed life after benchmarks at the Caisse. So how did their active management stack up? For the overall portfolio, the 12% return edged out the fund’s benchmark which delivered an 11.4% gain, adding 60 basis points of value-added last year (do not know the four year figure).

Below, I provide you with the highlights of the three main broad asset classes with a breakdown of individual portfolios (click on each image to read the highlights):

Fixed Income:

Fixed Income

Inflation-Sensitive:

Inflation-sensitive

Equities:

Equities

Some quick points to consider just looking at these highlights:

  • Declining rates helped the Fixed Income group generate strong returns in 2014 but clearly the value-added is waning. In 2014, Fixed Income returned 8.4%, 10 basis points under its benchmark which gained 8.5%. Over the past four years, the results are better, with Fixed Income gaining 5.6%, 70 basis points over its benchmark which gained 4.9%. Real estate debt was the best performing portfolio in Fixed Income over the last year and four years but on a dollar basis, its not significant enough to add to the overall gains in Fixed Income.
  • There were solid gains in Inflation-Sensitive assets but notice that both Real Estate and Infrastructure underperformed their respective benchmarks in 2014 and the last four years, which means there was no value-added from these asset classes. The returns of Infrastructure are particularly bad relative to its benchmark but in my opinion, this reflects a problem with the benchmark of Infrastructure as there is way too much beta and perhaps too high of an additional spread to reflect the illiquid nature and leverage used in these assets. More details on the Caisse’s benchmarks are available on page 20 of the 2013 Annual Report (the 2014 Annual Report will be available in April).
  • In Equities, Private Equity also slightly underperformed its benchmark over the last year and last four years, but again this reflects strong gains in public equities and perhaps the spread to adjust for leverage and illiquidity. U.S Equity led the gains in Equities in 2014 but the Caisse indexes this portfolio (following the 2008 crisis) so there was no value-added there, it’s strictly beta. However, there were strong gains in the Global Quality Equity as well as Canadian Equity portfolios relative to their benchmarks in 2014 and over the last four years, contributing to the overall value-added.

If you read this, you might be confused. The Caisse’s strategy is to shift more of its assets into real estate, private equity and infrastructure and yet there is no value-added there, which is troubling if you just read the headline figures without digging deeper into what makes up the benchmarks of these private market asset classes.

The irony, of course, is that the Caisse is increasingly shifting assets in private markets but most of the value-added over its benchmarks is coming from public markets, especially public equities.

But this is to be expected when stock markets are surging higher. And as a friend of mine reminded me: “It about time they produced value-added in Public Equities. For years, they were underperforming and so they came up with this Global Quality Equity portfolio to create value.”

Also, keep in mind private markets are generating solid returns and as I recently noted in my comment on why Canadian pensions are snapping up real estate:

… in my opinion the Caisse’s real estate division, Ivanhoé Cambridge, is by far the best real estate investment management outfit in Canada. There are excellent teams elsewhere too, like PSP Investments, but Ivanhoe has done a tremendous job investing directly in real estate and they have been very selective, even in the United States where they really scrutinize their deals carefully and aren’t shy of walking away if the deal is too pricey.

There is something else, the Caisse’s strategy might pay off when we hit a real bear market and pubic equities tank. Maybe that’s why they’re not too concerned about all the beta and high spread to adjust for leverage and illiquidity in these private market benchmarks.

But there are skeptics out there. One of them is Dominic Clermont, formerly of Clermont Alpha, who sent me a study he did 2 years ago showing the Caisse’s alpha was negative between 1998 and 2012. Dominic hasn’t updated that study (he told me he will) but he shared this:

I had done a study two years ago that showed that the Caisse’s alpha was close to -1% and close to statistically significantly different from zero and negative. Part of that regular value lost is compensated by taking a lot more risk than its benchmark by being levered. That leverage means doing better than the benchmark when the markets do perform well, and being in a crisis when the market tanks…

I asked him to clarify this statement and noted something a pension fund manager shared with me in my post on the highest paid pension fund CEOs:

Also, it’s not easy comparing payouts among Canada’s large DB plans. Why? One senior portfolio manager shared this with me:

First and foremost, various funds use more leverage than others. This is the most differentiating factor in explaining performance across DB plans. In Canada, F/X policy will also impact performance of past 3 years. ‎It’s very hard to compare returns because of vastly different invest policies; case in point is PSP’s huge equity weighting (need to include all real estate, private equity and infrastructure) that has a huge beta.”

Dominic came back to me with some additional thoughts:

I would love to do proper performance attribution, but I had limited access to data. But we can infer a lot with published data. We do have historical performance for all major funds like the Caisse, CPP, Teachers, PSP, etc. in their financial statements. They also publish the performance of their benchmark.

I agree that because of different investment policies, it is difficult to compare one plan to the next. But we can compare any plan to itself, i.e. its benchmark.

Again, I like to do proper performance attribution in a multivariate framework and that is one area of expertise to me. To do it on a huge plan like the Caisse would require a lot of data which I do not have access to. But a simple CAPM type of attribution would give some insight. In this case, the benchmark is not an equity market as in the base case of CAPM, but the strategy mix of the Caisse.

Thus if we regress the returns (or the excess returns over risk free rate) of a plan, over its benchmark return (or excess over RF rate), we would obtain a Beta of the regression to be close to one if the plan is properly managed with proper risk controls. That is what I obtain when I do this exercise with the returns of a well-known plan – well known for its quality of management, and its constant outperformance.

When I do this for the Caisse, I get a Beta of the regression significantly greater than 1 – close to 1.25. It looks like the leverage of the Caisse over the 15 years of the regression was on average close to 25% above its benchmark! Now part of that as you mentioned and as I explain in my study could come from:

  • Investment in high Beta stocks,
  • Investment in levered Private equity
  • Investment in levered Real Estate and Infrastructure
  • Investment in longer duration bonds
  • Leveraging the balance sheet of the plan: Check Graphic 1 on the link: http://www.clermontalpha.com/cdpq_15ans.htm

It shows the leverage of the Caisse going from 18% in 1998 to 36% in 2008! So my average of 25% excess Beta is in line with this documented leverage.

The chart also shows Ontario Teachers’ and OMERS’ leverage. The difference is that Teachers’ leverage is IN its benchmark, while the Caisse is NOT. Thus the Caisse is taking 25% more risk than its clients’ policy mix! You would think that all these clients risk monitoring would be complaining… They are not. 

Of course, that leverage is good when markets return positively and you can see that on the colored chart. But that leverage is terrible when the markets drop 2008, 2002, 2001. When that happen, it is time to fire the management, restart with a new one and blame the previous management for the big loss. Some of those big losses were also exaggerated by forced liquidation accounting (we all remember the ABCP $6 billion loss reserve which was almost fully recovered in the following years inflating the returns under the new administration).

By not doing proper attribution, we are not aware of the continuous loss (negative alpha) hidden by the excess returns not obtained by skilled alpha, but by higher risk through leverage. The risk-adjusted remains negative… And we are not focusing our energies into building an alpha generating organisation with optimal risk budgeting. Why bother, the leverage will give us the extra returns! But that is not true alpha, not true value added.

Which brings me to the alpha of the regression. I told you that this other great institution which does proper risk controls, gets a Beta close to one. They also get a positive alpha of the regression which is statistically significant (t stat close to 2). Not surprising, they master the risk budgeting exercise, and they understand risk controls.

For the Caisse, the Alpha of the regression is close to -1% per year and it is statistically significant. Nobody in the private market could sustain such long period of negative alpha. Nobody could manage a portfolio with 25% more risk than what is requested by the client.

In my report, I also talk about the QPP contribution rate. When Canada created the CPP in the mid-60s, Quebec said “Hey, we want to better manage our own fund.” That led to the creation of the Caisse de Depot and it was an excellent decision as the returns of the QPP were much better because they were managed professionally in a diversified portfolio (vs provincial bonds for the CPP). Unnoticed by everyone in Quebec, the contribution rate started to increase in 2012 and will continue to increase up until 2017 at which time Quebecers will pay 9% more than the rest of Canadians for basically the same pension plan (some tiny differences). And the explanation is this negative alpha.

I also explained that with proper risk budgeting techniques at all levels, the Caisse could deliver an extra $5 billion with 20% less risk! Instead of increasing the contribution rate of all CDPQ clients QPP, REGOP, etc., we could have kept them at the same level or lower. And part of that extra $5B return every year would find its way into the Quebec government coffer through reduced contributions and higher taxes (the higher contributions to QPP, Regop, etc. that Quebecers pay are tax deductible…)

For how long are we going to avoid looking at proper attribution? For how long are we going to forfeit this extra $5B per year in extra returns?

I shared Dominic’s study with Roland Lescure, the CIO of the Caisse, who shared this with me:

You are right, we have significantly lowered leverage at the Caisse since 2009. Leverage is now solely used to fund part of our real estate portfolio and the (in)famous ABCP portfolio which will be gone by 2016. As you rightly point out, most Canadian pension funds use leverage to different degrees. Further, we also have significantly reduced risk by focusing our investments on quality companies and projects, which are less risky than the usual benchmark-driven investments. And those investments happen to have served us well as they did outperform the benchmarks significantly in 2014. You probably have all the details for each of our portfolios but I would point out that our Canadian equity portfolio outperformed the TSX by close to 300 bps. And the global quality equity portfolio did even better.

I thank Dominic Clermont and Roland Lescure for sharing their insights. Dominic raises several excellent points, some of which are politically sensitive and to be honest, hard to verify without experts really digging into the results of each and every large Canadian pension. Also, that increase in the contribution rate for public sector workers is part of tackling Quebec’s pension deficits, slowly introducing more risk-sharing in these plans.

Again, this is why even though I’m against an omnipotent regulator looking at systemic risks at pensions, I believe all of Canada’s large pensions need to provide details of their public and private investments to the Bank of Canada and we need to introduce uniform comprehensive performance, operational and risk audits at all of Canada’s major pensions.

These audits need to be conducted by independent and qualified third parties that are properly staffed to conduct them. The current auditing by agencies such as the Auditor General of Canada is simply too flimsy as far as I’m concerned, which is why we need better, more comprehensive audits across the board and the findings should be made public for all of Canada’s large pensions.

And let me say while the Caisse has clearly reduced leverage since the ABCP scandal which the media keeps covering up, it is increasingly shifting into private markets, introducing more illiquidity risk that can come back to haunt them if global deflation takes hold.

As far as stocks are concerned, I see a melt-up occurring in tech and biotech even if the Fed makes a monumental mistake and raises rates this year (read the latest comment by Sober Look to understand why market expectations of Fed rate hikes are unrealistic). It will be a rough and tumble year but my advice to the Caisse is to stay long U.S. equities (especially small caps) and start nibbling at European equities like Warren Buffett. And stick a fork in Canadian equities, they’re cooked!

Will the liquidity and share buyback party end one day? You bet it will but that is a topic for another day where I will introduce you to a very sharp emerging manager and his team working on an amazing and truly unique tail risk strategy.

As far as U.S. equities, I think the Caisse needs to stop indexing and start looking at ways to take opportunistic large bets using some of the information I discussed when I covered top funds’ Q4 activity. This would be above and beyond the information they receive from their external fund managers.

By the way, if you compare the Caisse’s top holdings to those of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, you’ll notice they are both long shares of Waste Management (WM), one of the top-performing stocks in the S&P 500 over the last year.

I’ll share another interesting fact with you, something CNBC’s Dominic Chu discussed a few days ago. Five stocks — Apple (AAPL), Amazon (AMZN), Biogen Idec (BIIB), Gilead (GILD), and Netflix (NFLX) — account for all of the gains in the Nasdaq this year. If that’s not herd behavior, I don’t know what is!!

Lastly, it takes a lot of time to write these in-depth comments and you won’t read this stuff in traditional media outlets which get hung up on headline figures and hardly ever dig deeper. Please take the time to contribute to my blog on the top right-hand side, or better yet, stop discriminating against me and hire the best damn pension and investment analyst in the world who just happens to live in la belle province!

Below, Michael Sabia, CEO of the Caisse, discusses the Caisse’s 2014 results with TVA’s Pierre Bruneau (in French). Michael also appeared on RDI Économie last night where he was interviewed by Gérald Filion. You can view that interview here and you can read Filion’s blog comment here (in French).

Also, some food for thought for the Caisse’s real estate team. A new report from Zillow shows that rents across the U.S. are increasing, and not just in the expected regions of New York City, San Francisco and Boston. Overall, rents increased 3.3% year-over-year as of January. But many cities outpaced that, including Kansas City, which saw rent grow more than double the national average, jumping 8.5% year-over-year. St. Louis saw rent increase by 4.5% over the same period. Rents in Detroit grew by 5.0% and rents in Cleveland grew by 4.2%.

 

Photo credit: “Canada blank map” by Lokal_Profil image cut to remove USA by Paul Robinson – Vector map BlankMap-USA-states-Canada-provinces.svg.Modified by Lokal_Profil. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.5 via Wikimedia Commons – http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Canada_blank_map.svg#mediaviewer/File:Canada_blank_map.svg

Private Equity Eyes Longer Timelines For Largest Investors

binoculars

Some private equity firms are considering offering new investment structures that would allow their largest clients to invest over a longer period of time, according to a New York Times report.

The new structure would extend the timeline of some investments to over 10 years, which could appeal to institutional clients looking for longer-term, lower-risk investments in the private equity arena.

More details from the New York Times:

Joseph Baratta, the head of private equity at the Blackstone Group, the biggest alternative investment firm, said at a conference in Berlin on Tuesday that the firm was speaking with large investors about a new investment structure that would aim for lower returns over a longer period of time.

Mr. Baratta, whose remarks were reported by The Wall Street Journal, said the investments would be made outside of Blackstone’s traditional funds, which impose time limits on the investing cycle. Invoking Warren E. Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Baratta said he wanted to own companies for more than 10 years.

”I don’t know why Warren Buffett should be the only person who can have a 15-year, 14 percent sort of return horizon,” Mr. Baratta said, according to The Journal.

His remarks, at the SuperReturn International conference, were only the latest example of chatter about this sort of structure in private equity circles.

News reports last fall said that Blackstone and the Carlyle Group, the private equity giant based in Washington, were both considering making investments outside their existing funds. Such moves would let the firms buy companies they might otherwise pass on — big, established corporations that don’t need significant restructuring but could benefit from private ownership.

[…]

Blackstone, which has not yet deployed such a strategy, might gather a “coalition of the willing” investors to buy individual companies, Mr. Baratta said. This approach could be attractive to some of the world’s biggest investors, including sovereign wealth funds and big pension funds, which, though they want market-beating returns, also want to avoid taking too much risk.

Read the full NY Times report here.

 

Photo by Santiago Medem via Flickr CC

Study Dives Into Strategies of Best-Funded Public Pensions

magnifying glass

Center for State and Local Government Excellence released a study last week examining the practices of the best-funded public pension plans in the United States.

The report, titled “Success Strategies for Well-Funded Pension Plans,” attempted to determine if the best-funded pension plans utilized the same strategies to achieve their success.

The report found that there were several keys to maintaining a well-funded pension system: using realistic actuarial assumptions, occasionally adjusting benefits and maintaining residence in a state that makes its full required contributions to the pension system.

BenefitsPro summarized the findings:

The study indicated that each of the systems employed various strategies for making good on the basic concept of a thorough commitment to pension funding, for example:

* The Delaware Public Employees’ Retirement System employs what the study called “a solid and consistent investment strategy that does not change when markets are volatile,” which allowed the system to weather the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

* The Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund has the political authority to enforce the collection of annual required contributions from those government bodies that participate, and can in fact sue government entities for failing to pay in, or ask the state to withhold funding until payment is rendered.

* The Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System takes what the study called “incremental actions to reduce the unfunded liability to maintain the plan’s long-term fiscal health.”

* North Carolina Retirement Systems consistently employs the use of conservative actuarial assumptions — for example, a 7.25 percent return on investments — and also requires a full actuarial analysis of any proposal that could potentially have an impact on costs or benefits.

Elizabeth K. Kellar, president and CEO of the Center for State and Local Government Excellence, said the findings of the case studies illustrated “the importance of basing a government’s pension funding policy on an actuarially determined contribution, being disciplined about making required contributions, and clearly reporting how and when pension plans will be funded.”

The funding ratios of the featured plans were as high as 99 percent.

Read the full report here.

 

Photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

CalPERS, CalSTRS to Step Up Climate Change Engagement Efforts

smoke stack

CalPERS and CalSTRS have issued a joint statement recounting their track records on engaging corporations on the topic of climate change. The statement also outlines future initiatives aimed at stepping up their corporate engagement on the sustainability front.

From the statement:

We recognize climate change as a material risk to society, the economy, and the impacts on our investment decisions. We have been at the forefront of tackling climate change issues through policy advocacy, engagement with portfolio companies and investing in climate change solutions.

CalSTRS and CalPERS both have well-established, thorough vetting processes for potential investments, which seek to test not only for financial potential, but for social, human and environmental impacts, as well.

CalSTRS developed an investment policy for mitigating environmental, social and governance risks under its CalSTRS 21 Risk Factors, adopted in 2008.

* Included in the 21 factors are points specific to environmental concerns such as air quality, water quality, climate change, and land protection.

* This policy guides the Teachers’ Retirement Board’s investment decisions.

* CalSTRS internal ‘Green Team,’ made up of representatives across all investment groups, further identifies ways to avoid or mitigate risks to the investment portfolio posed by environmental, social and governance factors.

CalPERS adopted Investment Beliefs addressing Climate Change issues:

* CalPERS believes long-term value creation requires effective management of three forms of capital: financial, physical and human.

* Investors must consider risk factors, for example climate change and natural resource availability that could have a material impact on portfolio returns

Read the full statement here.

The statement comes as the California legislature considers a measure that would force the pension funds to divest from all coal holdings. The funds have come out against the proposal.

 

Photo by  Paul Falardeau via Flickr CC License

Disagreements Get Personal At San Diego Pension Board Meeting; One Trustee: “I Am Very Concerned For My Safety”

board room chair

Until now, the major points of contention among trustees of San Diego County’s pension fund have been matters of investment policy.

[Pension360 has covered some of the drama surrounding the fund’s outsourced CIO and its investment strategy.]

But things are getting personal among the fund’s board members. An email exchange obtained by U-T San Diego reveals the extent of the personal issues, particularly between trustees David Myers and Samantha Begovich:

The ongoing divide about investment strategies on the county pension board has spilled over into personal allegations of sexual harassment and racial discrimination, with threats of a potential lawsuit between board members and one trustee saying she fears for her personal safety.

[…]

According to the emails, Begovich told pension system CEO Brian White earlier this month that Myers has harassed and ridiculed her in public and private, and she is afraid he may lose his composure and commit violence against her.

“I am very concerned for my safety now,” Begovich wrote to White on the evening of Feb. 4, the night before a pension board meeting. “I wonder if we can have him not bring his gun to meetings.”

White responded 21 minutes later, telling Begovich he did not understand her statement about fearing for her safety at meetings of the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association.

“Are you saying that you are concerned that Dave Myers might shoot you?” replied White, who shared her private correspondence with the entire board without seeking Begovich’s approval. “I cannot give that any credence. I once again ask if you would like me to arrange a change in your seat with another board member.”

Begovich wrote back in five minutes: “Yes. That is what I am concerned about given his behavior to date and your unilateral decision to release a privileged document with my private conclusions relayed to you.”

More of the surreal email exchange can be read here.

New Jersey Bill, Now on Christie’s Desk, Would Expand Pay-to-Play Rules for Pension Investments

shaking hands

With all the drama surrounding New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie’s latest round of pension changes, one big pension-related development has been overlooked: on Monday, state lawmakers approved a bill that would expand pay-to-play rules as they relate to pension investments.

The bill, which would increase transparency around fees paid to private investment managers, was sent to Christie’s desk on Monday.

More from Philly.com:

[The bill] would expand restrictions on investments of state pension funds with outside money managers who donate to national political committees.

The legislation also would require the state Treasury Department to regularly publish reports disclosing fees paid to private managers who invest state pension funds.

Pay-to-play rules already prohibit the Division of Investment from awarding contracts to firms or investment managers who have donated to New Jersey political parties or campaigns in the preceding two years.

A 2010 federal law imposed a similar ban. Under that law, the Securities and Exchange Commission in June ordered Wayne-based TL Ventures Inc. to repay $250,000 in pension fees collected from Philadelphia and Pennsylvania after learning the firm’s founder had donated to Mayor Nutter and then-Gov. Tom Corbett.

But managers can still donate to national committees such as the Republican Governors Association or Democratic National Committee, which can spend money on and influence state politics. Legislation passed Monday by the Assembly on a 53-15 vote would close that loophole by extending the State Investment Council’s pay-to-play regulations to cover investors’ donations to national political committees.

The bill passed the Senate in October on a 25-8 vote, with seven abstentions.

Lawmakers believe the SEC pay-to-play rules are too lenient.

State pension officials, however, say the rules could harm the fund’s alternative investment portfolio; the fee disclosure requirement runs the risk of dissuading some investment managers from doing business with the fund.

Alternatives account for 28 percent of New Jersey’s pension investments.

 

Photo by Truthout.org via Flickr CC License


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