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Video: Discussing Investment Fees, Assumed Rates of Return and the Outlook of Public Pensions

The above video is a panel discussion from the Bloomberg Markets Most Influential Summit, which was held in New York on September 22.

The discussion is moderated by Bloomberg editor-at-large Tom Keene, and features Clifford Asness, managing and founding principal of AQR Capital Management, and John C. Bogle, founder of Vanguard Group Inc.

The pension discussions begin at around the 2:35 mark of the video.

Topics include investment fees, assumed rates of return, and the panelists “gloomy” outlook for public pensions.

Report: Maryland Fund Lost Billions Due To Underperformance

The Maryland State and Retirement Pension System returned 14.4 percent last fiscal year – a return that the Chief Investment Officer praised as “strong” and that doubled the fund’s expected rate of return of 7.75 percent.

But a new report from the Maryland Public Policy Institute claims that the returns weren’t good enough From the Maryland Reporter:

In a report, Jeffrey Hooke and John Walters of the Maryland Public Policy Institute say the failure to match the 17.3% return on investment made by over half the public state pension funds cost the state over $1 billion. As they have in the past, they also complained about the high fees paid to outside managers of some of the funds used by the State Retirement and Pension System, which covers 244,000 active and retired state employees and teachers and their beneficiaries

“As the table shows, the underperformance trend is not only continuing but worsening as the percentage divide widens,” said Hooke and Walters. “Part of problem may be due to the fund’s large exposure to alternative investments, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, that have tended to perform worse in recent years than traditional investments such as publicly traded stocks and bonds.”

A spokesman for the Maryland pension fund offered his response to the report:

[Spokesman] Michael Golden said the institute’s report was “flawed,” “not supported by facts,” and mischaracterized the agency’s investment performance.

“These returns have resulted in greater progress toward full funding of the system that was projected last year,” Golden said. The five-year return on investment was 11.68%, while the target for the fund is 7.7%.

[…]

Golden admitted that Maryland’s investment performance is “unimpressive” compared to other state funds.

“However, the reason for this ranking is not due to active management and fees,” Golden said. “After the financial crises of 2008-2009, the board determined that the fund had too much exposure to public equities, which historically has been one of the riskiest, most volatile asset classes, and wanted a more balanced and diversified portfolio.”

See the chart at the top of this post for a comparison between the returns of Maryland’s pension fund versus the Wilshire’s Trust Universe Comparison Service (TUCS), a widely accepted benchmark for institutional assets.

Advisors Question Hedge Fund Fee Structure

In light of CalPERS’ recent pullback from hedge funds, scores of investment consultants are coming out of the woodwork advocating for changes to the “2 and 20” fee structure traditionally used by hedge funds.

Towers Watson research chief Damien Loveday told the Wall Street Journal yesterday:

“We believe a better way of tackling fees is by assessing the skill managers offer to clients, rather than paying for market-based returns. ‘Two and 20’ should not be the norm.”

Kerrin Rosenberg, an executive at the consulting firm Cardano, shared the sentiment:

“If ever there was a moment to get rid of ‘two and 20’ forever, this is it.” He backed Towers Watson’s initiative, noting that many hedge funds were out to survive, rather than prosper.

Just because consultants think one way doesn’t mean pension funds will think the same. But it’s important to note that these firms frequently advise pension funds on investment decisions—so it’s safe to say the funds are hearing the same anti-fee sentiment that we are.

Last week, a major Dutch pension fund shut out hedge funds and cited one reason: the fees. From the Wall Street Journal:

Last week, PMT, the Dutch pension fund with €56 billion ($71.7 billion) under management, said it would close its €1 billion hedge fund portfolio, adding that although hedge funds were only about 2% of assets, they collected 32% of the investment fees it paid.

A spokeswoman for the fund said: “The hedge fund investments were expensive if you relate the cost to what the funds delivered. We found that we did earn from hedge funds, but we did not earn enough versus the risks and the costs.”

To be fair, it seems hedge funds have budged just a bit from the “2 and 20” scheme. According to Preqin data, fees have fallen to around 1.5 percent of assets and 18.7 percent of performance.

5 Potential Outcomes Of CalPERS’ Hedge Fund Pullback

The last week has seen a flurry of debate of what CalPERS’ hedge fund divestment actually means in the bigger picture.

Is this an instance of just one fund shifting its investment strategy? Or is it emblematic of a larger, accelerating trend?

At FinAlternatives, the founder of a hedge fund marketing firm has weighed in on the potential outcomes of CalPERS’ decision. Don Steinbrugge writes:

Agecroft Partners believes we will see the following 5 outcomes:

1. Continued pressure on hedge fund fees for large mandates

Over the past 5 years there has been a strong trend of hedge funds increasingly offering fee breaks for large pension funds and the clients of institutional consulting firms. These fee breaks began with a discount on management fees only, but now often includes performance fees. Fee breaks vary by manager, but for a typical hedge fund with a 2 and 20 fee structure the discount is often 25% off standard fees…

2. Pension funds will continue to increase their allocation to hedge funds

The average public pension fund will continue their long term trend of increasing their allocation to hedge funds in order to enhance returns and reduce downside volatility of their portfolio…

3. More focus on smaller hedge fund managers

In a study conducted from 1996 through 2009 by Per Trac, small hedge funds outperformed their larger peers in 13 of the past 14 years. Simply put, it is much more difficult for a hedge fund to generate alpha with very large assets under management…

Steinbrugge writes much more over at the link, here.

Steinbrugge is the Founder and Managing Partner of Agecroft Partners, a global hedge fund consulting and marketing firm.

Investigating Gina Raimondo’s Ocean State Investment Pool

GoLocalProv today published the results of an investigation into an investment pool – called the Ocean State Investment Pool – set up by Rhode Island Treasurer Gina Raimondo to help towns and cities “maximize investment returns”.

GoLocalProv writes that the fund certainly saw gains – but it also racked up investment expenses:

The investment pool is being run by Pyramis Global Advisors, LLC, a company owned by Fidelity Investments. The firm was paid a fee of $757,701 for fiscal year 2013 to manage what was by the end of the year $545.1 million in assets, according to the annual report for that year. After the fee, the pool generated a net investment income of $698,263, according to the report. (The pool earned a total of $1,450,050 in interest income that year.)

For the first three months of the pool’s existence—from March to June 2012—Fidelity Investments fetched a fee of $199,690, almost as much as the $448,680 in interest earned by the pool, according to the last annual report.

[…]

Pyramis’ fee ranges from .138 percent to .148 percent of the average net assets. The rates for the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 were on the higher end of that range, at .147 and .148 percent, respectively. The rates decrease as assets increase, meaning that the more money that’s in the pool, the lower the cost.

More on the creation and purpose of the Ocean State Investment Pool, from GoLocalProv:

Known as the Ocean State Investment Pool, the program was launched in the spring of 2012. Two years later, just three municipalities have signed up: Bristol, Cranston, and Lincoln. The remaining six governmental members are all state entities and include the state pension fund and the Rhode Island Student Loan Authority, for which the treasurer is a board member. Money from the state general fund also accounts for more than half of the assets in the fund.

The Ocean State Investment Pool was designed to help cities and towns maximize investment returns on so-called liquid assets—cash that cannot be invested over the long-term because it needs to be used for day-to-day expenses, like payroll.

GoLocalProv reached out to several cities and towns, asking why they had not signed up.

Answers varied. In Warwick, a city official said the investment pool does not meet all the city’s criteria for its liquid investments. William DePasquale, the acting chief of staff for Mayor Scott Avedisian, said that after the 2008 recession the city had a adopted a policy of only making liquid investments that were FDIC-backed. For that reason, he said the investment pool was not considered by the city.

Read the entire investigation here.

Photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

Is Now the Time For Pension Funds To Push Back On Fees?

CalPERS cut ties with hedge funds because, among other reasons, the fees associated with those investments.

Some money managers and pension fund staff are saying that now is the perfect time for other pension funds to speak up about their aversion to fee-heavy investments. The managers told Reuters:

“Pension funds and everyone else would be remiss not to push on fees now,” said Brad Balter, Managing Partner of Balter Capital Management, which invests in hedge funds and is now offering its own liquid alternatives fund that mimic hedge fund performance with a lower fee structure.

[…]

Joelle Mevi, who has long been arguing for lower fees, first as chief investment officer at New Mexico’s pension fund and now as executive director and CIO at the City of Fort Worth’s pension plan, agreed that Calpers’ move could be a wakeup call.

“Top hedge fund managers could see that this is a trend and it could strike fear in their hearts,” she said.

Hedge funds reached by Reuters declined to comment. But the industry has in the past rebuffed criticism over fees and performance by saying returns tend to outperform when markets fall. It has also pointed to strong demand: hedge funds which manage $3 trillion attracted $30.5 billion in new money during the second quarter alone.

Stephen Nesbitt, who runs consulting firm Cliffwater LLC and works with prominent pension funds, said hedge fund performance, like stock performance, can vary greatly – underscoring the need for investors to make careful choices.

“There are many investors who are happy with the results. It works for some and it has to do with implementation,” he said.

It’s not out of the ordinary for pension funds to negotiate with hedge funds on the matter of fees. The Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board (PRIM) was doing exactly that even before the CalPERS news came out. From Reuters:

Massachusetts, which invests roughly $5.6 billion with hedge funds, is pushing to move some of that money into separately managed accounts and may even invest, at a lower cost, in liquid alternative strategies.

“Moves by the big leading pensions like Calpers only reaffirms liquid alternatives are the wave of the future,” said Brad Alford, chief investment officer at Alpha Capital Management, which has put money into hedge funds and also now offers liquid alternative funds.

“Smart investors are no longer willing to pay these high fees for single digit returns,” Alford said. “High fees, little transparency, limited liquidity, light regulation plus hard to measure risk from leverage and derivatives are not a good investment solution.”

The Los Angeles Fire & Police Pension System chose to drop hedge funds long before CalPERS made headlines; they made the move early this summer when they removed $550 million from hedge funds.

Photo by www.SeniorLiving.Org

Rhode Island, Raimondo Defend Hedge Fund Position After CalPERS Pullout

Rhode Island’s pension fund invests nearly $2 billion in hedge funds, or 14 percent of its overall portfolio.

In light of CalPERS high-profile pullback from hedge funds, The Providence Journal asked Gina Raimondo, Rhode Island’s Treasurer, for her thoughts on CalPERS’ decision and the fate of hedge funds in Rhode Island’s portfolio:

State Treasurer Gina Raimondo sees no immediate reason to pull Rhode Island’s pension money out of hedge funds, just because the largest public pension fund in the U.S. – the California Public Employees Retirement System – has announced plans to do so over the next year.

[…]

Asked Tuesday if Rhode Island would take its cue from Calpers, Raimondo chief of staff Andrew Roos said: “We will continue to learn from best practices around the country and will look closely at the CalPERS decision.’’

But he said: “Rhode Island’s pension fund is less than 3% the size of Calpers and has very different funding and cash-flow needs. Given our fund’s different characteristics, we will continue to pursue strategies that pursue the best outcomes for Rhode Island pension participants.’’

Roos acknowledged that the state’s hedge-fund-heavy strategy brings loads of fees. He also admitted that the hedge funds have under-performed in 2013 compared to the rest of the pension fund’s portfolio. But he stood by the investments. He told the Providence Journal:

“Every action the State Investment Commission has taken during this administration has been to promote retirement security and ensure funds will be available to pay pension checks to our retirees,’’ he said.

“After the financial collapse of 2008-2009 when the fund lost over $2 billion dollars, the SIC reviewed its policies and unanimously adopted a plan to reduce volatility while continuing to pursue strong long-term returns … As a part of the strategy to reduce volatility while maintaining strong long-term returns, the SIC improved the pension fund’s diversification, which included making allocations to hedge funds….’’

“This strategy is working,’’ Roos said. “Over the last three years we have reduced the volatility of this portfolio by 50% and achieved strong returns (1 year: 15.12%; 3 year: 9.05% as of June 30, 2014) … [But] like every other investment the state makes, the SIC and staff are constantly evaluating and making adjustments to the hedge fund allocation to ensure it is performing as intended.’’

Rhode Island’s pension fund paid $70 million in investment fees in the 2012-13 fiscal year. Meanwhile, the state’s hedge fund investments returned around 8.8 percent in 2013-14, while the pension fund’s overall portfolio returned 15 percent over the same period.

New York Retirement System Is Prepared To Increase Its Allocation to Hedge Funds, Alternatives

CalPERS is running away from hedge funds, but, as Pension360 has covered in the past, most pension funds aren’t following. In fact, some are running in the opposite direction.

Case in point: the New York State and Local Retirement System (NYSLRS). The fund hasn’t made any decisions yet, but it is open to the possibility of expanding its allocation in hedge funds and other complex investments. From Public Sector Inc:

A bill passed by the New York State Senate and Assembly at the end of their session in June would expand, to 30 percent from 25 percent, the share of pension fund investments that can be allocated in “baskets” of assets not otherwise specifically permitted by law. These include hedge funds and private equity funds, which involve more complex financial risks and are more difficult to value and monitor than traditional stocks and bonds. The change has been supported in the past by Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, NYSLRS’ sole trustee, although the lobbying effort for the bill this year appears to have been spearheaded by the New York City pension funds.

The bigger-basket pension bill hasn’t yet been sent to Governor Andrew Cuomo for his signature. If his approval or veto message contains so much as a single sentence’s worth of substantive explanation, it will exceed the sum total of all public comment devoted to the subject by state lawmakers this year. (The issue has also gone virtually unnoticed by State Capitol news media.)

In fiscal 2007, when DiNapoli became comptroller, NYSLRS paid out $162 million of investment management fees, including $27 million for alternative investments. By fiscal 2013, the latest year for which data are available, investment fees had risen to $454 million, including $163 million in the “absolute return” category alone, which includes hedge funds.

The NYSLRS has ramped up its allocation towards alternative investments in recent years. It the fund’s official investment policy is any indication, it is planning on devoting an even higher percentage of its assets towards such investments. From Public Sector Inc:

Total NYSLRS assets in the alternative category came to 11.8 percent last year, including 3.2 percent invested in absolute return strategies. However, according to its annual report, the fund’s long-term goal is to increase its alternative allocation to 21 percent, including 10 percent in private equity and 4 percent in absolute return assets including hedge funds, plus 4 percent in the newer category of “opportunistic” investments and 3 percent in “real assets” including commodities, infrastructure and timberland meant to create “inflation hedging strategies,” the annual report said.

The pension funds also announced recently a partnership with Goldman Sachs. Sachs will receive $2 billion to manage.

Kentucky To Disclose More Details About Alternative Investments, But Some Data Will Remain Secret

About 30 percent of the Kentucky Retirement System’s investment portfolio is allocated towards alternative investments. That kind of investment strategy leads to significant fees and expenses. But much of the data surrounding the fees the System paid to firms to manage those alternative investments were hidden under lock and key…until now.

Yesterday, the KRS Board of Trustees approved a measure designed to increase transparency surrounding the fees the System pays to individual firms to handle its investments. From WFPL:

Kentucky Retirement Systems, which runs the $16 billion pension and health care funds for state, city and county workers and retirees, will be providing more detail about the fees it pays to the managers of its so-called “alternative” investments.

[Interim investment director David Peden] said KRS’ investment committee and the full board warmed to the idea after articles by the Kentucky Center for Investigative Reporting and the Lexington Herald-Leader on the level of transparency about fees paid to hedge funds and private equity firms.

Until now, KRS had disclosed the total amount of fees paid to investment firms — $53.6 million in the year that ended June 30, 2013 — but did not report the fee rates charged by individual firms. That practice will change in coming weeks, Peden said, as KRS staff posts fees for all current holdings on the agency’s website.

So, interested observers will be able to find the fee rates that KRS pays to individual firms.

But KRS still isn’t going to tell the public everything.

Among the information that will still be inaccessible to the public: the total dollar amount of fees paid to individual firms; the fee rates paid to “fund of funds”; and the specific make-up of the alternative funds, which are protected by confidentiality agreements between KRS and the fund managers.

Is There A Major Problem With the Endowment Model?

Over at Institutional Investor, Ashby Monk has posted a thought-provoking piece on the university endowment model and its shortfalls. An excerpt:

The endowment investment model, which is widespread among university endowments (hence the name), is often flagged as the best-in-class framework for long-term investors. This is an approach to institutional investment that is almost entirely outsourced and seeks to generate high returns through an aggressive orientation toward private equity and other alternative assets. In 2013 the average U.S. endowment had an allocation to alternatives of 47 percent, down from the previous year’s peak of 54 percent but still much higher than a decade before.

The model was pioneered by David Swensen, chief investment officer at Yale University, through the investment policies he implemented at the school’s endowment. Using this model, Swensen managed to generate a remarkable 15 percent internal rate of return over a 20-year stretch leading up to 2007. Because of Yale’s wild success, the endowment model was copied by hundreds (and probably thousands) of other endowments and institutional investors around the world. Although the model remains popular today, some institutional investors now see it as being at odds with long-term investing and perhaps even damaging to the long-term investment challenge.

Here’s why: The success or failure of this model seems to be based on access to top-performing managers, as endowments believe that certain managers can and do deliver alpha (returns above a market benchmark). The institutions that have privileged access to top managers see themselves as lucky passengers on an investment return rocket ship powered by hedge funds, private equity firms and other alternative managers.

So most (though not all) endowments won’t do anything to rock the boat with these managers. Thanks to this fear of restricted access, the asset managers would seem to hold the power to discipline and influence asset owners. It’s for this reason that many university endowments are more secretive than the most-secretive sovereign wealth funds. They are protecting their external asset managers from scrutiny. In addition, they are protecting themselves from having to inform their stakeholders about how much they are paying in fees (if they even know what they’re paying managers).

And therein lies a fundamental problem with the endowment model: The agents seem to be in charge of the principals.

Read the full piece here.

Photo by Chaval Brasil

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