Russia To Use Pension Money To Aid Companies In Midst of Sanctions

Flag and map of Russia

Russia is planning to take billions from its pension fund and use the money to aid banks and other companies that have been targeted by Western sanctions.
From BusinessWeek:

During flush years of high oil prices and economic growth, Russia salted away more than $80 billion in a sovereign wealth fund to ensure the long-term health of the country’s pension system. Now the Kremlin is raiding the fund to bail out Russia Inc.

Russian companies and banks are lining up for aid as Western sanctions, capital flight, and the plummeting ruble curb their ability to invest and repay debt. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told the Itar-TASS news agency last month that state-controlled oil giant Rosneft (ROSN:RM) and private gas company Novatek (NVTK:RM), both headed by close associates of President Vladimir Putin and hit by sanctions, could get as much as $4 billion apiece from the fund, whose current balance is $83 billion.

Although the exact amount of aid to the two companies hasn’t been confirmed, Vice Premier Arkady Dvorkovich said today that the government is ready to use the fund to support both public and privately owned energy companies. “The funds will be provided for a long term,” he told Itar-TASS.

Russia has diverted $30 billion from its pension fund since 2013 to plug holes in its general budget.

Russia’s Economy Minister indicated last month that taking money from the country’s pension fund to shield ailing companies from U.S. sanctions was a distinct possibility.

Pension Funds Need To Stay Out of the “Bargain Bin” When Shopping For Hedge Funds

supermarket

More than ever, pension funds are negotiating fees with hedge funds in an effort to lower the expenses associated with those investments.

That sounds like a wise course of action. But a new column in the Financial Times argues that pension funds need to stop shopping in the “bargain bin” for hedge funds—because the hedge funds that are willing to negotiate fees are also the ones who deliver lackluster returns.

From the Financial Times:

With many pension funds facing deficits, and needing investments that will generate high returns, the promise of hedge funds has an obvious appeal.

The problem is, like the star chef, the small number of hedge funds that have made staggering amounts of money for their investors over several decades already have too many clients and are closed for business.

Among these are Renaissance Technologies’ Medallion Fund, founded by the mathematician James Simons, which has long been all but shut to new money, and Seth Klarman’s Baupost Group, which last year returned $4bn to clients and has a highly select number of investors.

At the same time investors in hedge funds, such as pension managers, are loath to pay high fees for their services, and must enter into tough negotiations to bring these fees down. This makes sense.

But few of the handful of truly top tier hedge funds have any need to lower their fees for new investors and tend to politely show such requests to the door.

Mediocre hedge fund managers on the other hand cannot afford to be so dismissive, and are more than happy to gather more assets to play with.

The outcome is that many pension funds end up forcing themselves to shop in the hedge fund equivalent of the reduced aisle in a supermarket. They should stop. At the root of this problem is the flawed thinking that a large number of investors have been either seduced into, or institutionally obliged to believe in: the idea that hedge funds constitute an “asset class” all of their own, distinct from other types of active fund management.

[…]

Wholesale shopping for hedge funds is a bad idea. Instead of deciding to bulk invest in hedge funds as a questionable means of diversification (the HFR index shows the majority of hedge funds have underperformed the S&P 500 while being correlated to it), investors should only seek out the select few.

And if the best are closed to new investment they must find something else to do with their money.

The author puts the situation in context by comparing hiring a hedge fund to hiring a caterer. From the column:

You are planning a party and have decided to hire a caterer. A trusted friend has recommended two of the best in the city. One is a famous chef who has won numerous awards for his cooking, and another is a younger caterer who previously worked for one of the best restaurants in the world.

You call them both, only to have second thoughts. The first, the famous chef, is simply too busy with existing work to help you.

The other is unbelievably expensive, costing at least double what a regular caterer would charge. But you need your guests to be fed, so you look for an alternative option. You find a cheaper company on the internet and book them.

Come the party the food arrives late. When you taste it, the hors d’oeuvres are stale and the wine tastes like biro ink. Embarrassed and enraged, you mutter under your breath about the money you have wasted, vowing to never hire a caterer ever again.

This flawed thinking resembles the way too many institutional investors select hedge fund managers.

Pension360 has previously covered studies that suggest problems with the way pension funds select managers.

 

Photo by Gioia De Antoniis via Flickr CC License

Changing the Conversation About Pension Reform

conversation bubbles

Keith Ambachtsheer, Director Emeritus of the International Centre for Pension Management at the University of Toronto, wants to change the conversation around pension reform from “dysfunctional” to “constructive”.

In a recent article in the Financial Analysts Journal, Ambachtsheer explains how the reform conversation can be “re-framed” and become more productive. He writes:

The sustainability of traditional public sector defined benefit (DB) plans has become front-page news and the subject of acrimonious debates usually framed in stark terms of DB versus DC (defined contribution). This either/or framing is unhelpful: It simply perpetuates the strongly held views of the defenders and critics of these two opposing pension models. Moving the pension reform yardsticks in the right direction requires that we stop this dysfunctional either/or framing and move on to a more constructive conversation about what we want our pension arrangements to achieve and what that tells us about how to design them.

[…]

So, how do I propose to change the conversation about pension reform from dysfunctional to constructive? By reflecting on the implications of five pension design realities:

1. All good pension systems have three common features.

2. All pension systems have embedded risks that must be understood and managed.

3. Some of these risks have an intergenerational dimension.

4. Pension plan sustainability requires intergenerational fairness.

5. Achieving this fairness has plan design implications.

The three design features common to all good pension systems are:

1. inclusiveness—all workers are afforded a fair opportunity to provide for their retirement;

2. fitness-for-purpose—the system is purposefully designed to start paying a target pension for life on a target retirement date; and

3. cost-effectiveness—retirement savings are transformed into pension payments by “value for money” pension organizations.

Surely, no rational person would disagree with these three features. So far, so good.

Ambachtsheer goes on to talk about the failings of DB plans in recent years – but says it would be a “tragedy” to scrap them for DC plans:

Remember how we talked ourselves into a “new era” paradigm as the last decade of the 20th century unfolded? As it ended, most DB plan funded ratios were well over 100%. Did we treat these balance sheet surpluses as “rainy day” funds to see the plans through the coming lean years? We did not. Predictably, we spent the surpluses on benefit increases and contribution holidays. After all, was this not a new era of outsized economic growth rates and stock market returns? Was taking on more risk not synonymous with earning even higher returns?

A decade later, we know that the answers to these turn-of-the-century rhetorical questions are no and no. On top of these stark economic realities, red-faced actuaries are now confessing that they have been underestimating increases in retiree longevity for quite some time.

Given the current poor financial condition of many public sector DB plans, it should come as no surprise that people on the far right of the political spectrum want to do away with this type of pension arrangement altogether. Doing so would be a tragedy. I agree with Leech and McNish that none of these weaknesses need be fatal if we repair them now.

But how to repair DB plans? Ambachtsheer offers the idea of defined ambition (DA) plans. He writes:

It seems to me that ditching the dysfunctional DB/DC language is the best way to start these repairs. Political leaders in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia have already done so. They now speak of defined ambition (DA) pension plans. Vigorous debates on how best to design and implement DA plans are taking place in all four countries.3 In my view, a good DA pension plan has six critical features:

1. A target income-replacement rate—how much postwork income is needed to maintain an adequate standard of living?

2. A target contribution rate—given realistic assumptions about working-life length, longevity, and net real investment returns, how much money needs to be set aside to achieve the pension target?

3. Course correction capabilities—the plan provides regular updates on progress toward targets and offers course correction options when needed.

4. Fully defined property rights and no intergenerational wealth shifting—the plan design is tested for intergenerational fairness and clear property rights.

5. Long-horizon wealth-creation capability—the pension delivery organization can acquire and nurture healthy multi-decade cash flows (e.g., streams of dividends, rents, tolls) through a well-managed long-horizon investment program.

6. Payment-certainty purchase capability—plan members can acquire guaranteed deferred life annuities at a reasonable price.

The entire article, which contains more analysis than excerpted here, can be read here.

 

Photo by AJC1 via Flickr CC License

Chart: The Cost of Rhode Island’s Underperforming Investments

RI returns vs median

The chart above illustrates how Rhode Island’s pension fund returns stack up against the typical plan – Rhode Island has underperformed relative to the national median in three of the last four years.

The chart below illustrates the actual cost of that performance:

money lost due to RI trailing median

Chart credit goes to the International Business Times.

Illinois Loophole Lets Teacher Union Leaders Boost Pensions After Leaving Classroom

Springfield, Illinois

A Washington Times investigation has uncovered an interesting legal quirk in Illinois that lets retired teachers continue to build pension credit after retirement. The law allows teachers who later become union leaders to credit their union salaries towards their pension.

More from the Washington Times:

Collectively, 40 retired union leaders draw $408,136 per month in Illinois teachers’ retirement pension, or $4.9 million per year, according to data generated at the request of The Washington Times by OpenTheBooks.com, an online portal aggregating 1.3 billion lines of federal, state and local spending records.

Twenty-four of those retired union leaders have already collected more than $1 million each in retirement benefits, and the payments are likely to continue for years to come, the data show.

The union bosses collecting the payouts had jobs at the National Education Association (NEA), the Illinois Education Association (IEA) and the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) after their teaching careers. Most got massive pay raises when they jumped from the classroom to the unions, swelling their pension payouts by large amounts at the expense of taxpayers.

The labor leaders contribute into the state pension program during the time they work for the unions, but their larger salaries are then used to calculate their final retirement eligibility. The result is taxpayers must pay pensions to these leaders that are exponentially larger than if they just continued to teach in the classroom.

The arrangements live on even as the Illinois Teachers Retirement System (TRS) hurdles toward insolvency — it is currently underfunded by an estimated $54 billion — with teachers currently in the classroom questioning what sort of retirement they’ll receive. Right now, the TRS could only afford to pay out 40 cents on the dollar of each retiree it owes.

“Government pensions should go to government workers, period,” said Adam Andrzejewski, founder of OpenTheBooks.com. “The pension system for the hard-working teacher and public servant is being drained by union bosses with special pension privileges.”

It’s important to note that the employees in question were still contributing to the pension system during the time they worked with unions — so they weren’t getting a completely free ride.

More details on the law in question, from the Washington Times:

The labor officials are able to collect teacher pensions because of a pension code carve-out granted by the Illinois General Assembly back in 1987 — a change for which the unions lobbied heavily.

Under the pension code, active employees of the IFT and the IEA with previous teaching service can be TRS members. The IFT and IEA have been able to designate employees as active TRS members if they were already TRS members because of previous creditable teaching service. Since the 1940s, the pension code has allowed active employees of the Illinois Association of School Boards with prior TRS creditable service to be active TRS members.

The statutes outlining additional benefits within Illinois state and local pensions have many times “been amended in the state pension code without much public discourse, financial analysis or even justification as to why we should add on nongovernment employees such as municipal associations, unions or anyone else,” said Laurence Msall, president of the Civic Federation, a nonpartisan research organization. “This is the definition of insider benefits that don’t serve identifiable public purpose.”

In 2012, Illinois Gov. Pat Quinn signed a law that prevented teachers from using service time with unions to boost pension benefits – but the law only applies to union work done before the teachers were hired, not after.

San Diego Fund Trustee May Have Breached Code of Ethics While Lobbying For CIO

board room

The San Diego County Employees Retirement Association (SDCERA) board voted last week to retain its controversial chief investment officer, Lee Partridge, and his firm, Salient Partners.

The vote was 5 to 4, and trustees on both sides of the vote were adamant about their position.

But did one trustee go to0 far while lobbying to keep Partridge? Board Vice Chairman David Myers may have breached a code of ethics when he sent emails to his subordinates asking that they vouch for Partridge. From the San Diego Union Times:

Before the county pension board met last week and decided to keep its Texas consultant in charge of investments, Vice Chairman David Myers urged retired employees to email the agency to voice support for Lee Partridge and Salient Partners.

Myers’ request also was sent to current workers, including his own subordinates at the Sheriff’s Department. The communications raise the question of whether Myers put undue pressure on rank-and-file employees to send emails on a political matter.

Two weeks ago, when U-T Watchdog asked Myers whether it was appropriate for a senior commander to make such requests of subordinate employees, he declined to respond.

The San Diego County Employees Retirement Association responded on Myers’ behalf, saying he only contacted retirees — not the hundreds of deputies that serve beneath him.

But in emails since obtained under the California Public Records Act, Myers states that he included his own subordinates in his effort to retain Partridge’s services, sending them a three-page letter in support of Partridge’s contract and asking them to advocate for it.

“I sent to all law enforcement members, active and retired,” Myers wrote to pension system CEO Brian White on Sept. 24, adding that all 40 responses he received were positive. “I am asking them to also communicate that message via email to SDCERA.”

There may be further emails from Myers to employees on the subject. The county has delayed release of five additional emails pending input from the pension system.

Those actions could be in breach of the SDCERA Code of Ethics, according to U-T San Diego:

The SDCERA Code of Ethics says trustees must remain objective and says “misuse of influence” is unacceptable. The code does not specify what types of misused influence are at issue, and agency officials declined to discuss Myers’ actions.

Jan Caldwell, a spokeswoman for the Sheriff’s Department, said there is no issue with Myers’ communications with front-line staff.

“The San Diego County Sheriffs’ Department does not have a policy or procedure that would preclude an employee representative of the County’s Retirement Association from communicating to county employees on matters of interest to county employees relating to their retirement system,” she said.

Bruce Cain, a political-science professor at Stanford University, questioned the wisdom of a higher-up asking subordinates to become activists in any cause.

“Typically you don’t want senior people engaging in this kind of thing because it could be perceived as pressure,” Cain said.

Max Neiman, senior research fellow at the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, agreed, saying, “I would find that unseemly, if not a violation of ethics or the law.”

SDCERA spokesmen have maintained that Myers didn’t violate any ethics codes.

What Does CalPERS’ Hedge Fund Pullout Mean For the “Average” Investor?

one dollar bill

Larry Zimpleman, chairman and president of Principal Financial Group, has written a short piece in the Wall Street Journal today detailing his reaction to CalPERS cutting hedge funds out of their portfolio and what the move means for the average investor.

From the WSJ:

I was very interested (and a bit surprised) to read about the decision of Calpers (the California Public Retirement System) to move completely out of hedge funds for their $300 billion portfolio.

While I haven’t visited directly with anyone at Calpers about the reasons for their decision, from the stories I’ve read, it seems to be a combination of two things. First, it’s not clear that hedge-fund returns overall are any better than a well-diversified portfolio (although the management fees of hedge funds are much higher). Second, hedge funds had only about a 1% allocation in the overall portfolio. So even if they did provide a superior return, it would have a negligible impact on overall performance.

What’s the takeaway for the average investor? First, if you have “alternatives” (like hedge funds) in your own portfolio, they need to be a meaningful percentage of your portfolio (something like a 5% minimum). Second, take a hard look at the recent performance against the management fees and think about that net return as compared to a well-diversified stock and bond portfolio. Hedge funds are, as their name implies, set up more for absolute performance and outperformance during stressed times. If you’re a long-term investor that believes in diversification and can tolerate volatility, hedge funds may be expensive relative to the value they provide, given your long-term outlook.

Principal Financial Group is one of the largest investment firms in the world and also sells retirement products.

Zimpleman’s post was part of the WSJ’s “The Expert” series, where industry leaders give their thoughts on a topic on their choice.

Video: Lessons From Pension Reform in Utah

In the video above, former Utah senator Dan Liljenquist talks about the pension reform efforts he sponsored in Utah from 2008-2011 and what other states can learn from those efforts.

Liljenquist sponsored bills that ended “double-dipping” in the state, moved new hires into a defined-contribution plan and ended pension benefits for Utah lawmakers.

 

 

Does Investment Return Affect Pension Costs?

Graph With Stacks Of Coins

Does Investment Return Affect Pension Costs? Larry Bader, who worked as an actuary for 20 years before moving to Wall Street, tackled that question in the latest issue of the Financial Analysts Journal.

An excerpt of his answer:

Answer: It doesn’t.

Yes, a higher return on plan assets reduces the funding requirements for the pension plan and the expense that the sponsor must report. But the plan’s true economic cost is independent of the investment performance of the plan assets.

To see why this is so, suppose that you establish a fund to pay for your child’s college education and I do the same for my child. We make equal contributions to our respective funds, and we both face the same tuition payments. But being a smarter, bolder, or luckier investor, you grow your college fund to twice the size of mine. Can we now say that your child’s education costs less than my child’s education? Surely not. Our tuition payments are the same; it’s just that you have a larger education fund available to help pay your child’s tuition.

Or think of it this way: Suppose that your college education fund performed miserably and a similar fund that you had set up to buy a small vacation home struck it rich. Would you now say that college tuition has become very expensive but vacation homes very cheap? Can you now afford to buy a vacation mansion — or private island — but not to send your child to college? Behavioral economics suggests that you might think along those lines, but common sense says, “Get over it.”

Similarly, a higher pension fund return does not lower the economic cost of the plan. The economic cost reflects solely the amount and timing of the pension payments, which are unaffected by the size or growth of the assets.

To read the full answer, click here.

Missouri Pension Sues A Dozen Banks, Investment Firms Over Inflating Stock Prices

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Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi (PERSM) has filed a class action lawsuit against over a dozen banks and investment firms over alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

PERSM claims the firms artificially inflated the price of Millennial Media Inc. common stock by “hiding” disappointing revenue results. More from Legal News Line:

PERSM claims Millennial Media, Bessemer Venture Partners, Columbia Capital, Charles River Ventures, New Enterprise Associates Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co., Goldman Sachs & Co., Barclays Capital Inc., Allen & Company LLC, Stifel Nicolaus & Company, Canaccord Genuity Inc. and Oppenheimer & Co. hid information that reflected poorly on the company and, once released publicly, caused the company’s stock price to drop, according to a complaint filed Sept. 30 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

[…]

On March 28, 2012, Millennial Media commenced its initial public offering through which the company and certain shareholders sold more than 11.7 million shares at $13 per share for aggregate gross proceeds of more than $152 million, according to the suit.

PERSM claims through a second stock offering on Oct. 24, 2012, Millennial and its shareholders sold an additions 11.5 million shares of company stock at $14.15 per share for aggregate gross proceeds of more than $162 million.

“Pursuant to the Securities Act, defendants are strictly liable for material misstatements in the offering documents…vissued in connection with the offerings and these claims specifically exclude any allegations of knowledge or scienter,” the complaint states.

On Feb. 19, 2013, after the close of the markets, Millennial issued a press release announcing revenue for the fourth quarter of 2012 of $58 million, sharply below analysts’ expectation of $62.9 million, according to the suit.

PERSM claims Millennial also gave disappointing revenue guidance for 2013 and disclosed that it would acquire Metaresolver Inc.

“Millennial Media’s poor results, weak guidance and its need to acquire Metaresolver arose out of ongoing problems with the company’s then-existing technologies…which were driving clients away,” the complaint states. “In response to this partial disclosure of the true state of the company’s proprietary software and related technologies, Millennial Media’s stock price fell $5.38 per share, or 37.54 percent to close at $8.95 per share of February 20, 2013.”

On Aug. 13, 2013, Millennial issued a press release announcing the company would acquire Jumptap Inc. and, due to ongoing company problems, Millennial’s stock price fell $1.60 per share or 18.82 percent to close at $6.90 per share on Aug. 14, 2013, according to the suit.

PERSM claims on Nov. 13, Feb. 19 and May 7, the company’s stock fell again, to $6.32, $6.15 and finally to $3.36 per share.

As a result of the defendants’ materially false and/or misleading statements and omissions, Millennial’s common stock was offered at artificially inflated prices and traded at inflated prices during the class period.

“However, as the truth about Millennial Media’s operations and outlook became known to investors, the artificial inflation came out and the price of Millennial Media’s common stock fell, declining 86.56 percent from its class period high,” the complaint states. “These price declines caused significant losses and damages to plaintiff and other members of the class.”

The suit is classified as a class action because PERSM filed on behalf of everyone who purchased Millenial Media stock during the period where it was allegedly inflated.


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