Preqin: More Pensions Invested in Private Equity, But Average Allocation Down From 2013

opposing arrows

Data from Preqin shed some light on private equity activity in 2014, and showed that more public pension funds invested in private equity in 2014.

Even still, public pensions’ average allocation to private equity has dipped slightly since 2013.

From ThinkAdvisor:

Preqin, the investment alternatives data provider, found that the number of active U.S.-based public pension funds in private equity has risen year over year, from 266 in 2010 to 299 in October 2014. The average allocation to private equity was 7% as of October 2014, down from 7.2% a year earlier.

Preqin said private equity looked set to remain an important component of U.S.-based public pension funds’ portfolios for years to come, offering investors good portfolio diversification and outsized returns over the long term.

Fundraising for the year was likely to be strong, Preqin reported, with $254 billion raised by funds that closed in the first half.

A record 2,205 funds are currently in the market seeking an aggregate $774 billion, compared with 2,098 funds that were looking to raise $733 billion in January.

Preqin also reported that its internal data showed co-investment would increase in 2014. It acknowledged that concerns about high expenses and competition were holding back some general partners from offering co-investment opportunities. But researchers found that co-investment figured prominently in the plans of many GPs and limited partners.

Preqin said that as the private equity industry matures and investors become more sophisticated, co-investment activity could increase, with benefits for both fund managers and limited partners.

Preqin also found that venture capital funds raised more money in 2014 than in 2013.

 

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Is It Harder Than Ever for Pension Funds to Invest With Top Private Equity Funds?

lock

Many more private equity funds reached or surpassed their hard caps in 2014 than in 2013, and the funds are also raising capital at a faster pace.

As a result, many pension funds are finding it difficult to put their money in the most sought-after private equity funds.

From the Wall Street Journal:

Heated competition to get into top private-equity funds is leaving some investors out in the cold.

Pension funds, endowments and wealthy individuals that invest with private equity are finding it increasingly hard to get into the most sought-after funds, according to data and industry participants.

Private-equity firms, which raise money from such investors and then put it to work in various investment strategies, are generally filling their coffers faster this year from clients. The proportion of private-equity funds that reached or exceeded the maximum amount the firms set out to raise this year is at its highest level since at least 2009, according to a snapshot of funds for which private-equity tracker Preqin has data. Typically, firms put a limit on the size of the fund they are raising, known as a hard cap, at the beginning of the fundraising process. That hard cap generally can’t be exceeded without approval from fund investors.

As of Nov. 13, 55% of roughly 280 funds for which Preqin had hard-cap data reached or surpassed that maximum size. Last year, 43% of funds hit or exceeded those limits.

Also, private-equity firms have taken an average of 16.4 months to raise capital for funds that have closed this year, Preqin data show. That’s two months shorter than the average time it took to raise funds that closed in 2013.

“The number of quick fund closings has been especially pronounced this year,” said Cathy Konicki, a partner at investment-consulting firm NEPC LLC.

Read the entire Wall Street Journal report here.

 

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Pension Funds Criticize Excessive Private Equity Fees; More Look To Direct Investing

broken piggy bank over pile of one dollar bills

Pension fund officials from Canada and the Netherlands expressed their frustration with private equity fees during a conference this week.

The chief investment officer of the Netherlands’ $220 billion healthcare pension fund said it needs “to think about” the fees it is paying, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Ruulke Bagijn, chief investment officer for private markets at Dutch pension manager PGGM, said a Dutch pension fund for nurses and social workers that she invests for, paid more than 400 million euros ($501.6 million) to private-equity firms in 2013. The amount accounted for half the fees paid by the PFZW pension fund, even though private-equity firms managed just 6% of its assets last year, she said.

“That is something we have to think about,” Ms. Bagijn said.

Among the things pension officials are thinking about: bypassing private equity firms and fees by investing directly in companies. From the Wall Street Journal:

Jane Rowe, the head of private equity at Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, is buying more companies directly rather than just through private-equity funds. Ms. Rowe told executives gathered in a hotel near Place Vendome in central Paris that she is motivated to make money to improve the retirement security of Canadian teachers rather than simply for herself and her partners.

“You’re not doing it to make the senior managing partner of a private-equity fund $200 million more this year,” she said, as she sat alongside Ms. Ruulke of the Netherlands and Derek Murphy of PSP Investments, which manages pensions for Canadian soldiers. “You’re making it for the teachers of Ontario. You know, Derek’s making it for the armed forces of Canada. Ruulke’s doing it for the social fabric of the Netherlands. These are very nice missions to have in life.”

But an investment firm executive pointed out that direct investing isn’t as cost-free as it sounds. From the WSJ:

[Carlyle Group co-founder David Rubenstein] warned that investors who do more acquisitions themselves rather than through private-equity funds will have to pay big salaries to hire and retain talented deal makers.

“Some public pension funds will just not pay, in the United States particularly, very high salaries and will not be able to hold on to people very long and get the most talented people,” Mr. Rubenstein said at the conference. “I don’t think there are that many people who will pay their employees at these sovereign-wealth funds and other pension funds the kind of compensation necessary to hold on to these people and get them.”

[…]

Mr. Rubenstein had a further warning for investors seeking to compete for deals with private-equity firms. “If you live by the sword you die by the sword,” he said. “If you are going to do disintermediation you can’t blame somebody else if something goes wrong.”

Pension360 has previously covered how pension funds are bypassing PE firms and investing directly in companies. One such fund is the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System. The fund’s Euporean head of Private Equity said last month:

“The amount of fees that we were paying out for a fund, 2 and 20 [percentage points] and everything that goes with that, was a huge amount of value that we were losing to the fund,” Mr. Redman said. “If we could deliver top quartile returns and we weren’t hemorrhaging quite so much in terms of fees and carry that would mean that we would be able to meet the pension promise.”

 

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Private Equity Firm Threatens To Shut Out Iowa Pension Over FOIA Request

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Over at Naked Capitalism, Yves Smith has penned a long post expounding on the practice of private equity firms dissuading public pension funds from complying with FOIA requests related to investment data – often with the threat of shutting out pension funds from future investment opportunities.

The post stems from yesterday’s Wall Street Journal report covering the same topic.

Here’s the Naked Capitalism post in full:

_________________________________

By Yves Smith

A new story on private equity secrecy by Mark Maremont at the Wall Street Journal started out with a bombshell, that of private equity industry kingpin KKR muscling a public pension fund to deny information requests about KKR’s practices:

KKR & Co. warned Iowa’s public pension fund against complying with a public-records request for information about fees it paid the buyout firm, saying that doing so risked it being barred from future private-equity investments.

In an Oct. 28 letter to the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System, KKR General Counsel David Sorkin said the data was confidential and exempt from disclosure under Iowa’s open-records law. Releasing it could cause “competitive harm” to KKR, the letter said, and could prompt private-equity fund managers to bar entree to future deals and “jeopardize [the pension fund’s] access to attractive investment opportunities.”

The article also demonstrated, as we’ve pointed out earlier, than many investors are so cowed that they don’t need to be on the receiving end of overt threats:

Once public pension funds start releasing detailed information in response to public-records requests, “that’s the moment we’re done,” said Linda Calnan, interim chief investment officer of the Houston Firefighters’ Relief and Retirement Fund. “These are sensitive documents that managers don’t want out there.”

This risk, that private equity funds might exclude public pension funds that the general partners deemed to be insufficiently zealous in defending their information lockdown, has long been the excuse served up public pension funds for going along with these secrecy demands. As we demonstrated in May, the notion that the information that the funds are keeping hidden rises to the level of being a trade secret or causing competitive harm is ludicrous. We based that conclusion on a review of a dozen limited partnership agreements, the documents that the industry is most desperate to keep under lock and key.

But the only known instance of that sort of redlining actually taking place, as the Journal notes, took place in 2003 after CalPERS said it would start publishing limited data on financial returns as a result of a settlement of a Public Records Act (California-speak for FOIA) lawsuit. As we wrote in April:

Two venture capital firms, Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins, had a hissy fit and refused to let funds that would disclose their return data invest in them. Now this is of course terribly dramatic and has given some grist to the public pension funds’ paranoia that they’d be shut out of investments if they get too uppity. But the fact is that public pension funds overall aren’t big venture capital investors. And people in the industry argue that there was a obvious self-serving motive for Sequoia to hide its returns. Sequoia has launched a number of foreign funds, and many are believed not to have performed well. Why would you invest in Sequoia’s, say, third India fund if you could see that funds one and two were dogs?

So why has industry leader KKR stooped to issue an explicit, thuggish threat? Why are they so threatened as to cudgel an Iowa pension fund into cooperating with KKR and heavily redacting the response? Just as with the Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins case, it’s naked, and not at all defensible self interest.

Law firm Ropes & Gray, which counts Bain Capital among its clients, issued what amounted to an alarm to its private equity and “alternative investment” clients over an increase in inquiries to public pension funds about the very subject that the SEC had warned about in May, about fee and expense abuses, as well as other serious compliance failures. It’s a not-well-kept-secret that many investors were correctly upset about the SEC’s warnings, and some lodged written inquires with general partners as to what specifically was going on. We’ve embedded an unredacted example of one such letter at end of this post. It was the same one that CalPERS board member JJ Jelincic used to question investment consultants last month because the letter ‘fessed up to an abusive practice called evergreen fees.

Journalists like Maremont and interested members of the public have written public pension funds to obtain the general partners’ responses to these questionnaires. And this is a matter of public interest, since shortfalls in private equity funds, even minor grifting, is ultimately stealing from beneficiaries, and if the pension fund is underfunded, from taxpayers. Yet notice how Ropes & Gray depicts questions about what are ultimately taxpayer exposures as pesky and unwarranted intrusions:

We have recently observed a surge in freedom-of-information (“FOIA”) requests made by media outlets to state pension funds and other state-government-affiliated investment entities. Although the requests have so far concentrated on information related to private equity sponsors, they have also sought information about investments with other alternative investment fund sponsors. The requests tend to focus on information about advisers’ treatment of fees and expenses, issues raised as areas of SEC interest in a speech by an SEC official earlier this year. The requests may also ask for information concerning recent SEC examinations of fund managers. Many state-level FOIA laws exempt confidential business information, including private equity or other alternative investment fund information in particular, from disclosure. Nonetheless, record-keepers at state investment entities may reflexively assume that all information requested should be disclosed. But a prompt response, supported by the applicable state law, can help ensure that confidential information that is exempt from FOIA disclosure is in fact not released.

The sleight of hand here, which we’ve discussed longer-form, that merely asserting that something is confidential does not exempt it from disclosure. In fact, if you look at the examples from selected states that Ropes & Gray cites in its missive, states have tended to shield certain specific types of private equity information from disclosure, including limited partnership agreements and detailed fund performance information, but generally restrict other disclosures not on the basis of mere confidentiality but on trade secrecy or similar competitive harm, meaning the private equity firm’s competitors might learn something about the fund’s secret sauce if they obtained that information.

Please look at the first letter at the end of this post and tell me what if anything in it is so valuable that competitors might seek to copy it. Contrast that with a second letter from a Florida pension fund, from KKR that the Journal obtained and see how much is blacked out.

The fact is that the various FOIAs focused on getting at SEC abuses aren’t about protecting valuable industry intelligence, to the extent there really is any in any of their documents; it’s simply to hide their dirty laundry. The Wall Street Journal story reports how in Washington, Florida, and North Carolina, public pension fund officials have been acceding to private equity fund “concerns” and using strategies ranging from foot-dragging to woefully incomplete disclosure to outright denial to stymie inquiries.

The interesting thing about KKR’s exposure is that its defensiveness is likely due to how much scrutiny it is getting from the SEC. Maremont earlier exposed how KKR’s captive consulting firm KKR Capstone appeared to be charging undisclosed, hence impermissible fees to KKR funds. KKR has attempted to defend the practice by arguing that KKR Capstone isn’t an affiliate. We debunked that argument here.

Even though we have criticized the SEC for its apparent inaction on the private equity front, in terms of following through with Wells notices after describing widespread private equity industry malfeasance, we have been told that the agency is in the process of building some major cases against private equity firms. Given how many times KKR’s name has come up in Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and Financial Times stories on dubious private equity industry practices, one has to imagine that KKR would be a likely target for any action that the SEC would consider to be “major”.

This is an area where readers can make a difference. The one thing public pension funds, even one like CalPERS, are afraid of is their state legislature. Call or e-mail your state representatives. If you have the time and energy, also write to the editor of your local paper and the producers of your local television station. Tell them you’ve read in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal (and if you are in California, the Sacramento Bee) about public pension funds refusing to provide information to members of the public about fees as well as widespread abuses that the SEC discussed at length in a speech this year. Tell them that the SEC has made it clear that private equity can’t be treated on a “trust me” basis any more. The time has come for more pressure on public pension funds to weight the public interest more strongly in dealing with these inquiries, and if needed, new legislation to force more accountability from private equity funds and their government investors.

What Types of People Should Manage Institutional Money?

institutional investors

What traits does it take to be a successful manager of institutional money? A high IQ? A steady temperament? A penchant for going on lucky streaks?

Jack Gray, of the Paul Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality at University of Technology, Sydney, dives deep into this question in a recent article published in the Rotman International Journal of Pension Management.

From the article:

Successful investors are likely to be overweight on several the following traits:

• A paradoxical blend of arrogance, to discover and arbitrage opportunities ahead of the market, and humility, to simultaneously be skeptical about those discoveries.

• A commitment to the principle “know thyself” – for instance, recognizing when previously justified contrarianism has degenerated into unjustified stubbornness.

• The ability to make effective decisions under uncertainty, ambiguity, and pressure. A temperament that seeks comfort and stability will likely be ill-suited to investing.

• The confidence to encourage and absorb dissent yet to know when to act. Almost all organized human endeavors have at their core a paradigm of broadly agreed beliefs, stylized facts, and patterns of thought that impose a uniformity of views.

Ideas that challenge the paradigm tend to be ignored, not absorbed: Markowitz’s thesis was not rated as genuine economics, while Akerlof’s ground-breaking paper on the pricing impact of information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970) was twice rejected. Both eventually won Nobel prizes.

• The wisdom to know when to cooperate, a rare trait in a culture that has elevated competition to quasi-religious status. Much (though not all) investment information is “non-rival,” so that its value increases through sharing, as evident in open-source ventures. Yet by temperament, training, and incentives, many have an antipathy to sharing. In a study that engaged students in a game in which participants do better by cooperating, 60% of general students cooperated while only 40% of economics students did (Frank et al. 1999).

• The self-control to value patience, and so resist the short-term imperative and its eternal concomitant, being busy.

• A willingness to question and be curious, traits lacking in many boards that oversee other people’s money. After spending time embedded in American pension funds, the anthropologists O’Barr and Conley (1992) reported “a surprising lack of interest in questioning and surprisingly little interest in considering alternatives.”

Gray goes on to write that we can put people into two categories: hedgehogs and foxes. And while the investment world has plenty of the former, it is short on the latter. From the article:

Isaiah Berlin (1953) bequeathed us a crude but useful typology of people: hedgehogs view the world through the lens of a single defining, and usually substantial, idea; foxes view it through multiple lenses. Both types are needed in investing, but we are over-populated with hedgehogs who better fit compartmentalized corporate structures and are more fecund. We need more foxes, people with broader perspectives willing to trespass—a notion coined by Albert Hirschman (1981)—into foreign fields.

[…]

Cultural change is needed to recognize, support, and reward foxes, who tend to be spurned by tribal hedgehogs as soft-headed dilettantes. To Charlie Munger (1994), having different mental models is the most important thing in investing, because they expose new opportunities and drive a dialectic of risk. Investment organizations should seek more people with “contrary imaginations,” as the psychologist Liam Hudson (1967) phrases it: people with exceptional intelligence in alternative but meaningful ways; people with intelligence about the humanities, especially history and psychology, the disciplines that underlie and drive markets; people with emotional intelligence to direct and manage others; and people with organizational intelligence to get things done.

Gray provides much more analysis in the full article, which can be read here.

 

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Roger Martin: CalPERS, Other Top Funds Could Undermine Capitalism

Monopoly

Roger Martin, Academic Director of the Martin Prosperity Institute at the Rotman School of Management and the world’s 3rd most influential business thinker according to the Thinkers50 list, has written a thought-provoking column over at the Harvard Business Review.

The premise of the column is that the largest pension funds are monopolistic entities – and although Martin doesn’t think they’re doing a bad job, he is worried that, like most monopolies in history, they will “slowly but surely gravitate to serving themselves, not their customers.”

Here’s a few excerpts from the column:

The top 350 pension and sovereign wealth funds control just under $20 trillion of assets. They are the largest holders of securities in for-profit organizations competing in democratic capitalist environments.

[…]

If one looks carefully at these holders of competitive, capitalist company securities, one thing jumps out distinctly: they are not themselves competitive, capitalist organizations. Virtually all of them share a single form: a monopoly enforced by government regulation. As a Canadian, I have no choice as to where the pension contributions that are legally deducted from my paycheck go. Whether I like it or not they are sent to the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board. CPPIB is granted a monopoly right by the Government of Canada to serve me (except in Quebec, where the relevant and equivalent monopoly body is the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec).

The same rules hold in the home of the brave and the land of the free. California state employees, Texas teachers, and New York City workers have zero choice. They are served by government-regulated pension fund monopolies. In fact, 19 of the top 25 U.S. pension funds, with $2.1 trillion of assets under management, are government-regulated monopolies. The other six, with $500 billion of assets, are corporate-run monopolies in which employees have little or no ability to opt out.

Capitalism has broad support because of a general belief in the power of competition, free entry to industries, and customer choice to produce increasing productivity and high levels of innovation. However, the ownership of those actively competing companies is increasingly in the hands of organizations that face zero competition, no threat of entry, and have customers who are forced to use them.

Why is putting the economy in the hands of regulated monopolists a good idea? Obviously, many of those monopolists are doing a good job. I don’t begrudge sending my pension deductions to CPPIB because it is well run and does a nice job for me with my pension savings, and I have to applaud California Public Employees’ Pension Fund (America’s second largest pension fund with about a quarter of a trillion dollars of assets under management) for making the bold and brilliant decision to eliminate hedge fund investments from its holdings.

But the broad history of regulated monopolies is not inspiring. Without the forcing mechanisms of competition, entry, and choice, monopolies slowly but surely gravitate to serving themselves, not their customers.

[…]

If we really believe in competition and choice, then a big question we should all be asking ourselves today is what should be done about our monopolistic pension system?

You can read the rest of the piece here.

 

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What Would Adam Smith Say About CalPERS’ Hedge Fund Pullback?

Adam Smith

Tim Worstall has written an interesting piece for Forbes in the wake of CalPERS’ decision to remove $4 billion from 30 different hedge funds. The premise: What would Adam Smith think about the pension fund’s decision to end its investments with hedge funds?

Worstall writes:

We can look back all the way to 1776 and the foundation text of modern economics, Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” and find a reasonable explanation of what’s happening here. Essentially, hedge funds were a great idea but the innate structure of free market capitalism means that no idea stays great over time.

[…]

When the capitalists (investors) spot someone making those above average profits then they’ll move their investments over into that sector so that they can get them some of those excess returns. All of which is entirely fine and is a reasonable enough description of what happened to hedge funds from their small start in the 60s and 70s up to recent times. They were making higher (risk-adjusted) profits and people were moving more of their capital into them in order to get those higher returns.

However, Smith goes on to point out what happens next. That increased capital in that sector introduces more competition into that sector. Such competition, umm, competes away those excess profits and it’s thus, in the end, the very movement of capital (or investment) in chase of higher returns that leads to the higher returns disappearing. This would be a reasonable description of the hedge fund industry in more recent times.

Certainly, some funds have done very well indeed, but others have tanked. The average return from the industry (after fees, a vital point to consider) is now lower than many if not most other investment strategies. At which point we should see capital flowing out of the industry and that’s just what Calpers is doing.

Worstall is a senior fellow at the Adam Smith Institute. Read the rest of his piece here.

 

Photo credit: “AdamSmith” by Etching created by Cadell and Davies (1811), John Horsburgh (1828) or R.C. Bell (1872). Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons