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State Funds For Kentucky Pension Systems Could Come With Strings Attached As Lawmakers Push For Pension Transparency

The Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System (KTRS) and the Kentucky Employees Retirement System Non-Hazardous Plan (KERS Non-Haz) could both be in line for state money sooner than later.

But there might be some strings to that state funding, as lawmakers push for more transparency around investments and placement agents associated with the pension systems.

One lawmaker wants the pension systems to make the search for investment firms more competitive – and more public. From the Lexington Herald-Leader:

Rep. Jim Wayne, D-Louisville, wants the pension systems to use the state’s competitive bidding process to solicit investment proposals, rather than award the lucrative deals privately. Terms of each deal, including the management fees, would be made public. Wayne also would ban payments to third-party “placement agents,” middlemen who help private investment firms sell their products to pension funds.

“The status quo works for the special interests on Wall Street because it hides what they’re making off our pension system,” Wayne said.

Another lawmaker wants to know the fees paid to placement agents, as well as the pension benefits received by state lawmakers:

Sen. Chris McDaniel, R-Taylor Mill, wants full disclosure of placement agent fees. He also wants the public to see how much money individual members of the General Assembly expect to collect through pensions or how much they do collect if they are retired. Kentucky’s part-time lawmakers not only have awarded themselves state pensions, but they also carefully keep them in a separate system, apart from KRS, that is 62 percent funded.

Last winter, several bills along these lines were ignored by House and Senate leaders, including one that would have required public disclosure of all state retirees’ pensions. This time, McDaniel said, he has narrowed the focus to his fellow lawmakers.

“I’ve told people, 95 percent of state workers don’t receive a very big pension when they retire. But there are a handful of pension abuses, and it would be useful for us to understand how it works. So at the very least, the legislature can lead from the front and require transparency for its own pensions,” McDaniel said.

Not everyone in Kentucky politics agrees with the transparency initiatives. In fact, one powerful lawmaker says he won’t consider either of the aforementioned ideas:

House State Government Committee Chairman Brent Yonts, D-Greenville, said he’s not inclined to consider Wayne’s or McDaniel’s bills this winter.

“I’m reluctant to support a can-opener approach to the pension system without knowing the consequences of that and without knowing why it’s currently done this way,” Yonts said.

Outside investment managers might not want to accept KRS’ and KTRS’ money if they know their fees will be publicly disclosed, Yonts said. And nobody who gets a state pension should have to share that information with the public, he said.

“Frankly, I don’t think that’s the public’s business,” Yonts said. “They have access to the public payroll and salary information. They can theorize about what we’re going to collect in pensions. But the public is not entitled to know every last little thing about us.”

Both of the state’s major pension plans are dangerously underfunded, but the KERS Non-Haz plan is among the unhealthiest in the country, with a funding ratio of 21 percent. KTRS is 52 percent funded.

NYC Pensions Paid Record Fees in 2014; Former Pension Official Says Comptroller “Dragging His Feet” On Cutting Expenses

New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer serves as investment advisor to the boards of the city’s five pension funds, which together manage $144 billion in assets.

Last year, Stringer’s office said the city’s pension systems needed to “limit costs” and “negotiate lower fees”.

One year later, the pension systems have paid a record number of investment fees – $530 million – and a former director of the city’s largest pension fund is accusing Stringer of “dragging his feet” on bringing expenses down.

The city’s pension system paid more fees in 2014 than it had in any previous year. From the New York Post:

The city paid a record $530.2 million in fees to pension investment firms last fiscal year, despite Comptroller Scott Stringer’s vow to rein in the escalating costs.

The fat fees forked out to private advisers and consultants skyrocketed from $472.5 million in fiscal year 2013. The half-billion dollars in fiscal year 2014 is five times the $97.9 million paid in 2003.

In the last 15 years, the city has paid $4 billion to advisers.

A year ago, Stringer reacted sternly to reports that his predecessor, John Liu, had paid investment firms 28 percent more than the year before.

“We need to limit costs, ensure payments are commensurate with performance and . . . negotiate lower fees,” a Stringer spokesman said at the time.

Last week, Stringer’s office said he “has made lowering fees a top priority,” but did not give any examples of lowered fees or firms fired for lackluster performance.

One former pension official questioned Stringer’s commitment to lowering investment fees. The official said that Stringer has voted for fees in the past, and hasn’t done anything to bring them down. From the NY Post:

John Murphy, former executive director of NYCERS, the city’s largest pension fund, said Stringer sat on the NYCERS board of trustees as Manhattan borough president.

“He voted for these fees for eight years. Now he’s dragging his feet on doing something about it as a comptroller,” Murphy said.

Besides putting money into stocks and bonds, the comptroller pays dozens of outside advisers to manage investments in riskier private-equity, real-estate and hedge funds.

Murphy called on Stringer to make public his contracts with investment managers, especially private-equity firms, which take payments from the funds they oversee.

“There’s no way to know how much money they’re making” for the pension funds or taking in compensation, Murphy said.

[Stringer spokesman Eric] Sumberg said, “We are reviewing ways to provide transparency on the general terms of our contracts.”

NYC’s five pension systems control $144 billion in assets. They assume a 7 percent return on investment annually.

Paul Singer: CalPERS’ Hedge Fund Exit Was “Off-Base”

Paul Singer, a hedge fund manager, activist investor and billionaire, wrote in a recent letter to clients that CalPERS’ exit from hedge funds was “off-base”.

CalPERS said at the time that its decision to exit hedge funds was based on their “complexity, cost and the lack of ability to scale at CalPERS’ size”.

Singer responded to those criticisms, according to CNBC:

“We are certainly not in a position to be opining on the ‘asset class’ of hedge funds, or on any of the specific funds that were held or rejected by CalPERS, but we think the decision to abandon hedge funds altogether is off-base,” Singer wrote in a recent letter to clients of his $25.4 billion Elliott Management Corp.

[…]

On complexity, Singer wrote that it should be a positive.

“It is precisely complexity that provides the opportunity for certain managers to generate different patterns of returns than those available from securities, markets and styles that are accessible to anyone and everyone,” the letter said.

Singer also took issue with claims that drawbacks of hedge funds include opaqueness and high fees. From CNBC:

“We also never understood the discussions framed around full transparency. While nobody wants to invest in a black box, Elliott (and other funds) trade positions that could be harmed by public knowledge of their size, short-term direction or even their identity.”

Singer also slammed CalPERs for its complaint about the relative high cost of hedge funds.

“We at Elliott do not understand manager selection criteria based on the level of fees rather than on the result that investors could reasonably expect after fees and expenses are taken into account,” he wrote.

The broader point Singer makes is on the enduring value of hedge funds to diversify a portfolio.

“Current bond prices seem to create a modest performance comparator for some well-managed hedge funds. Moreover, stocks are priced to be consistent with bond prices, and we have a hard time envisioning double-digit annual stock index gains in the next few years,” the letter said.

“Many hedge funds may have as much trouble in the next few years as institutional investors, but investors should be looking for the prospective survivors of the next rounds of real market turmoil.”

Hedge funds have returned 2.92 percent this year, according to Preqin. Singer’s hedge fund, Elliott Associates LP, has 13.9 percent annually since 1977.

Photo by World Economic Forum via Wikimedia Commons

Pension Funds Push G20 Leaders to Regulate and Reform With Long-Term Investing in Mind

Pension funds and other investors participating in the Fiduciary Investors Symposium at Harvard University have written a letter to Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott encouraging him and other G20 leaders to implement regulations and reforms that encourage long-term investing.

[The letter can be read at the bottom of this post.]

Australia is hosting the 2014 G20 summit.

From the letter:

There was a request to alert you to this support from the industry and to request action from G20 leaders on the following:

1. That we acknowledge the OECD’s definition of long-term capital in terms of being patient, engaged and productive.

2. That investor voices can play an important role in the discussion of those factors that are fundamental to the development of a sustainable financial system that delivers benefits to the economy, our societies and the planet, now and into the future.

3. That asset owners, including pension funds, sovereign funds and endowments have an interest to ensure that, in order to provide strong financial returns, and effective stewardship of assets as well as value creation, all the stakeholders in funds management need to be well informed about and active in pursuing a long term investment horizon. This requires a commitment to stronger direct engagement with companies and changes in reporting cycles and greater transparency.

4. That regulation can be enabling of long-term investment and we want to ensure that regulation does not inhibit long-term investment. We therefore encourage a deeper level of engagement between asset owners and investment managers with policy makers that relate to the evolving global financial, economic and social processes as they become more integrated and more complex and help design a regulatory framework that helps and does not hinder long-term investment.

Read the entire letter here, or below.

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Photo by G20.org

Teacher Sues Kentucky Pension System Over Funding Status, Transparency Issues

A Kentucky teacher has filed a lawsuit against the Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System (KTRS), claiming KTRS has “failed in their fiduciary duty” by letting the system become one of the worst funded teachers’ plans in the country.

From WFPL:

A Jefferson County Public Schools teacher filed a lawsuit Monday against the Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System, which has been called one of the worst-funded pension systems for educators in the U.S.

The plaintiff, duPont Manual High School teacher Randolph “Randy” Wieck, told WFPL that the system supporting over 140,000 teachers in Kentucky is billions of dollars in debt; also that teachers pay about 12 percent of their paychecks into the retirement system.

“We have raced to the bottom and we’re neck and neck with the worst funded teachers plan in the country,” he said.

As WFPL reported, the General Assembly during this year’s legislative session funded KTRS at around 50 percent of what the retirement system requested.

The federal Government Accounting Office and Standard & Poor say Kentucky’s pension system is being funded at an unhealthy rate.

KTRS has “failed in their fiduciary duty by not aggressively and publicly demanding the full funding they need to stay solvent,” Wieck argues in a copy of the complaint he provided to WFPL. The complaint further alleges that KTRS has not been transparent enough in the “system’s dire funding status,” and that the investments made by KTRS are not responsible.

The teacher, Randy Wieck, is giving KTRS one year to become fully funded. After that, he says he will bring the lawsuit to the steps of Kentucky’s General Assembly; for many years, lawmakers have failed to pay the state’s actuarially-required contribution to the pension system – although they did make the full payment to the teachers’ system in 2011.

TRS’ attorney commented on the suit:

“I am very optimistic that we are going to find a solution for this,” said Beau Barnes, general counsel for KTRS.

There are positive signs among members of the General Assembly to come up with a plan, he said, adding that next week, KTRS will appear before the state’s Interim Joint Committee on State Government to discuss a financing plan for the pension fund. Wieck, who was joined by “Kentucky Fried Pensions” author Chris Tobe, seemed skeptical of previous conversations that seemed to excite Barnes.

The state legislature is not poised to discuss budget issues during the 2015 legislative session, but Wieck said Kentucky is violating its duty to keep the pension system solvent.

“You don’t actually have to wait for the bus to hit you to experience danger. And that is what is happening to Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System. It is being damaged every year,” he said.

KTRS manages $17.5 billion in assets. The system is about 51 percent funded.

Principles For Better Pension Design

A long, insightful discussion and analysis of pension design was published in the Fall issue of the Rotman International Journal of Pension Management. During the course of the paper the three authors, Thomas van Galen, Theo Kocken, and Stefan Lundbergh, propose a set of principles to help navigate the dilemmas and trade-offs posed by both public and private pension systems.

The paper begins:

Designing a pension system is a complex business in which difficult tradeoffs must be made. On the one hand, we may want everyone to receive a retirement income that is linked to their own contribution; on the other, we want to protect people from poverty. How do we weight these two goals? The choice will depend on societal preferences and cultural values. We must also ask for whom we should design the pension system: what is ideal for a self-employed high-income earner may be far from adequate for someone living on a minimum wage, paying rent, and raising a family of five.

Addressing these dilemmas is a daunting task, especially with the recognition that pension systems all have their own historical background, and that each has evolved in its own particular context.

The authors propose a set of pension design principles, organized into three groups: behavioral principles, stability principles and risk-sharing principles.

The behavioral principles:

1. Keep it simple. Don’t make the pension solution any more complex than necessary. Complexity and lack of transparency make decision making more difficult, increasing the risk that people will make decision they will later regret. Simplicity, by contrast, helps manage people’s expectations and increases their trust, both vital qualities for a successful pension system.

2. Provide sensible choices. Employees should be given a standard package, on top of which a limited set of well- considered alternatives are offered, to protect them from making mistakes while allowing them individual freedom (Boon and Nijboer 2012). Creating a set of choices for a pension system is like drawing up a good restaurant menu: it offers people tools (the menu) for tailoring the solution (the meal) to their needs, but without expecting them to be financial experts (the chef) (Thaler and Benartzi 2004).

3. Under-promise, over-deliver. Research has shown that people experience twice as much pain from a loss as pleasure from a gain of equal size. Therefore, it is wise to avoid delivering outcomes below people’s expectations, which implies that a pension system should offer people a minimum level of pension income that, in practice, will likely be exceeded (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Research shows that people value some kind of certainty very highly and are willing to pay substantial sums of money for it (Van Els et al. 2004), but too much certainty will make the pension design unaffordable.

The stability principles:

1. Ensure adaptability. Constantly changing external conditions require an adaptable pension system. Explicit individual ownership rights ensure flexibility, so that the system can adjust itself over time, and also make pensions more mobile to move to other systems.

2. Keep it objective. The health of a pension system should be measured based on objective market valuations. An objective diagnosis ensures that beneficiaries feel comfortable with how the pension fund deals with their property rights. If the valuations are calculated differently from market practice, participants may feel they are better off outside the system.

3. Prepare for extreme weather. The world is uncertain and unpredictable things happen; a pension system should be robust under extreme circumstances, built not on predictions but on consequences of possible outcomes. To assess the system’s robustness, draw up a set of “extreme weather” scenarios for risks outside and inside the pension system. The design of the pension system should target the ability to endure these extreme scenarios.

And the risk-sharing principles:

1. Avoid winner/loser outcomes. To avoid losing support, pension system design should prevent any one group of participants benefitting at the cost of another group. For example, if internal pricing in DB plans deviates from market pricing, it is likely to create winner/loser outcomes, eventually leading to pension system distrust.

2. Only diversifiable risks should be shared. A system founded on solidarity in bearing diversifiable risk creates value for all by reducing individual risk. For example, we have no idea how long we will live after we retire, but we can estimate the current average life expectancy of a homogenous group reasonably well, so it makes sense for individuals to pool their individual longevity risk with a large group.

3. Individuals must bear some risks. Risks that cannot be diversified or hedged in the market should be borne by the individual. Pooling non-diversifiable risks leads inevitably to transfers between groups in the collective pool and will eventually erode trust in the system. In reaching for higher long-term returns, younger people can absorb more market risk than older people; this calls not for risk sharing but for age differentiation in exposure to financial markets.

The authors go on to provide examples of these principles in action, using pension systems from the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands. The full seven page paper can be read here.

CalPERS Board Asks Private Equity Consultants: Are “Investors Having Their Pockets Picked” By Evergreen Fees?

http://youtu.be/gn7XSqZZanU

Over at Naked Capitalism, Yves Smith has posted an extensive analysis of the October 13^th meeting of CalPERS’ investment committee.

At the meeting, the committee heard presentations from three consultants: Albourne America, Meketa Investment Group, Pension Consulting Alliance.

The meeting gets interesting when one committee member asks the consultants about “evergreen fees”.

[The exchange begins at the 34:30 mark in the above video].

From Naked Capitalism:

The board is presented with three candidates screened by CalPERS staff. Two, Meketa Investment Group and Pension Consulting Alliance, are established CalPERS advisors. There’s one newbie candidate, Albourne America. Each contender makes a presentation and then the board gets a grand total of 20 minutes for questions and answers for each of them. This isn’t a format for getting serious.

To make a bad situation worse, most of the questions were at best softballs. For instance, Dana Hollinger asked what the consultants thought about the level of risk CalPERS was taking in private equity program. Priya Mathur asked if the advisors could do an adequate job evaluating foreign managers with no foreign offices. Michael Bilbrey asked how the consultants kept from overreacting to positive or negative market conditions.

One board member, however, did manage to put the consultants on the spot. The answers were revealing, and not in a good way. The question came from J.J. Jelincic, where he asks about a particular type of abusive fee, an evergreen fee.

Evergreen fees occur when the general partner makes its portfolio companies, who are in no position to say no, sign consulting agreements that require the companies to pay fees to the general partners. It’s bad enough that those consulting fees, which in industry parlance are called monitoring fees, seldom bear any resemblance to services actually rendered. Over the years, limited partners have wised up a bit and now require a big portion of those fees, typically 80%, to be rebated against the management fees charged by the general partners.

So where do these evergreen fees come in? Gretchen Morgenson flagged an example of this practice in a May article. The general partner makes the hapless portfolio company sign a consulting agreement, say for ten or twelve years. The company is sold out of the fund before that. But the fees continue to be paid to the general partner after the exit. Clearly, the purchase price, and hence the proceeds to the fund, will have been reduced by the amount of those ongoing fees, to the detriment of the fund’s investors. And with the company no longer in the fund, it is almost certain to be no longer subject to the fee rebates to the limited partners.

[…]

Jelincic describes the how the response said that the fees are shared only if the fund has not fully exited its investment in the portfolio company. Jelincic asks if that’s an example of an evergreen fee, and if so, what CalPERS should do about it.

Naked Capitalism on the consultants’ responses:

The response from Albourne is superficially the best, but substantively is actually the most troubling. The first consultant responds enthusiastically, stating that CalPERS is in position to stop this sort of practice by virtue of having a “big stick” as the SEC does. He says that other funds aren’t able to contest these practices.

The disturbing part is where he claims his firm was aware of these practices years ago by virtue of doing what they call back office audits. That sounds implausible, since the rights of the limited partners to examine books and records extends only to the fund itself not to the general partner or the portfolio companies (mind you, some smaller or newer funds might consent). But the flow of the fees and expenses that the limited partners don’t know about go directly from the portfolio company to the general partner and do not pass through the fund. How does Albourne have any right to see that?

But if they somehow really did have that information, the implication is even worse. It means they were complicit in the general partners’ abuses. If they really did know this sort of thing and remained silent, whose interest were they serving? It looks as if they violated their fiduciary duty to their clients.

The younger Albourne staffer claimed a lot of the fees were disclosed in footnotes and that most limited partners have been too thinly staffed or inattentive to catch them. That amounts to a defense of the general partners and if Albourne really did know about these fees, Albourne’s inaction.

However, The SEC doesn’t agree with that view and they have the right to do much deeper probes than Albourne does. From SEC exam chief Drew Bowden’s May speech:

[A]dvisers bill their funds separately for various back-office functions that have traditionally been included as a service provided in exchange for the management fee, including compliance, legal, and accounting — without proper disclosure that these costs are being shifted to investors.

For these fees to be properly disclosed, they had to have been set forth in the limited partnership agreement or the subscription docs for the limited partners, meaning before the investment was made, to have gotten proper notice. Go look at any of the dozen limited partnership agreements we have published. You don’t see footnotes, much the less other nitty gritty disclosure of exactly who pays for what. Not very clear disclosures after the limited partners are committed to the funds, to the extent some general partners provide them, do not constitute proper notice and consent.

Meketa was clearly not prepared to field Jelincic’s question and waffled. They effectively said they thought the fees were generally permissible but more transparency was needed. They threw it back on CalPERS to be more aggressive, particularly on customized accounts, and urged them work with other large limited partners.

Pension Consulting Alliance was a tad less deer-in-the-headlights than Meketa but in terms of substance, like Albourne, made some damning remarks. The consultant acted if evergreen fees might be offset, which simply suggests he is ignorant of the nature of this ruse. He said general partners are looking to do something about it, implying they were intending to get rid of them, but said compliance was inconsistent. Huh? If the funds intend to stop the practice, why is compliance an issue? This is simply incoherent, unless you recognize that what he is actually describing is unresolved wrangling, not any sort of agreement between limited and general partners that charge these fees on this matter. He also said he would recommend against being in funds that have evergreen fees. But there was no evidence he had planned to be inquisitive about them before the question was asked.

You’ll notice that all of the answers treat the only outcome as having CalPERS, perhaps in concert with other investors, be more bloody-minded about evergreen and other dubious fees. You’ll notice no one said, “Yes, you should tell the SEC this stinks. You were duped. You should encourage the SEC to fine general partners who engaged in this practice and encourage the SEC to have those fees disgorged. That would to put an end to this. Better yet, tell the general partners you’ll do that if they don’t stop charging those fees and make restitution to you. That’s the fastest way to put a stop to this and get the most for your beneficiaries.” Two of the three respondents said CalPERS is in a position to play hardball, so why not take that point of view to its logical conclusion?

But this is what passes for best-of-breed due diligence and supervision in public pension land. Imagine what goes on at, say, a municipal pension fund.

Read the entire Naked Capitalism post, which features more analysis, here.

Surveys: Institutional Investors Disillusioned With Hedge Funds, But Warming To Real Estate And Infrastructure

Two separate surveys released in recent days suggest institutional investors might be growing weary of hedge funds and the associated fees and lack of transparency.

But the survey results also show that the same investors are becoming more enthused with infrastructure and real estate investments.

The dissatisfaction with hedge funds — and their fee structures — is much more pronounced in the U.S. than anywhere else. From the Boston Globe:

Hedge funds and private equity funds took a hit among US institutions and pension managers in a survey by Fidelity Investments released Monday.

The survey found that only 19 percent of American managers of pensions and other large funds believe the benefits of hedge funds and private equity funds are worth the fees they charge. That contrasted with Europe and Asia, where the vast majority — 72 percent and 91 percent, respectively — said the fees were fair.

The US responses appear to reflect growing dissatisfaction with the fees charged by hedge funds, in particular. Both hedge funds and private equity funds typically charge 2 percent upfront and keep 20 percent of the profits they generate for clients.

Derek Young, vice chairman of Pyramis Global Advisors , the institutional arm of Fidelity that conducted the survey, chalked up the US skepticism to a longer period of having worked with alternative investments.

“There’s an experience level in the US that’s significantly beyond the other regions of the world,’’ Young said.

A separate survey came to a similar conclusion. But it also indicated that, for institutional investors looking to invest in hedge funds, priorities are changing: returns are taking a back seat to lower fees, more transparency and the promise of diversification. From Chief Investment Officer:

Institutional investors are growing unsatisfied with hedge fund performance and are increasingly skeptical of the quality of future returns, according to a survey by UBS Fund Services and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).

The survey of investors overseeing a collective $1.9 trillion found that only 39% were satisfied with the performance of their hedge fund managers, and only a quarter of respondents said they expected a “satisfying level of performance” in the next 12-24 months.

[…]

The report claimed this showed a change in expectations of what hedge funds are chosen to achieve. Investors no longer expect double-digit returns, but instead are content to settle for lower fees, better transparency, and low correlations with other asset classes.

Mark Porter, head of UBS Fund Services, said: “With institutional money now accounting for 80% of the hedge fund industry, they will continue seeking greater transparency over how performance is achieved and how risks are managed, leading to increased due diligence requirements for alternative managers.”

Meanwhile, the USB survey also indicated investors are looking to increase their allocations to infrastructure and real estate investments. From Chief Investment Officer:

“Despite the challenges of devising investment structures that can effectively navigate the dynamic arena of alternative markets, asset managers should remain committed to infrastructure and real assets which could drive up total assets under management in these two asset classes,” the report said.

“This new generation of alternative investments is expected to address the increasing asset and liability constraints of institutional investors and satisfy their preeminent objective of a de-correlation to more traditional asset classes.”

The report noted that despite waning enthusiasm for hedge funds, allocations aren’t likely to change for the next few years.

But alternative investments on the whole, according to the report, are expected to double by 2020.

Fiduciary Capitalism, Long-Term Thinking and the Future of Finance

John Rogers, CFA, penned a thoughtful article in a recent issue of the Financial Analysts Journal regarding the future of finance – and how pension funds and other institutional investors could usher in a new era of capitalism.

From the article, titled “A New Era of Fiduciary Capitalism? Let’s Hope So”:

From my perspective, a new era of capitalism is emerging out of the fog. What I define as fiduciary capitalism is gathering strength and needs to become the future of finance. An era of fiduciary capitalism would be one in which long-term-oriented institutional investors shape behavior in the financial markets and the broader economy. In fiduciary capitalism, the dominant players in capital formation are institutional asset owners; these investors are legally bound to a duty of care and loyalty and must place the needs of their beneficiaries above all other considerations. The main players in this group are pension funds, endowments, foundations, and sovereign wealth funds.

Fiduciary capitalism has several attractive traits. It encourages long-term thinking. As “universal owners,” fiduciaries foster a deeper engagement with companies’ management teams and public policymakers on governance and strategy. In textbook terms, they seek to minimize negative externalities and reward positive ones. Because reducing costs is easier than generating alpha, we can expect continued pressure on financial intermediaries to reduce costs. To be sure, there are considerable gaps to bridge between today’s landscape and fiduciary capitalism. Transparency and disclosure, governance of fiduciaries, agency issues, and accountability are all areas that need more work.

On barrier in the way of fiduciary capitalism: lack of transparency. From the article:

Too many institutional investors are secretive and do not disclose enough about their activities. Their beneficial owners (including voters, in the case of sovereign funds) need more information to make reasonable judgments about their operations. Similarly, far more transparency is needed in the true costs of running these pools of assets. Investment management fees and other expenses often go unreported. Too much time and energy is spent comparing returns with market benchmarks, and not enough is spent defining and comparing the organizations’ performances against their liabilities—or against adequacy ratios.

Pension governance itself needs to be improved. As Ranji Nagaswami, former chief investment adviser to New York City’s $140 billion employee pension funds, has observed, public pension trustees are often ill equipped to govern platforms that are effectively complex asset management organizations. Compensation remains a complicated issue. In the public sector, paying for great pension staffers ought to be at least as important as a winning record on the playing field, yet in 27 of the 50 US states, the highest-paid public employee is the head coach of a college football team.

Rogers concludes:

The future of finance needs to be less about leverage, financial engineering, and stratospheric bonuses and more about efficiently and cleanly connecting capital with ideas, long-term investing for the good of society, and delivering on promises to future generations. In the public policy arena, governments that promote long-term savings, reduce taxes on long-term ownership, and require transparency and good fiduciary governance can help hasten this welcome change in our financial markets.

The era of finance capitalism wasn’t all bad, and an era of fiduciary capitalism wouldn’t be all good. In a time when leadership in finance is desperately lacking, fiduciaries have the potential to reconnect financial services with the society they serve. Let’s hope it’s not too late.

Read the entire article, which is free to view, here.

Kolivakis: Time To Tear Down Private Equity’s “Iron Curtain”

Leo Kolivakis runs the blog Pension Pulse, which tightly covers the world of pensions and investments.

Kolivakis recently commented on Gretchen Morgenson’s New York Times story, “Behind Private Equity’s Curtain”. Here’s what he had to say:

There is still way too much secrecy in the private equity industry, and much of this is deliberate so that PE kingpins can profit off…public pension funds that hand over billions without demanding more transparency and lower fees. This is why I played on the title and called it an “iron curtain.”

Go back to read my comment on the dark side of private equity where I discussed some of these issues. I’m not against private equity but think it’s high time that these guys realize who their big clients are — public pension funds! That means they should provide full transparency on fees, clawbacks and other terms. They can do so with a sufficient lag as to not hurt their “trade secrets” but there has to be laws passed that require them to do so.

And what about the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA)? This organization is made up of the leading private equity investors and it has stayed mum on all these transparency issues. If they got together and demanded more transparency, I guarantee you all the big PE funds would bend over backwards to provide them with the information they require.

Interestingly, all the major private equity funds have publicly listed stocks, many of which have sold off recently during the market rout (and some offer very juicy dividends!). Go check out the charts and dividends of Apollo Global Management (APO), Blackstone (BX), Carlyle Group (CG), and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR).

On its Q3 conference call, Blackstone’s management pointed out that during the past four years, its growth had been limited only by how much capital it can manage efficiently, not by how much capital investors have been willing to provide.

But as valuations keep inflating, it will be even more difficult for these alternative investment managers to find deals that are priced reasonably. And if deflation settles in, I foresee very difficult days ahead for all asset managers, including alternative investment managers.

Read the entire post here.

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