featured | Pension360

CalPERS Cautious on Real Estate Despite Owning Hot Property

For CalPERS, the empty lot that currently sits at Third and Capitol in downtown Sacramento represents both a past failure and future opportunity.

CalPERS owns the lot, which has sat vacant since the fund lost $60 million on a failed condo development there in 2007.

That’s why CalPERS is being cautious with plans to develop the lot, even if it’s a hot property with the new Sacramento Kings arena being built just a few blocks away.

From the Sacramento Bee:

CalPERS has become more conservative about developing property from the ground up and now says it will take its time before proceeding at the downtown site.

“We plan to be very smart before jumping back into construction,” said Ted Eliopoulos, the newly installed chief investment officer at the California Public Employees’ Retirement System.

That’s not to say the nation’s largest public pension fund is ignoring the site’s potential. With the Kings’ arena set for an October 2016 opening and the downtown market in a state of revival, Eliopoulos said CalPERS and its development partner, CIM Group of Los Angeles, are committed to eventually doing something big at Third and Capitol.

“It deserves a project of scale, an iconic project,” said Eliopoulos, the man who pulled the plug on the original condo and hotel towers in 2007 after construction had begun.

In the most extensive comments the pension fund has made about the site in years, Eliopoulos said CalPERS and CIM are trying to determine “what mix of office, apartment, retail would be most appropriate for the site, from an economic standpoint, from a community standpoint.”

More details on the failed condo development that was originally supposed to occupy the space:

For the past seven years…Third and Capitol has been a humbling reminder, for both CalPERS and the city, of the collapse of the real estate market.

With CalPERS as his major financial backer, Sacramento developer John Saca was going to build twin 53-story condo and hotel towers on the site that once housed the old Sacramento Union newspaper. Along with the Aura condo project proposed a few blocks east, the Saca Towers were going to launch a downtown housing boom.

Neither project materialized, but the Saca project was the more spectacular failure. The fenced-off site, now a ghost town of weeds, trees and concrete pilings, has become known in some quarters as “the hole in the ground.”

Billed as the tallest residential project on the West Coast, the towers got off to a surprisingly strong start.

[…]

Eventually, though, the project ran into big problems – namely, $70 million worth of cost overruns caused by troubles with the concrete pilings. After spending $25 million, CalPERS cut off funding in January 2007. The decision was made by Eliopoulos, a private developer who had just joined CalPERS as senior investment officer for real estate.

“That was my first week on the job,” Eliopoulos said. “That was the first decision that I made, to stop the project.”

Months of public wrangling ensued between the two partners, with Saca complaining that he’d been undermined by CalPERS. Eventually, the pension fund got control of the site, but at a cost. On top of the original $25 million, it spent an additional $35 million to satisfy contractors’ liens, repay a mortgage and perform some additional pre-construction work. (The customers’ deposits, parked in an escrow account, were also returned.) CIM Group, which has built several downtown Sacramento buildings and partnered with CalPERS on the Plaza Lofts project on J Street years ago, was brought in to manage the forlorn site and advise the pension fund on possible uses.

CalPERS lost $10 billion on real estate investments between 2008 and 2010. In the years since, its real estate portfolio has seen double-digit returns almost every year.

The fund plans to increase its real estate holdings by 27 percent by 2016.

Photo by Photo by Stephen Curtin

CalPERS Board Asks Private Equity Consultants: Are “Investors Having Their Pockets Picked” By Evergreen Fees?

http://youtu.be/gn7XSqZZanU

Over at Naked Capitalism, Yves Smith has posted an extensive analysis of the October 13^th meeting of CalPERS’ investment committee.

At the meeting, the committee heard presentations from three consultants: Albourne America, Meketa Investment Group, Pension Consulting Alliance.

The meeting gets interesting when one committee member asks the consultants about “evergreen fees”.

[The exchange begins at the 34:30 mark in the above video].

From Naked Capitalism:

The board is presented with three candidates screened by CalPERS staff. Two, Meketa Investment Group and Pension Consulting Alliance, are established CalPERS advisors. There’s one newbie candidate, Albourne America. Each contender makes a presentation and then the board gets a grand total of 20 minutes for questions and answers for each of them. This isn’t a format for getting serious.

To make a bad situation worse, most of the questions were at best softballs. For instance, Dana Hollinger asked what the consultants thought about the level of risk CalPERS was taking in private equity program. Priya Mathur asked if the advisors could do an adequate job evaluating foreign managers with no foreign offices. Michael Bilbrey asked how the consultants kept from overreacting to positive or negative market conditions.

One board member, however, did manage to put the consultants on the spot. The answers were revealing, and not in a good way. The question came from J.J. Jelincic, where he asks about a particular type of abusive fee, an evergreen fee.

Evergreen fees occur when the general partner makes its portfolio companies, who are in no position to say no, sign consulting agreements that require the companies to pay fees to the general partners. It’s bad enough that those consulting fees, which in industry parlance are called monitoring fees, seldom bear any resemblance to services actually rendered. Over the years, limited partners have wised up a bit and now require a big portion of those fees, typically 80%, to be rebated against the management fees charged by the general partners.

So where do these evergreen fees come in? Gretchen Morgenson flagged an example of this practice in a May article. The general partner makes the hapless portfolio company sign a consulting agreement, say for ten or twelve years. The company is sold out of the fund before that. But the fees continue to be paid to the general partner after the exit. Clearly, the purchase price, and hence the proceeds to the fund, will have been reduced by the amount of those ongoing fees, to the detriment of the fund’s investors. And with the company no longer in the fund, it is almost certain to be no longer subject to the fee rebates to the limited partners.

[…]

Jelincic describes the how the response said that the fees are shared only if the fund has not fully exited its investment in the portfolio company. Jelincic asks if that’s an example of an evergreen fee, and if so, what CalPERS should do about it.

Naked Capitalism on the consultants’ responses:

The response from Albourne is superficially the best, but substantively is actually the most troubling. The first consultant responds enthusiastically, stating that CalPERS is in position to stop this sort of practice by virtue of having a “big stick” as the SEC does. He says that other funds aren’t able to contest these practices.

The disturbing part is where he claims his firm was aware of these practices years ago by virtue of doing what they call back office audits. That sounds implausible, since the rights of the limited partners to examine books and records extends only to the fund itself not to the general partner or the portfolio companies (mind you, some smaller or newer funds might consent). But the flow of the fees and expenses that the limited partners don’t know about go directly from the portfolio company to the general partner and do not pass through the fund. How does Albourne have any right to see that?

But if they somehow really did have that information, the implication is even worse. It means they were complicit in the general partners’ abuses. If they really did know this sort of thing and remained silent, whose interest were they serving? It looks as if they violated their fiduciary duty to their clients.

The younger Albourne staffer claimed a lot of the fees were disclosed in footnotes and that most limited partners have been too thinly staffed or inattentive to catch them. That amounts to a defense of the general partners and if Albourne really did know about these fees, Albourne’s inaction.

However, The SEC doesn’t agree with that view and they have the right to do much deeper probes than Albourne does. From SEC exam chief Drew Bowden’s May speech:

[A]dvisers bill their funds separately for various back-office functions that have traditionally been included as a service provided in exchange for the management fee, including compliance, legal, and accounting — without proper disclosure that these costs are being shifted to investors.

For these fees to be properly disclosed, they had to have been set forth in the limited partnership agreement or the subscription docs for the limited partners, meaning before the investment was made, to have gotten proper notice. Go look at any of the dozen limited partnership agreements we have published. You don’t see footnotes, much the less other nitty gritty disclosure of exactly who pays for what. Not very clear disclosures after the limited partners are committed to the funds, to the extent some general partners provide them, do not constitute proper notice and consent.

Meketa was clearly not prepared to field Jelincic’s question and waffled. They effectively said they thought the fees were generally permissible but more transparency was needed. They threw it back on CalPERS to be more aggressive, particularly on customized accounts, and urged them work with other large limited partners.

Pension Consulting Alliance was a tad less deer-in-the-headlights than Meketa but in terms of substance, like Albourne, made some damning remarks. The consultant acted if evergreen fees might be offset, which simply suggests he is ignorant of the nature of this ruse. He said general partners are looking to do something about it, implying they were intending to get rid of them, but said compliance was inconsistent. Huh? If the funds intend to stop the practice, why is compliance an issue? This is simply incoherent, unless you recognize that what he is actually describing is unresolved wrangling, not any sort of agreement between limited and general partners that charge these fees on this matter. He also said he would recommend against being in funds that have evergreen fees. But there was no evidence he had planned to be inquisitive about them before the question was asked.

You’ll notice that all of the answers treat the only outcome as having CalPERS, perhaps in concert with other investors, be more bloody-minded about evergreen and other dubious fees. You’ll notice no one said, “Yes, you should tell the SEC this stinks. You were duped. You should encourage the SEC to fine general partners who engaged in this practice and encourage the SEC to have those fees disgorged. That would to put an end to this. Better yet, tell the general partners you’ll do that if they don’t stop charging those fees and make restitution to you. That’s the fastest way to put a stop to this and get the most for your beneficiaries.” Two of the three respondents said CalPERS is in a position to play hardball, so why not take that point of view to its logical conclusion?

But this is what passes for best-of-breed due diligence and supervision in public pension land. Imagine what goes on at, say, a municipal pension fund.

Read the entire Naked Capitalism post, which features more analysis, here.

Surveys: Institutional Investors Disillusioned With Hedge Funds, But Warming To Real Estate And Infrastructure

Two separate surveys released in recent days suggest institutional investors might be growing weary of hedge funds and the associated fees and lack of transparency.

But the survey results also show that the same investors are becoming more enthused with infrastructure and real estate investments.

The dissatisfaction with hedge funds — and their fee structures — is much more pronounced in the U.S. than anywhere else. From the Boston Globe:

Hedge funds and private equity funds took a hit among US institutions and pension managers in a survey by Fidelity Investments released Monday.

The survey found that only 19 percent of American managers of pensions and other large funds believe the benefits of hedge funds and private equity funds are worth the fees they charge. That contrasted with Europe and Asia, where the vast majority — 72 percent and 91 percent, respectively — said the fees were fair.

The US responses appear to reflect growing dissatisfaction with the fees charged by hedge funds, in particular. Both hedge funds and private equity funds typically charge 2 percent upfront and keep 20 percent of the profits they generate for clients.

Derek Young, vice chairman of Pyramis Global Advisors , the institutional arm of Fidelity that conducted the survey, chalked up the US skepticism to a longer period of having worked with alternative investments.

“There’s an experience level in the US that’s significantly beyond the other regions of the world,’’ Young said.

A separate survey came to a similar conclusion. But it also indicated that, for institutional investors looking to invest in hedge funds, priorities are changing: returns are taking a back seat to lower fees, more transparency and the promise of diversification. From Chief Investment Officer:

Institutional investors are growing unsatisfied with hedge fund performance and are increasingly skeptical of the quality of future returns, according to a survey by UBS Fund Services and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).

The survey of investors overseeing a collective $1.9 trillion found that only 39% were satisfied with the performance of their hedge fund managers, and only a quarter of respondents said they expected a “satisfying level of performance” in the next 12-24 months.

[…]

The report claimed this showed a change in expectations of what hedge funds are chosen to achieve. Investors no longer expect double-digit returns, but instead are content to settle for lower fees, better transparency, and low correlations with other asset classes.

Mark Porter, head of UBS Fund Services, said: “With institutional money now accounting for 80% of the hedge fund industry, they will continue seeking greater transparency over how performance is achieved and how risks are managed, leading to increased due diligence requirements for alternative managers.”

Meanwhile, the USB survey also indicated investors are looking to increase their allocations to infrastructure and real estate investments. From Chief Investment Officer:

“Despite the challenges of devising investment structures that can effectively navigate the dynamic arena of alternative markets, asset managers should remain committed to infrastructure and real assets which could drive up total assets under management in these two asset classes,” the report said.

“This new generation of alternative investments is expected to address the increasing asset and liability constraints of institutional investors and satisfy their preeminent objective of a de-correlation to more traditional asset classes.”

The report noted that despite waning enthusiasm for hedge funds, allocations aren’t likely to change for the next few years.

But alternative investments on the whole, according to the report, are expected to double by 2020.

Chart: The Rise of Hedge Funds In Pension Portfolios

In recent years, hedge funds have solidified themselves as a big part of pension portfolios by two measures:

1) More pension funds than ever are investing in hedge funds

2) Those pensions are allocating more money towards hedge funds than ever before

That bears itself out in the above graphic, and this next one:

A recent Preqin report had this to say about the numbers:

“There are more US public pension funds than ever before allocating capital to hedge funds, and these investors are investing the most they ever have in the asset class. Public pension funds have increasingly recognized the value of hedge funds as part of a diversified portfolio, and although CalPERS’ withdrawal from the asset class will spark some investors to look more closely at their current allocation model, the importance of hedge funds as a source of risk-adjusted returns for these investors is likely to continue to prove attractive for US retirement schemes.

Preqin’s recent research highlights that investors are not using hedge funds to produce outsized returns, but instead to produce uncorrelated, risk-adjusted returns. Over short and longer time frames, hedge funds have in general met investor needs for risk-adjusted returns. However 2014 has been a period of relatively turbulent returns when looking at Preqin’s monthly benchmarks; in times like this, investor calls for changes in fee structures and better alignment of interests become more vocal, and this clearly has had an impact on CalPERS’ decision.”

Chart Credit: Preqin

New Jersey Blocks Public Release of Pension Pay-to-Play Investigation

In 2011, politician and businessman Charlie Baker made a $10,000 contribution to the New Jersey Republican State Committee. At the time, he was a partner at General Catalyst, a venture capital firm.

Months later, New Jersey’s pension system gave a contract to General Catalyst to manage the state’s pension money.

After the potential conflict of interest was uncovered by journalist David Sirota, New Jersey launched an investigation into the situation.

But the state is now refusing to release the findings of the investigation. From David Sirota:

Christie officials have denied an open records request for the findings of the investigation.

In a reply to International Business Times’ request for the findings of the audit under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, Christie’s Treasury Department said the request is being denied on the grounds that the documents in question are “consultative and deliberative material.” Despite officials’ assurances in May that the probe would take only weeks, the New Jersey Treasury said in September that the investigation is still “ongoing” — a designation the department says lets it stop the records from being released.

IBTimes is appealing the open-records denial to the state’s Government Records Council. Neither Baker nor Christie responded to requests for comment on the issue.

General Catalyst and Baker have denied that Baker had anything to do with persuading Christie officials to invest in the firm. To try to verify that assertion, IBTimes filed a separate request for any General Catalyst documents sent to the New Jersey Department of Treasury prior to its investment. Those documents would show whether General Catalyst specifically promoted Baker’s involvement in the firm when pitching its investment to New Jersey.

Christie officials are pushing back the due date to release those documents to Nov. 6 — two days after the election.

New Jersey has fallen into a habit recently of denying public records requests. From the International Business Times:

The denial letters to IBTimes come only weeks after the Associated Press documented a spike in the number of open records requests that have been rejected by Christie officials. Since 2012, Christie’s administration has paid out $441,000 in taxpayer funds to reimburse open-records plaintiffs who were unlawfully denied access to government records.

“Open records requests to the executive branch have become even more highly politicized than usual,” said Walter Leurs, president of the New Jersey Foundation for Open Government. “These documents are subject to the open records laws and they are supposed to be disclosed within seven days, so this is stonewalling. They know that any lawsuit challenging the denials wouldn’t be heard for 60 days — which is well after the election.”

Charlie Baker has denied he worked for General Catalyst when New Jersey decided to give the firm a contract. But the firm’s website listed him as a partner, and Baker himself called himself a partner in documentation related to his $10,000 contribution back in 2011.

Redacted Document Demonstrates Secrecy Surrounding Pension Funds and Private Equity Investments

The New York Times recently obtained a copy of a private equity limited partnership agreement from Carlyle Partners, and the document offers outsiders a rare peak into the opaque world of private equity investments.

[Document can be viewed at the bottom of this post, or by clicking here.]

The document is heavily, heavily redacted, but it’s important because it reveals just how few details are publicly available regarding the private equity investments of pension funds.

Many pension funds sign agreements just like this one – in fact, the list of pension funds that invest in Carlyle funds is long:

New York City Retirement Systems

CalPERS

CalSTRS

Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System

Florida State Board of Administration

Michigan Retirement Systems

Texas County & District Retirement System

New Mexico Public Employees Retirement System

Los Angeles County Employees’ Retirement Association

and many more.

Pension360 has previously covered how private equity firms encourage pension funds not to comply with FOIA or public records requests pertaining to private equity investments.

That sentiment is reflected in the Carlyle agreement, which pushes pension funds to resist public records requests if possible. From the New York Times:

Another blacked-out section in the Carlyle V agreement dictates how an investor, like a pension fund, also known as a limited partner, should respond to open-records requests about the fund. The clean version of the agreement strongly encourages fund investors to oppose such requests unless approved by the general partner.

Some pension funds have followed these instructions from private equity funds, even in states like Texas, which have sunshine laws that say “all government information is presumed to be available to the public.”

For an in-depth foray into the redacted elements of the agreement and its implications, head over to this Naked Capitalism post or the New York Times article.

[iframe src=”<p style=” margin: 12px auto 6px auto; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; -x-system-font: none; display: block;”> <a title=”View Carlylepartnersvlpa Redacted on Scribd” href=”https://www.scribd.com/doc/243705906/Carlylepartnersvlpa-Redacted” style=”text-decoration: underline;” >Carlylepartnersvlpa Redacted</a></p><iframe class=”scribd_iframe_embed” src=”https://www.scribd.com/embeds/243705906/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&show_recommendations=true” data-auto-height=”false” data-aspect-ratio=”undefined” scrolling=”no” id=”doc_43005″ width=”100%” height=”600″ frameborder=”0″></iframe>”]

Photo by Truthout.org via Flickr CC License

The Ten Pension Funds Getting Best Private Equity Returns

A new report from Bison and the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC) ranked the ten pension funds seeing the best private equity returns over the last decade.

[List can be seen above.]

CalPERS Reprimands Two Board Members for Campaign Finance Violation, Bashing CIO

Two CalPERS board members were punished yesterday; one for failing to disclose campaign finance documents and the other for publicly criticizing the fund’s chief investment officer.

One board member, J.J. Jelincic, was instructed to stop speaking to the press after he publicly criticized CalPERS’ new chief investment officer, Ted Eliopoulos. Writes the Sacramento Bee:

“He doesn’t have the temperament or the management skills,” Jelincic said in a Sept. 29 Pensions & Investments story about the hiring [of the fund’s new CIO].

And he didn’t stop there. Eliopolous played favorites with staff, Jelincic said, listened too much to outside consultants and made poor investment decisions.

CalPERS board President Rob Feckner called the comments “unfortunate and a breach of board governance policy of civility and courtesy as well as a breach of the CalPERS core values.” Jelincic was then instructed to stop talking to the media.

After the board meeting, Jelincic told the media:

“I’m not sure what the hell it meant other than they didn’t want me talking to the press.” As for the statements he made about Eliopoulos, he added: “It was a comment on a public action.”

The other reprimanded board member, Priya Mathur, was stripped of several leadership positions on Wednesday after repeatedly failing to disclose campaign finance disclosures. From the Sacramento Bee:

Priya Mathur, a board member since 2003, was removed as board vice president and chair of the CalPERS Pension and Health Benefits Committee. She also is out as vice chair of two committees: Board Governance and Performance, Compensation & Talent Management.

Mathur, who is facing a $4,000 fine from the state Fair Political Practices Commission, sat stoically as CalPERS board President Rob Feckner announced the punishment at a board meeting. She didn’t speak and wasn’t available for comment afterward.

[…]

The FPPC is fining Mathur for failing to file four campaign finance statements in connection with her recent successful bid for re-election to the CalPERS board.

She had no campaign funds to report, and Mathur has previously described the issue as a paperwork snafu. Nonetheless, “we still believe that rules are rules,” Feckner said.

Mathur has been fined $13,000 by the FPPC during her tenure as a board member. She failed to make necessary disclosures in 2002, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013.

Study: Has a 400 Percent Increase in Alternatives Paid Off For Pensions?

A newly-released study by CEM Benchmarking analyzes investment expenses and return data from 300 U.S. defined-benefit plans and attempts to answer the question: did the funds’ reallocation to alternatives pay off?

The simple answer: the study found that some alternative classes performed better than others, but underscored the point that “costs matter and allocations matter” over the long run.

In the chart at the top of this post, you can see the annualized return rates and fees (measured in basis points) of select asset classes from 1998-2011.

Some other highlights from the study:

– Listed equity REITs were the top-performing asset class overall in terms of net total returns over this period. Private equity had a higher gross return on average than listed REITs (13.31 percent vs 11.82 percent) but charged fees nearly five times higher on average than REITs (238.3 basis points or 2.38 percent of gross returns for private equity versus 51.6 basis points or 0.52 percent for REITs). As a result, listed equity REITs realized a net return of 11.31 percent vs. 11.10 percent for private equity. Net returns for other real assets, including commodities and infrastructure, were 9.85 percent on average. Net returns for private real estate were 7.61 percent, and hedge funds returned 4.77 percent. On a net basis, REITs also outperformed large cap stocks (6.06 percent) on average and U.S. long duration bonds (8.97 percent).

– Many plans could have improved performance by choosing different portfolio allocations. CEM used the information on realized net returns to estimate the marginal benefit that would have resulted from a one percentage point increase in allocation to the various asset classes. Increasing the allocations to long-duration fixed income, listed equity REITs and other real assets would have had the largest positive impacts on plan performance. For example, for a typical plan with $15 billion in assets under management, each one percentage point increase in allocations to listed equity REITs would have boosted total net returns by $180 million over the time period studied.

– Allocations changed considerably on average from 1998 through 2011. Of the DB plans analyzed by CEM, public pension plans reduced allocations to stocks by 8.5 percentage points and to bonds by 6.6 percentage points while increasing the allocation to alternative assets, including real estate, by 15.1 percentage points. Corporate plans reduced stock allocations by 19.1 percentage points while increasing allocations to fixed income by 10.5 percentage points (consistent with a shift to liability driven investment strategies), and to alternative assets by 8.6 percentage points. For the DB market as a whole, allocations to stocks decreased 15.1 percentage points; fixed income allocations increased by 4.3 percentage points; and allocations to alternatives increased by 10.8 percentage points. In dollar terms, total investment in alternatives for the 300 funds in the study increased from approximately $125 billion to nearly $600 billion over the study period.

The study’s author commented on his findings in a press release:

“Concern about the adequacy of pension funding has focused attention on investment performance and fees,” said Alexander D. Beath, PhD, author of the CEM study. “The data underscore that when it comes to long-term net returns, costs matter and allocations matter.”

[…]

“Many pension plans could have improved performance by choosing different allocation strategies and optimizing their management fees,” Beath continued. “Listed equity REITs delivered higher net total returns than any other alternative asset class for the fourteen-year period we analyzed, driven by high and stable dividend payouts, long-term capital appreciation and a significantly lower fee structure compared to private equity and private real estate funds.”

Read the study here.

Arkansas Teacher’s Fund Fires PIMCO, Withdraws $475 Million From Firm

PIMCO's Newport Beach Office — PIMCO’s Newport Beach Office

The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System is pulling its money out of PIMCO, the fund announced today. Its investments with PIMCO had totaled $475 million.